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Modern breech-loading rifles flooded into Arabia and
the region around the Persian Gulf between 1880 and World
War I. This work examines in detail, and analyzes, the
introduction of modern arms to Arabia, the origin of those
arms, the trade patterns by which they were moved, and the
international and local political factors that affected the
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trade.

The international arms trade was driven by three

major factors.

First, the rapid technological development

of small arms in the nineteenth century fed the market,
resulting in the availability of hundreds of thousands of
obsolete military rifles for resale.

Each time new rifles

were adopted by the armies of Europe, old stocks were dumped
on the private arms market.
Second, international politics and European colonial
rivalry contributed to the growth and maintenance of the
arms trade.

The French Consul at Muscat protected the trade

in the Persian Gulf, while French arms dealers commanded a
substantial portion of the trade.

British efforts to slow

the flow of arms through Muscat was hampered by European
politics.
Third, the internal politics of the region created a
demand for the modern arms.

Inside Arabia, the resurgent

Saudis fought Rashidis and Hashimites in a series of wars,
while other tribal raids and wars further built the demand
for modern rifles: if one group had modern weapons, its
enemies felt a need for them also.

Outside Arabia, a strong

demand for weapons in Persia and on the Northwest Frontier
of India helped" pull weapons to the markets of the Gulf.
This thesis deals first with the changing technology
of weapons in the nineteenth century, so that the military

3

impact of the new weapons can be understood.

The types of

modern rifles introduced to the Peninsula is then reviewed,
finding that the Peabody-Martini and the Martini-Henry, and
their numerous variations, were the weapons most commonly
imported in the decades around the turn of the century.
with this information as background, the international
politics of the arms trade are examined.

Emphasis is on the

Anglo-French rivalry at Muscat that gave treaty protection
to French arms dealers.

European fears that modern arms

would reach Africa and make colonial control of the
continent difficult or impossible led, in 1890, to the arms
control provisions of the General Act of Brussels. The Act
did not, however, extend to Arabia.
The heart of the work is a detailed examination and
analysis of the arms trade in and around Arabia. The arms
trade in the region was centered in two main entrepots,
Djibouti in French Somaliland and Muscat in southeast
Arabia. By the late l890s, the bulk of the trade was passing
through the Suez Canal before transshipment at one of these
ports.

Just over half of the arms reaching Muscat were

exported to Persia and the Northwest Frontier, with the
remainder reaching Arabia or Mesopotamia. The patterns of
the private arms trade were complex, both at sea and on
land, and are discussed at length.
The political use of weapons by the Ottoman
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Government, and by European states, contributed to the flood
of guns into Arabia. The Ottomans, in particular, used their
stocks of obsolete weapons to arm their client tribes in
Arabia. Ottoman purchases of Sniders, Martinis, and finally
Mausers, gave them a constant supply of older rifles for
distribution.

The arms trade in Arabia was controlled by

international and local political developments, and fed by
the availability of modern arms on the international
market.

The trade was complex and impossible to prevent so

long as the European states and the Ottomans continued to
sell or distribute obsolete rifles as new guns were
adopted.
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INTRODUCTION
A Snider Squibbed in the jungle 
Somebody laughed and fled,
And the men of the first Shikaris
Picked up their Subaltern dead,
with a big blue mark in his forehead
And the back blown out of his head. [1]
War, death and modern weapons swept through Arabia in
the opening years of the century, as they now sweep across
the plains of southern Mesopotamia. The great powers of the
world and of the region supported their allies, sought to
undercut their rivals or tried to block the perceived
advance of their enemy.

The trade in modern arms became the

focus of international contention, and a cause of wealth,
death and victory: it was at once the cause and the result
of international and regional conflicts.

This work examines

in detail, and analyzes, the introduction of modern arms to
Arabia, the origin of those arms, the trade patterns by
which they were moved, and the international and local
political factors that affected the trade.

Throughout most

of the period, Britain sought to protect her position in the
region, and the sea routes to India, while France sought to
undermine that position.
unique.

The arms trade in Arabia was not

Nations behaved then as they had for millennia, and
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as they do now.
Arms and national policy cannot be separated.

Writing

about a more recent period, George Thayer notes that the
increased availability of modern weapons following World War
II has been accompanied by an increased level in regional
violence.

He suggests that graphs of the availability of

arms and of the level of violence would match.

[2] To argue

whether arms or violence came first is to renew a chicken or
the egg argument.

What is clear is that both arms and a

desire for violence are, and must be, present at the same
time.

This was true for Arabia.
The change to modern arms in Arabia primarily involved

a shift from muzzle-loading muskets to single-shot
breech-loading rifles, followed by the introduction of still
more modern magazine-fed rifles.

The General Act of

Brussels in 1890 sought to prevent modern arms from entering
central Africa, and provided a working definition of those
weapons.

Article IX of the Act distinguished between the

old "flint-lock guns, with unrifled barrels, and common
gunpowder, known as trade powder"1 and modern "arms for
accurate firing, such as rifles, magazine guns, or
breech-loaders, whether whole or in detached pieces, their
cartridges, caps, or other ammunition intended for them."
[3] The increased firing speed, range and accuracy of the

rifled breech-loader made it far more dangerous than its
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predecessor.
Wyman Bury, a British official from Aden, pointed out
the danger to the Ottoman Government, and by extension to
the European colonial powers, of the modern arms he saw in
Yemen in 1914.
This covert traffic has gradually undermined the
pillars of Ottoman rule, ••• Now the population is
as well armed as the forces of government, far
more numerous, and, on their own ground, more
formidable, man for man. [4]
The pattern of the arms trade to Arabia is simply
traced.

In the 1880s, the international arms trade was

centered at Zanzibar, and was primarily aimed at Africa.
With the controls of the Brussels Act, the trade shifted
north to Muscat and fed into Persia, Afghanistan, and
Arabia. Much of the trade moved directly from Europe through
the recently opened Suez Canal to Djibouti or Muscat for
regional distribution.

At Djibouti and Muscat the arms were

purchased by local captains or transshipped by the European
firms based at those ports.

This pattern remained in place

until the turmoil of World War I. (Figure 1.)
The arms trade in Arabia was driven by three major
forces.

First, the volume of trade was made possible by the

rapid development of small arms in the nineteenth century.
European armies began introduction of breech-loaders in the
l840s: over the next sixty years, military rifles evolved
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more quickly than at any time in the history of firearms.
The armies of Europe and the Ottoman Empire adopted in quick
succession muzzle-loading rifles, single-shot black powder
breech-loading rifles, magazine-fed black powder rifles, and
finally smokeless powder magazine-fed rifles.

Each time new

rifles were adopted, old stocks of weapons were dumped on
the private international market.

There was a constant flow

of reliable, though obsolete, weapons into Arabia. An arms
trade would have existed without the rapid technological
changes, but those changes served as a pre-condition for the
size and importance of the trade that developed.
Second, the trade was driven by international and
colonial politics which often determined the course of the
arms trade, and encouraged its growth.

The political

disputes of Europe were of primary importance in the rapid
technological changes in the arms themselves, as a series of
wars swept across the continent.

These same rivalries

effected European colonial policy.

In particular, the

rivalry between Britain and France led to French protection
of the arms trade in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The
arms trade became, in part, a tactic used by the French to
undermine the British in the region.

It is important to

remember that Britain had more at stake in the region than
did France: anti-British activity in the Red Sea and Persian
Gulf threatened the sea lanes to India, while arms reaching
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the Northwest Frontier of India threatened the stability of
that important border.

And as Anglo-French rivalry ebbed

with the rise of Germany as a common threat, the French
allowed controls on the trade.
Third, the trade was driven by the internal politics
of Arabia and of the region in general, which created a
local demand for modern arms.

It must be remembered that

the market for arms in Afghanistan and on the Northwest
Frontier accounted for up to half of the arms entering the
region.

within Arabia, the resurgence of the Saudi state

under Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, and the wars he fought against
Rashidis and Hashimites created a constant demand for
weapons.

In addition, the raids and counter raids of many

smaller groups also required guns and ammunition.

And when

the enemy had modern rifles, if became a matter of survival
for a tribe to obtain the new guns themselves.
The internal Arabian demand for modern arms meshed
with the external European and American desire to dispose of
surplus arms: the need to buy modern rifles matched the need
to sell old rifles.

Taken together, the international and

the internal political rivalries were the most important
factors shaping and driving the arms trade in Arabia. The
British objected again and again to the arms trade, yet they
continued to sell surplus weapons to the international
market in Britain or South Africa, while fighting the arms
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market in Muscat. Samuel Cummings, founder of Interarms and
perhaps the largest private arms dealer in the world today,
has said: "In the final analysis, the morality of armaments
boils down to who makes the sale."

[5] Sam Cummings would

have been at home in the arms markets of Muscat or Djibouti.

NOTES

1. Kipling, R., "The Grave of the Hundred Head", in
"Departmental Ditties", page Ill, in Departmental Ditties
and Ballads and Barrack Room Ballads, New York, Doubleday,
Page & Company, 1920.
2. Thayer, G., The War Business, New York, Avon Books, 1969,
page 19.
3. Malloy, William M., Treaties, Conventions, International
ActS( Protocols and Agreements Between the United States of
Amerlca and Other Powers, 1776-1909, washington, Government
Printing Office, 1910, Volume II, Page 1971.
4. Bury, G.W., Arabia Infelix or the Turks in Yamen, London,
Macmillan and Company, Limited, 1915, pages 175-76.
5. Thayer, page 43.
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CHAPTER I
DEATH AND TECHNOLOGY
THE TRADITIONAL ARMS OF ARABIA
Before examining the arms trade itself, it is
necessary to review the traditional weapons present in
Arabia prior to the introduction of modern, breech-loading,
rifles.

This will lead directly to a review of the rapid

technological changes made in military rifles in the
nineteenth century.

These changes, and the resulting

availability of obsolete weapons on the international arms
market, helped drive the arms trade in Arabia. The arms
trade would clearly have existed without the rapid changes
then underway, but it would have operated on a much smaller
scale, and would have been very different.
In 1853, Richard Francis Burton disguised himself as a
Turk and traveled south from Egypt through the Hejaz to
Mecca and Medina. The book he wrote about his expedition
contains valuable descriptions of the traditional arms of
the Arabian Peninsula. Burton reported the local "sheikhs"
commonly carried a crooked dagger (the Jambiyah), a sword, a
short javelin, and a matchlock or a flintlock (called by
British sources a fire1ock).

A cartridge-case, powder
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flask, flint and steel, priming horn and other equipment
were carried on a bandoleer.

A pair of long-barreled,

flintlock pistols decorated with silver were also common.
[1]

Later, Burton repeated that matchlocks and flintlocks
were the major guns carried in the central Hejaz, adding
that double-barreled guns were rare.

All of the weapons

were imported into Arabia from Egypt, Syria, and Turkey.
Local gunsmiths could repair, but not make, the guns, which
were often kept for generations.

pistols had recently been

introduced to the Hejaz and were well liked, in part because
they came from Constantinople: a pair of flintlock pistols
was ten times higher in price than in England. [2]
Burton's trip to Arabia occurred just as the armies of
Europe were adopting breech-loading rifles as their major
service arms.

These first service breech-loaders were soon

replaced with still more modern rifles, and the old stocks
flowed onto the international market.

At the time of

Charles Doughty's travels near Hail during 1876-78 it
appears that the new rifles were present but still uncommon,
for the main weapons he mentions are old muzzle-loading
muskets or rifles.
special comment.

Any breech-loaders he saw elicited
In particular, he reported regarding

Mohammed ibn Rashid, that "The Prince Mohammed is pitiless
in battle, he shoots with an European rifle".

[3]
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By the start of the twentieth century, however, modern
guns had largely replaced the older weapons, at least for
combat, and the Martini-Henry (and its variants) had become
the most common modern rifle in Arabia. In a dispatch dated
July 10, 1907, united States Consul Magelssen at Baghdad
reported on the types of weapons carried by the bedouin
"Arabs in Turkish Arabia":
The Bedouins ••• are nearly all armed with
spear, sword and rifle, and some tribes carry
Martini-Henri rifles almost to a man. [4]
To understand the importance of the change first to
Martinis and later to magazine-fed rifles and to smokeless
powder, it is necessary to understand the changing
technology of weapons in the late nineteenth century.
THE INCREASED DEADLINESS OF MODERN WEAPONS
In Palestine in the decades after 1850, a number of
European observers reported that the battles for power
between the "leading families in the mountains north and
south of Jerusalem" were conducted with larger forces than
in the past, and that they led to a far greater level of
destruction.

(The situation was aggravated by the

withdrawal of Ottoman troops for the Crimean War.) [5] With
more and better weapons available, the deadliness of even
local clashes increased.

with reason, Lorimer blames the

arms trade for "intensifying anarchy and bloodshed in
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Central Arabia and in some of the smaller states· of the
Middle East. [6] The first great nineteenth century change
in small-arms technology had occurred decades before the
events discussed here.
The dominant infantry weapon of the Napoleonic Wars
was the smoothbore, muzzle-loading musket firing a round
lead ball.

The musket was fired through the use of a

flintlock mechanism.

In 1798-99, the discovery of fulminate

of silver and fulminate of mercury provided for the first
time an explosive that could be ignited by concussion.

By

1814, a percussion cap was developed for use in firearms.
The percussion cap was soon in use for both small-arms and
artillery.

[7] The new caps eliminated one of the major

uncertainties inherent in the old muskets.

The flintlocks

misfired "about every seventh shot," while the new
percussion caps misfired less than one time in two hundred.
[8 ]

Muskets were still inaccurate and slow, however.
British tests with a percussion musket in 1846 illustrate
the problem.

With the barrel elevated five degrees, the

weapons had a maximum range of only 650 yards.

At more

normal firing distances, they were still inaccurate.

Ten

shots were fired at targets eleven and a half feet by six
feet in size, at a range of 250 yards: all ten missed.

To

hit a target at 200 yards, the musket had to be aimed five
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and a half feet above it; while at 600 yards, the aiming
point was 130 feet over the target.

Black powder

muzzle-loading muskets had an effective combat range of 150
yards or less.

[9]

Accuracy could only be improved by greatly increasing
the amount of powder used, with the inevitable danger of the
gun bursting when fired; by rifling the barrel so that the
projectile spun, giving it greater stability in flight; or
by improving the powder.
available at the time.

Rifling was the best solution
But while rifling improved the

accuracy of firearms, it also made them slow to re-load, and
limited their use in combat.

To ensure that the lead balls

fit firmly into the grooves of the barrel, they had to be
slightly larger in diameter than the bore.

This required

that they be forced down the barrel, often with the help of
a mallet.

While irregular troops and skirmishers did' use

rifles, they were too slow for use on the line by regulars.
Between 1850 and 1860, most European armies introduced
various cylindro-conoidal bullets, for rifled
muzzle-loaders.

The most famous of these was the French

Minie, adopted in 1851. The British adopted their own
version with the Pritchett bullet used in the Pattern 1853
Enfield. [10] The caliber of the bullets used in the various
guns changed dramatically at the same time.

The British

musket used during the l840s had a caliber of .753:
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three-quarters of in inch in diameter.

The Minie fell to

.702, and the Pattern 1853 declined further to .577, nearly
a quarter of an inch smaller than the old musket bullets.
[11]

The new bullets solved two of the major problems of
the old muskets.

First, they were cylindrical, and had less

resistance in the air and greater stability in flight.
Second, to allow their easy use in rifles, they were
slightly smaller than the bore and thus slid easily down the
barrel.

To avoid loss of gas and pressure when fired and to

impart spin, however, the bullet still had to fit tightly
into the rifling of the barrel.

This was accomplished by

designing the projectile so that its rear expanded as the
powder exploded, wedging it tightly into the grooves of the
rifling.

The combined effect was dramatic, as noted by

Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, formerly director of a United
States Army study on the lethality of weapons:
The introduction of the rifle musket and its
conoidal bullet ••• was to have the greatest
immediate and measurable revolutionary impact on
war of any new weapon or technological development
of war before or since. When and if tactical
nuclear weapons appear on the battlefield,
presumably they will have an even greater effect.
But certainly not even the high-explosive shells,
airplanes, or tanks of the twentieth century were
to have effects of contemporary scale and
significance comparable to the rifled musket in
its early days.
The principal reason for this dramatic rise in
the lethality of small arms ••• was that with the
rifled musket every infantryman had a weapon with
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the same effective range as the largest and most
powerful cannon - in other words to the limit of
effective vision, or the crest of the next hill or
ridge. [12]
The increased range and accuracy of the new rifles had
the immediate effect of greatly augmenting the strength of a
defensive position and of infantry in general.

An

enemy

force could be fired upon, with good effect, over a much
greater distance than in the past.
The evolution of gunpowder complimented the
developments in rifle design.

The first major change came

in about 1860 with the principle of progressive combustion.
The black powder was compressed into higher-density pellets,
slowing the rate of its combustion and the building of
pressure from the expanding gas.

Older gunpowder created

high pressure through a sudden release of gas in the
weapon.

Progressive combustion led to a release of gas

throughout much of the bullet's passage down the barrel.
The result was higher muzzle velocities from lower maximum
breech pressure, and a flatter tr ajectory.

[13] Minor

additional improvements were made in black powder until it
was finally replaced by smokeless powder.
At about the time that the new rifled musket was
placed in service, developments occurred that would soon
allow the full introduction of breech-loaders.

The

percussion cap, powder, and bullet were combined into a
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single metallic cartridge.

The first service breech-loader

was the Prussian needle-gun (adopted in 1842). Other
European states soon followed Prussia's lead.

It appears,

for example, that the British began converting their stocks
of Enfield muskets into breech-loading Sniders within a year
or two of the Enfield's introduction.

By the late l870s,

the major armies of Europe were all armed with
breech-loaders using metallic cartridges, and having steel
barrels.

[14]

The Martini-Henry of 1871 became the most common rifle
in Arabia by the early years of this century.

It well

illustrates the late black powder breech-loaders.

The

British Martini-Henry fired a 480 grain, .45 caliber bullet,
with a muzzle velocity of 1,350 feet per second.

[15] Speed

and ease of re-loading were the major advantages of
breech-loaders over muzzle-loaders.

In Arabia, cavalry 

mounted on either camels or horses - was of far greater
importance than it was in Europe. And breech-loaders can be
easily re-loaded while mounted.
The next major development in rifle design came with
the wide introduction of magazine-fed breech-loaders.

These

took the improved ballistics of the new bullets and the
smooth loading of the metallic cartridges and greatly
increased the speed with which the rifles could be fired.
Most European rifles eventually followed the design of the
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German Mauser in the l890s. A number, including the
tube-magazine fed Mauser purchased by the Ottomans, were
developed for use with black powder.

The heavy fouling

caused by black powder, however, slowed the introduction of
new designs.

The first magazine-fed rifles had scarcely

been introduced into the armies of Europe before the French
invention of smokeless powder in 1886 made them obsolete.
Smokeless powder had several major advantages over
black powder.

It did not foul the gun as badly, it did not

give away the shooter's position or obscure his vision, and
it was slow-burning.

[16] The slow, progressive, combustion

of smokeless powder gave much higher muzzle velocities than
had been possible with black powder.

The difference becomes

clear when one considers the reaction between the projectile
and the explosive gasses in the gun barrel as the powder
burns.
Progressive combustion black powders burn at a fairly
steady rate, giving an even pressure that forces the bullet
out of the barrel: however, if the gun is long enough, the
projectile still begins to lose velocity before leaving the
barrel.

with the progressive explosion of smokeless

powders, the rate of combustion and the resulting gas
pressure builds throughout the explosion: as a result, the
projectile accelerates throughout its time in the barrel.
For projectiles with the same mass, the new powders provide
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a much higher muzzle velocity and resulting impact.

(The

formula is mass times velocity, squared.)
Changes brought by the powder are illustrated by
comparing three models of the Mauser. The single shot black
powder Model 1871; the tube magazine-fed Model 1887, the
last of the black powder Mausers; and the Model 1890, the
first of the smokeless powder Mausers. The last two were
both sold to the Ottomans. The Model 1871 fired a 660 grain
bullet of llmm. caliber at about 1,427 feet per second [17];
the black powder Model 1887 (Turkish) fired a 284 grain,
9.5mm caliber bullet with a muzzle velocity of about 1,758
feet per second [18]; while the smokeless powder Model 1890
(Turkish) fired a 154 grain bullet of 7.95mm. caliber with a
muzzle velocity of about 2,720 feet per second.

[19]

There was thus a near doubling in the muzzle velocity
between the 1871 and 1890 Models, with most of the
improvement coming from the introduction of smokeless
powder.

The contrast is even greater with the old

Martini-Henries: the British Service cartridge, as noted,
had a muzzle velocity of 1,350 feet per second, while the
Turkish version had a muzzle velocity of 1,380 feet per
second.

[20] When the Martini is compared with the Model

1890 Mauser's 2,720 fps, the improvement is dramatic.
The increased muzzle velocity of early single-shot
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breech-loaders over muzzle-loaders and then of black powder
over smokeless powder is vital.

While the smaller bullets

of the later guns had less wind resistance to hinder their
flight, the most important difference was their velocity.
Each round would fall the same distance per second (ignoring
wind resistance) after leaving the barrel of the rifle.
Thus, the higher the muzzle velocity, the further the round
would travel before striking the ground.

The flatter

trajectory permitted more accurate aiming over longer
distances.

A shot that would merely announce a man's

presence and fall short of his enemy with an older rifle
would kill with the newer.

Technology might well outpace an

actual intent to kill.
The second major change of tactical importance was in
the increased rate of fire of bolt-action magazine-fed
rifles compared with single-shot breech-loaders.

The

British found that troops using the Martini could fire
between eight and twelve aimed shots per minute [21], while
the new magazine rifles could fire up to 30 aimed shots in
the same time.

[22] The extra use of ammunition could be a

problem, as pointed out by al-Nuri in his conversation with
Musil (below, Chapter II), but the ability to shoot quickly
in battle could "be a matter of life or death.
The dates for the introduction of these changes can be
quickly listed for review: cylindro-conoidal bullets for
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rifled muzzle-loaders, c.1849-l860; breech-loading rifles,
c.1848-l87l; bolt operated magazine-fed rifles (especially
when combined with smokeless powder), c.1885-l895; smokeless
powder, c.1885-l890.

[23] The international market could

move obsolete weapons quickly.

For example, some older

breech-loaders reached Central Africa in about 1886, within
a year of their replacement in Europe. [241 Generally,
however, changes took a number of years to reach Arabia. The
delay seems to have shortened as the speed of technological
change increased

~nd

as European nations modernized their

own stocks in the years leading up to the First World War.
An additional factor that affected the use of the
weapons in Arabia, as elsewhere, was the reliability of
early breech-loading ammunition.

In early Martini-Henries,

for example, the base of the cartridge case was actually a
separate piece of metal.

(In the case of the British

Service Martini, a coiled brass or iron case was used,
before conversion to a solid brass case.

[25]) When the

rifle become hot, the fired shell could rip apart, forcing
use of a special extraction tool to dig out the casing
before the next shot.

[26] Sources for Arabia do not

mention the problem, and it may have been corrected before
the weapon reached the area.
The rapid changes made in the technology of infantry
rifles in Europe, and the resulting dumping of older guns on
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the world market, made the large scale introduction of
modern arms to Arabia possible.

It is, of course,

inevitable that modern weapons would have eventually reached
Arabia. But that eventuality could have represented a very
long time indeed had the major powers not been burdened with
enormous stocks of rifles that had became obsolete, and had
they chosen to destroy these rifles rather than sell them to
arms dealers.

But they did not destroy them, and

technological change helped drive the arms market in Arabia,
and elsewhere.
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CHAPTER II
THE SWEEP OF TECHNOLOGY
With a general understanding of the changing
technology of military rifles during the period as
background, the types of rifles actually found in Arabia can
now be examined.

This information will itself serve as

background for the later examination of the arms trade.
MODERN RIFLES IN ARABIA
By the first decade of this century, the Martini-Henry
was the most common modern rifle in Arabia. The 1907
dispatch by the United States Consul in Baghdad [1] reports
the prevalence of the Martini. At about the same time,
British officials in the Persian Gulf made a detailed study
of the tribes and weapons of the region.

(c. 1905-07) The

study was undertaken for the Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf,
then being prepared by J.G. Lorimer of the Indian Civil
Service. The results of their study are scattered throughout
Lorimer's work.

There was still a considerable variety of

guns in the region, some tribes being well armed, while
others had few breech-loaders and still carried flintlock
muskets.

[2] In general, however, the old flintlocks and

matchlocks were considered "entirely out of date", and it is
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the Martini that is cited again and again in Lorimer as the
standard modern rifle.

[3] By 1896, Martinis were used to

pay customs duty on arms imported into Bahrein. [4]
The several variations of the Martini, and their
different compound names, are easily confused.

All are

often referred to simply as Martinis. The two elements in a
compound rifle name refer to the type of breech operating
mechanism and to the barrel design.

The rifle eventually

called the Martini started as the peabody Rifle in the
United States. A Swiss designer, Martini, altered the breech
mechanism, creating the peabody-Martini sold to the Ottomans
in 1873. [5] The British then replaced the original barrel
with their own, called the Henry, yielding the
Martini-Henry. Martini rifles in Arabia could be either the
peabody-Martini or the Martini-Henry, with the sources
seldom distinguishing between the two designs.
Martinis are mentioned specifically for the Ajman
Tribe of Hasa and eastern Arabia, [6] the Sheikhdom of
Dubai, [7] the Muntafik Tribe of Iraq, [8] the Mutair Tribe
of central Arabia, [9] the towns of the Oman Sultanate, [10]
and Riyadh in Nejd. [11] In addition, un-named
breech-loaders are cited for Jabal Sammar and the region
around Hail. [12]
During 1905-06, .dispatches from the Military Attache
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of the British Embassy in Constantinople, Lieutenant Colonel
Maunsell, also note the presence of Martinis in Mesopotamia
[13] and with the Iraqi section of the Sammar Tribe. [14] As
early as 1905, however, the acting British Consul at Basra
reported that while the Muntafik Tribe carried Martinis,
some of the tribes allied to it were already armed with
Mausers. [15] The Martini was dominant, but still more
modern rifles were entering the arms trade in Arabia.
Observations made by travelers to Arabia in the years
before World War I further document the distribution and use
of modern rifles in different parts of the Peninsula. In
1912, the Dane Barclay Raunkiaer traveled from Kuwait to
Riyadh and then back to the coast of al-Hasa.

Raunkiaer's

trip broke his health, and he died shortly after returning
home.

The information he obtained at so high a personal

price is of great value.

He found that carbines were far

more popular than rifles, that the Martini-Henry carbine was
the weapon "most in use," and that it had "been known in
Arabia for over a generation."
and then."

Mausers were "met with now

Sheikh Mubarak of Kuwait, for example, had a

paid guard of about 150 men who were armed with
Martini-Henry and Mauser carbines.

[16] Raunkiaer believed

the major importation route for the Martinis was through
Muscat after shipment from Djibouti. He added a description
of the way in which the Martini-Henry was altered by the
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local Bedouin tribes:
No sooner has an Arab taken possession of such a
carbine than he sets about making alterations. As
a result it assumes a distinctly Arab character,
while at the same time it loses most of its value
as a firearm. First and formost the backsight 
an offense to the Arab's sense of beauty - is
knocked off, the foresight goes the same way, and
where the sights have been, strips of tin or brass
are bound round the barrel and kept polished.
After thus making short work of the means of
sighting, the Arab pursues the process of
embellishment by paring as much wood as ever he
can off the weapon, to make it lighter, and after
the stock has finally assumed its form, he studs
it with innumerable little nails with brass heads
disposed in various patterns. That done, the
formidable arm is put safely in the leathern
holster, which has its place on the camel saddle
behind the rider. [17]
Charles Doughty in the l880s had noticed the same
practice of cutting off the sights during his visit to Hail
when a local gun-smith handed him "an army rifle [from
India] whereupon I found the Tower mark; the sights - they
not understanding their use!

- had been taken away."

[18]

Raunkiaer's description is both reasonable and partly
confirmed, but in blaming aesthetics for the alterations he
was assuredly wrong.

Of the alterations he described, I

suggest that only the studs were primarily decorative.
others were practical.

The

The paring of excess wood from the

carbines would have not only reduced the weapon's weight,
but also would have shifted its balance point and made it
easier to handle while mounted.

The wrapping of the

carbines was a needed protection against sand and dirt, and
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was a method apparently used in most parts of the Peninsula.
The question of the sights is more difficult, but becomes
clear on analysis.
If a shooter is not trained, and trained well, to use
sights he will find them an obstruction.

The shooter must

break the old habit of sighting down the barrel, and learn
to concentrate on holding the proper sight picture on the
target.

This training requires a considerable use of

ammunition, and ammunition was generally in short supply in
Arabia. And without effective training, a quick conversation
to the use of sights would have been difficult and
expensive.

In addition, the sights of a military rifle are

easily knocked out of adjustment, and the regular use of
l'

ammunition is needed to readjust them.

As a final point, it

is important to remember that when firing at relatively
short ranges (up to about 200 yards) sights on a rifle are
only needed for target shooting.

Both men and animals are

large enough to be easily hit without precision sights.
Reporting on the northern parts of the Peninsula,
Alois Musil noted that for hunting the Ruwala used
muzzle-loading muskets and rifles with percussion caps or
flintlocks.

However:

For fighting, the Rwala have rifles of as-sam',
as-sehani and Mauser makes. Among the common
Bedouins before the World War the sam', an old
English military gun, was the most popular. A
genuine one cost 40 to 45 megidijjat ($36-$40.50)
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and was imported chiefly from Egypt, an imitation,
tuggarijje, which came from India, sold for 28 to
30 megidijjat ($25.20-$29). The sehani is a
Turkish military rifle, a Martini, the umm sunki
kind of sehani could be bought for 50-60
megidijjat ($36-$45). All modern rifles are called
Mausers by the Bedouins. Breechloaders are not
liked by the Rwala and the rifles fitted with
breechblocks, ummu-s-sba, are less sought after
than those without. The original Mausers,
especially the Mannlichers, cost 50-60 megidijjat
($45-$54), the imitations, tuggari, were sold for
as much as 20 megidijjat ($18) less. • •• In the
camp of every tribe an expert mechanic may be
found, who can repair guns and manufacture
cartridges. [19)
It is likely that economics had much to do with the
preference for muzzle-loaders for hunting.

Ammunition for

the modern guns was both expensive and in short supply,
while a flintlock could have been fired again and again for
little cost.

And while percussion caps would have had to be

imported, their cost would have been much lower than the
cost of brass ammunition.

In addition, over the average

distances involved in hunting (about 200 yards) a well made
and smoothed lead ball is sufficiently accurate.

[20)

During hunting, reloading and firing speed is seldom vital,
while during combat it can become a matter of survival.
It immediately seems apparent that Musil was either
not an expert on the military weapons he discussed, or he
chose not to report accurately on these weapons.

He refers

to the Austrian Mannlicher as a sub-type of the German
Mauser, while it was in fact a different weapon.

The

mistake is odd, for Musil traveled with Herr Thomasberger of
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Austrian Military Intelligence on some of his expeditions,
[21] and used weapons himself throughout his travels.

When

he states that the Ruwala preferred breech-loaders without
breechblocks, he appears to refer to a developing preference
for the newer magazine-fed rifles over the Martinis and
Sniders. As this would have meant a change from black-powder
to smokeless powder, the superiority of the cartridge may
have been a more important factor than the rifle's action.
Direct evidence that the Ruwala did not object to
breech-loaders is provided in another of Musil's works where
he reported a conversation with a prince of the Ruwala
shortly after the start of World War I. The prince said that
the best modern weapons were made by the "Alman" (Germans),
and the next best by the "Namsa" (Austrians). [22] The
German guns would have been Mausers, and the Austrian guns
Mannlichers: both were magazine-fed breech-loaders.

The

advantage of smokeless powder and the problems of scarce
ammunition, in addition to the difficulty of changing old
shooting habits are illustrated by Musil's story of a
meeting near Damascus with Sheikh al-Nuri of the Ruwala in
November, 1908:
An-Nuri showed me a Mannlicher carbine of the
1898 Model which I had given him. Being used to
the Martini rifle, he could not accustom himself
to the Mannlicher lock and had had it changed to
the Martini type. This pleased him beyond measure
and made him boast that his carbine carried much
farther and better than the Martini. To my mild
reproof that he could have loaded the original
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Mannlicher with five cartridges, while now he had
to be satisfied with only one, he replied that at
least he would not have to waste so much
ammunition as before. [23]
The identity of the "old English military gun," the
sam', is unclear.

Because he recognized the Turkish service

peabody-Martini, it seems very likely that Musil would have
identified the British service version of the Martini as
well, had it been the gun in question.

It also seems

unlikely that he would have identified any of the
magazine-fed Enfields that succeeded the Martini in British
service as being "old." Thus, the best candidate for the
sam' is the Snider breech-loading conversion of the old
Enfield muzzle-loading musket.

As this weapon was the

standard service rifle of the Ottomans and the British
before the Martini-Henry, it would have been easily
available through Turkish sources, or from surplus European
stocks.
The availability of arms in south western Arabia was
affected by a number of factors, including Government of
India regulations.

Wyman Bury suggested, in 1911, that in

outfitting an expedition to the interior of Aden and Yemen,
the traveler should arm his men with breech-loading
carbines,.with a simple breech design and using "high
velocity smokeless powder."

He then noted that the .303

Martini-Medford (I believe this to be a version of the
British service Martini-Henry modified to take the newer
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Enfield cartridge) would have been a good choice, but that
Government of India regulations banned use of that caliber.
The same regulations banned the ammunition for the "Snyder"
(Snider) and the Martini-Henry. Bury ended by suggesting
that the Mauser .350 saddle-carbine answered "all
requirements."

[24]

In early 1914, Bury discussed the lack of military
protection for Sana, Yemen, in the absence of Turkish
troops: "modern commercial enterprise has armed the remotest
tribesmen with modern weapons.

• •• There the city stands in

her isolation and arrogance like a fat heifer among

w~lves,

" [25] Even the local Arab gendarmerie, the zaptieh, were
at a disadvantage.

They served beside Turkish regular

infantry, and were also responsible for most Ottoman
dealings with the Yemani population.

However, they were

armed with an early pattern Mauser using black powder
cartridges fed from a tubular magazine under the barrel.
The smoke from the black powder was "a serious drawback in
mountain warfare."

[26] The Mausers observed by Bury were

likely part of the shipment of black powder Model 1887
Mausers ordered by Turkey in that year, and discussed in
Chapter VII.
The irregular troops in Yemen were not alone in their
use of the old Mausers, however.
Pasha's 1911 campaign included

Bury reports that Izzet

~urkish

troops of "several
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European battalions" armed with "modern Mausers, burning
smokeless powder."

However:

They have returned with their rifles, and all
ammunition of that caliber has been shipped back
to Europe or Asia Minor. Yamen is garrisoned with
Asiatic battalions, armed with the same weapon as
the Zaptieh, and the one or two European
battalions that are still left there are similarly
armed. [27]
Thus by 1914, on the eve of World War I, Turkish
provincial forces were still using the old-model Mausers.
CHANGES DURING WORLD WAR I
The situation regarding tribal arms changed with the
great influx of arms during World War I, particularly in the
area near Mesopotamia. In 1915, British troops at Basra were
fired on nightly by Arab irregulars fighting for the
Ottomans. A variety of rifles were in use, and they could be
identified easily by their sound.

"Heavy Martini bullets

droned, Mausers fizzed, and individuals were sometimes
recognized by the noise made by their particular weapons,
" The irregulars took advantage of breaks in the fighting
to strip the battlefield of rifles dropped by the dead and
wounded.

[281

By the end of World War I magazine fed modern rifles
appear to have largely replaced the older weapons.

Bertram

Thomas reported on the tribes of Northern Arabia and Iraq
following the war, stating that they "re-armed themselves
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with modern rifles of which the gleanings of the
battle-fields had provided a bounteous harvest."

Sir Arnold

Wilson analyzed the results of the World War I arms glut in
central Iraq in 1917, for both farmers and bedouin:
••• the population as a whole had contrived to
provide itself with modern weapons and abundance
of ammunition, to such effect that the price of a
Mauser or Lee-Enfield, which before the War stood
at £ 20 or £ 25, had dropped to £ 5 or less.
British and Turkish rifles had been picked up on
fields of battle or stolen on the lines of
communication in thousands; ammunition had been
accumulated on a scale hitherto undreamt of.
In one British camp over seventy boxes of 1,000
rounds each were dug up and stolen from under the
noses of the sentries. Every narrative of the
period testifies to the ingenuity displayed in
these predatory activities and the nervous
irritation they caused. • •• the only action
taken, at the instance of the military authorities
and at their expense, was to purchase rifles and
ammunition from any tribesman who would sell.
More than half a million rounds, several hundred
good rifles and as many useless ones were thus
purchased, but the measure did more harm than
good. Prices did not rise in the open market.
The rifles and ammunition freely issued to our
Allies on the Syrian side, together with captured
Turkish arms, soon filled the gap, and the money
we paid went to purchase more and better rifles.
[29]
The inundation of Arabia with modern arms during the
Great War - and the battles fought around the northern edges
of the Peninsula by the combatants - were the sharpest
examples of international politics effecting the region
during this period.

But World War I was only the final of a

series of international events to influence the arms trade
in Arabia. Technological change was the first leg driving
the arms trade, European colonial rivalry was the second.
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CHAPTER III
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE ARMS TRADE
THE GENERAL ACT OF BRUSSELS
The rapid changes in technology have been reviewed as
a precondition for the arms trade as it developed in Arabia.
The international political rivalries that shaped and
directed the course of the trade can now be studied.
The arms trade in Arabia was influenced by, and often
contrO.lled by, international political considerations not
directly related to the region.

This influence was felt in

three major ways: first, the wars "and rivalries of Europe
drove the evolution of weapons, and thus helped create the
vast stock of surplus rifles dumped on the world market; and
second, general colonial rivalry in Africa led to controls
on the arms trade there and the shift of the trade north;
and third, the rivalry between Britain and France protected,
and in fact encouraged, the arms merchants and hindered
British efforts at control.
Between l849'and 1871 two new, unified, states rose to
influence in Europe while a series of major internal wars
shifted and re-shifted the balance of power.

The increasing
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power of Italy and Germany and the relative decline of
Austria and France coincided with a desire by the two new
states to gain overseas colonies.

During the l870s and

l880s, Germany and Italy sought to catch up in the race for
colonies while France recovered from its defeat in the
Franco-Prussian War. Britain, at first, stayed on the
outside watching, then began to participate in Europe's
series of shifting alliances.

During the Berlin Congress in

1878, Britain resumed a strong role in European politics,
gaining a better position in the Middle East at the expense
of Russia. [1] Despite France's defeat in 1870-71, the
alliances formed during the l880s were primarily directed
against France or Russia by Germany, Austria and Italy.
The shifting of alliances continued until the final
changes at the start of World War I. The various alliances
had a constant effect on events in and near Arabia, and on
the arms trade.

Colonial rivalry, in particular, was soon

seen as a threat to the peace of Europe itself, and the
European powers began seeking ways to control their
competition.
Two important agreements on Africa preceded the
Brussels Conference and helped settle the colonial situation
on the East Coast of Africa, thus easing Anglo-German
tensions.

In 1886 Britain and Germany signed an agreement

stating that both recognized the

It

sovereignty of the Sul tan
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of Zanzibar over the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba ••• as
well as over the Islands of Lamu and Mafia" and over a strip
of the African coast opposite the islands.

In addition, the

agreement set the boundaries of the German and British areas
of influence in East Africa. [2] The 1886 Agreement favored
Germany, in that Britain agreed to Germany's area of
influence in East Africa. A second Agreement four years
later favored Britain, for Germany approved Britain's
declaration of a Protectorate over Zanzibar and yielded
parts of various African areas of' influence to Britain. [3]
The new Zanzibar Protectorate (1890) put Britain in a
stronger position to attack the southern link in the slave
trade and the related arms trade.
More than bilateral action was needed, however.

In

August, 1889 King Leopold of Belgium, on the suggestion of
Britain, invited seventeen states to a conference at
Brussels to discuss the African slave and arms trades.

Many

of the nations receiving invitations were uncertain of
British motives in requesting the conference, and of whether
they should attend.

The French feared that the conference

was a British attempt to isolate France, while the United
States wanted to do nothing to help the colonial powers.
Other states had a variety of concerns, but in the end the
conference convened, and after much work produced the
General Act of Brussels for the Repression of the African
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Slave Trade. The Act included a lengthy section designed to
control the arms trade in much of Africa. [4] As discussed
below, the arms provisions of the Act helped force a
northward shift in the arms trade from Africa to the lands
around Arabia. Arab vessels that carried slaves from Africa
to the markets of the Peninsula often also shipped guns.
The linking of the slave trade and the arms trade by
the Brussels Act was symptomatic of a growing problem for
the colonial powers in the l880s; the peoples they wished to
control were obtaining

mode~n

weapons that threatened to

make their resistance more effective than it had been.
British Consul-General Euan-Smith at Zanzibar stated the
dangers in June, 1888 dispatch to the Foreign Office:
The great question is that regarding the import
of arms and ammunition into East Africa. This
trade has now assumed proportions of which your
Lordship may possibly be unaware. Formerly the
arms so imported were cheap and worthless weapons
manufactured to last for a maximum period of some
two or three years and after that time becoming
useless and worn out. Now, however, arms of
precision and breech-loading rifles and ammunition
are being imported in very large quantities and
are rapidly taking the place of the flintlock and
muzzle-loading cheap muskets. • ••, Unless some
steps are taken to check this immense import of
arms into East Africa the development and
pacification of this great continent will have to
be carried out in the face of an enormous
population, the majority of whom will probably be
armed with first-class breech-loading rifles. [5]
The major goal of the Brussels Convention may, in
'fact, have been to prevent modern arms from reaching central
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Africa, and not suppression of the slave trade.

[6] There

was apparently a direct link between the slave and arms
trades.

While White believed that the act was aimed

primarily at the slave trade, she noted that the slavers
were generally armed with guns and were -the backbone of
resistance to white penetration."

[7] This linkage extended

to many of the slave and arms traders active in the seas
around Arabia.
Regardless of the balance of motives behind the
Conference, the General Act of Brussels established two
different maritime control zones, one for control of the
slave trade, and one for control of the arms trade.
2 shows both zones.

Figure

The signers of the Act asserted high

moral goals for their control of the arms trade, while
implicitly admitting the fear of armed "natives" that
apparently motivated their agreement.
In regard to the arms trade, the General Act of
Brussels provided, in part:
ARTICLE VIII
The experience of all nations that have
intercourse with Africa having shown the
pernicious and preponderating part played by
fire-arms in operations connected with the
slave-trade as well as internal wars between
native tribes; and this same experience having
clearly proved that the preservation of the
African population whose existence it is the
express wish of the powers to protect, is a
radical impossibility, if measures restricting the
trade in fire-arms and ammunition are not adopted,
the powers decide, so far as the present state of
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their frontiers permits, that the importation of
fire-arms, and especially of rifles and improved
weapons, as well as of powder, ball and
cartridges, is, except in the cases and under the
conditions provided for in the following Article,
prohibited •••
(The Act ordered the establishment of
governmental warehouses in the African colonies of
the signers, and required that arms only be
removed from the warehouses for the use of
~olonial governments, authorized European
travelers, or persons working for Europeans.
Article IX then specified which weapons were to be
controlled and which could still be sold to the
natives.)
ARTICLE IX
••• authorization shall ••• be refused for the
withdrawal (from the government warehouses) of all
arms for accurate firing, such as rifles, magazine
guns, or breech-loaders, whether whole or in
detached pieces, their cartridges, caps, or other
ammunition intended for them. • ••
The above rule as to warehousing shall also
apply to gunpowder.
Only flint-lock guns, with unrifled barrels, and
common gunpowder known as trade powder, may be
withdrawn from warehouses for sale. • •• [8]
Most of the signers of the General Act ratified it
without trouble.

[9] The French Chamber of Deputies,

however, refused to agree to the Articles allowing for the
visit, search and detention of merchant vessels at sea by
the warships of the other signers.

(Articles XXI-XXIII and

XLII-LXI) France had never allowed foreign warships to
search vessels flying the French flag, and would not do so
now.

French honor would not be sacrificed.

would the British give up the enforcement

But neither

clau~es

that they
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considered vital.

To save the treaty, an unusual compromise

was reached: France was allowed to exclude the offending
passages from its ratification, while the other signers
approved the entire treaty.

[10]

As a result the French were in a position to avoid any
real regulation on the use of their flag, and they freely
issued it to native craft engaged in both the slave and arms
trades from Omani ports.

This protection for the arms trade

became vital and was to bedevil the British until the eve of
World War I.
USE OF THE FRENCH FLAG TO PROTECT THE ARMS TRADE
International Law allowed a state to authorize use of
its flag by any vessel, and under any circumstances, that it
chose.

Throughout the period this right was fully accepted

by both Britain and France in regard to any persons who were
residents in any of their formal colonies or protectorates.
The acceptance of this principle is clear from the comment
by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague in the
Muscat Dhows Case that:
••• generally speaking it belongs to every
sovereign to decide to whom he will accord the
right to fly his flag and to prescribe the rules
governing such grants... [11]
The General Act of Brussels, however, modified this
right for its signers, and its modification became critical
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to efforts to control the arms trade.

Early disputes over

flag rights in the region were generally related to the use
of the French flag to protect the slave trade, and the
earlier process by which native craft gained this protection
is important.
Traditionally the sailors of the region used the red
Turkish flag, making it difficult to determine the exact
origin of a vessel.

As late as 1900, the traditional flag

was still in general use in the Persian Gulf, and was viewed
as the proper flag by the Arab sailors of both Oman and
Kuwait. It was not until after the turn of the century that
distinct local flags were put into service.

[12] In the

1847, however, a decree by the Ottoman Sultan prohibited
Turkish vessels from engaging in the slave trade, and the
British Navy was allowed to search suspected Turkish ships.
[13] During the l840s most of the Gulf rulers had signed
agreements allowing the Royal Navy to act against the slave
trade.
Additional local agreements followed.

In reaction,

Arab sailors began "to conceal their operations by use of
the French flag, which secured them against search by
British vessels".

[14] For a number of reasons, the arms

trade began to build strongly after 1883, and by 1891, use
of the French flag had:
••• become somewhat cQmmon among the subjects of
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the Sultan of Oman. In 1892 the practice appeared
likely to be extended to the vessels of Trucial
Oman, and in the same year slave cargoes began to
reach Basrah under French colours.
Lorimer carefully added a caveat regarding the
involvement of the French Government at this time:
It should be mentioned, however, in extenuation
of the responsibility of the French Government,
that use of their flag by slave traders was often
unauthorized and fraudulent. [15]
Use of the French flag by slavers and arms traders
along the east coast of Africa was little more than an
irritant to the British. The real crisis developed when the
French Consul in Muscat began to distribute French papers to
local Arabs. This

pra~tice

was to severly limit the ability

of the British to strike at the arms trade.
TREATY PROTECTION FOR THE ARMS TRADE AT MUSCAT
International Law assumed that all states were
sovereign and independent, but unless there were political
or military factors involved, the colonial powers did not
extend this doctrine to the nations and peoples they wished
to control.

By the l890s, the British were in effective

control of most of the Gulf littoral, or were in a position
to extend their control
European power.

witho~t

interference from any other

However, European politics created in the

mid-nineteenth century in Oman a shield that maintained the
technical independence of the Sultanate, and protected the
arms tr ade.
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Britain and France began to take an interest in Oman
late in the eighteenth century when the Sultan at Muscat
ruled both Oman and Zanzibar, commanding much of the
internal shipping of the Indian Ocean region.

British

interest, in particular, rose and fell in accord with the
shifts of European politics and French activity in the
area.
Muscat remained neutral during the Anglo-French War in
1793. But it was a neutrality of trade.

In 1796 the British

feared that Sultan ibn Ahmed had leaned toward the French,
following reports that Muscati vessels carried information
on British shipping to the French colony of lIe de France
(Mauritius), and that Frenchmen were "frequently passing
through Muscat" to Persia and the Levant. Also, Muscati
merchants were "doing a thriving business" trading British
goods captured by the French and were running the British
blockade of the Mascarenes Islands. The Governor of Bombay
sent an officer to Muscat to investigate.

[16]

By an Agreement signed in 1789, the Sultan promised
not to give the French or the Dutch a trading or military
base within his territory "whilst warfare shall continue
between the English Company and them" [17] A further
agreement in 1800 called for an East India Company Agent to
be stationed at Muscat.
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Notwithstanding these agreements, throughout the
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, French privateers from
lIe de France used Muscat as a base for shelter and supplies
while attacking British shipping in the Indian Ocean. Goods
captured by the French were sold to Muscati merchants, and
both the merchants and the Sultan regularly purchased
captured English ships and goods at Port Louis. Captured
ships were re-sold throughout the Gulf and even at Calcutta.
[18]
Seyyid Said bin Sultan began his rule in 1806, and was
faced with a renewal of the Anglo-French war.
French option open.

Said kept his

He maintained the long-standing trade

with Port Louis, and in 1807, concluded an agreement with
the French Governor of lIe de France allowing for a French
commercial agent at Muscat. [19]
Both during and after the war, Said's policy was based
on his desire to remain independent.

While he saw the

British as his protectors, both in the Gulf and in East
Africa, [20] he did not cut himself off from the French. In
1817 a French merchant from Bourbon visited Muscat and
sought to revive the old lIe de France-Muscat trade.

Said

accepted the idea, and trade was soon underway, [21]
sanctioned by·a commercial treaty with the Governor of
Bourbon that gave most-favored-nation rights to both
parties.

[22] Said was thus able to use France's recovery
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from defeat, and her renewed interest in trade and colonies,
as a counter to British influence.
Throughout the remainder of the century, British
policy in the region was often based on fear.

When the

Egyptians were in control of central Arabia and the Trucial
Coast, the British feared an expansion of Egypt's power,
believing that France was behind Mahomet Ali's expansion.
Later, they feared direct French action against the routes
to India. Lord palmerston, following in pitt's tradition,
stated the danger: "the mistress of India cannot permit
France to be mistress directly or indirectly of the road to
her Indian dominions."

[23] Whether the danger came

directly at sea, or indirectly through arms reaching the
Northwest Frontier, the need to protect India largely
determined the British reaction to the arms trade.
Britain and France were not the only powers involved
in the Indian Ocean, however, for the united States had a
growing role in world trade.

While The United States had no

colonial ambitions in the Middle East, her commercial
activity led to the signing of a treaty with Muscat in 1833
that undercut any possible legal monopoly by the two
European states.

This agreement was Muscat's first treaty

directly with a Western state, [24] as the earlier
agreements had been signed with British and French colonial
officials.

A similar commercial treaty was not signed with
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Britain until 1839 and with France in 1844. [25] The Treaty
allowed the United States to send a consul to Muscat, and
established the rules for future relations.

It is of

particular importance that the Treaty was requested not by
the United states, but by Said. [26]
It is probable, given Said's desire to balance British
and French influence, that he sought relations with the
United States as a counter to. both European powers.

And if

this was his goal, he was successful, for this Treaty helped
insure Oman a legal status not available to the other states
of the Gulf.
The next

importan~

step in securing international

protection for Oman's legal independence was a commercial
treaty with France, sigried on November 17, 1844, by Captain
Romain-Desfosses and Said. It was similar to a treaty signed
with the British in 1839 granting commercial and
extraterritorial rights.

The Treaty granted trading and

consular rights in Oman that France later used to protect
the arms trade.

These included the right to "purchase, sell

or rent land, houses or warehouses" in the Sultan of
Muscat's territory.

Any "premises occupied by the French,

or by persons in their service" was protected by the Treaty
and could not be "forcibly entered without the permission of
the French Consul." [27] In addition:
ART. 4. The subjects of

the Sultan of
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Maskat, actually in the service of the French,
shall enjoy the same privileges which are granted
to the French themselves; but ••• (convicted
criminals lost such protection) •••
ART. 5. The two ••• parties acknowledge
reciprocally the right of appointing Consuls to
reside in each other's dominions, ••• and such
Consuls shall at all times be placed on the
footing of 'the Consuls of the most favored
nations. • •• The French Consul shall be at
liberty to hoist the French flag over his house.
[28]
Said was able to maintain his independence fairly well
until his death in 1856. Unfortunately for the unity of his
state, his sons Thwaini and Majid each claimed the entire
succession.

The British were not willing to allow a civil

war to be fought between Muscat and Zanzibar across the
Indian Ocean, and they moved to prevent the fight from
developing.
The rivals for the throne agreed to arbitration by the
British India Government, and in 1861 Lord Canning, Viceroy
of India, issued his Award. The Omani empire was partitioned
into a rich African section ruled from Zanzibar, and the
poor Arabian/Persian section ruled from Muscat. [29]
The Canning Award called for an annual payment of
40,000 Maria Theresa Talers ($MT, equal to £8,500) by the
newly created Sultan of Zanzibar to the Sultan of Muscat, to
compensate for his loss of income from the African sections
of the combined state.

The payment was "not to be

understood as a recognition of the dependence of Zanzibar
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upon Muscat." In exchange for the money, the Sultan of
Muscat abandoned "all claims upon Zanzibar." [30]
The effect of the Award on Oman was to be dramatic.
The British had influenced the internal politics of the
Sultanate during Said's reign, but not decisively.

[31]

Following the Award, Britain was drawn deeply into the
affairs of Oman, for after 1866, she assumed responsibility
for payment of the money.

The Award became vital to any

pretender, both economically and politically.

British

payment of the subsidy to a claimant served as recognition
of his position, and no sultan held power long when it was
withheld.

British support kept unpopular Sultans in power,

while the lack of British support led to the fall of popular
rulers.

[32]

The Canning Award soon became an issue between Britain
and France, for under France's 1844 Treaty with Oman, her
legal rights in the Sultanate were equal to those of
Britain. In 1860, French interest in obtaining a large
building for their use in Zanzibar aroused British concern.
The British Ambassador to France told the French that
Britain would agree to no limit on Zanzibar's independence
or to a foreign power gaining territory there.

The conflict

between supporting Zanzibar's independence while limiting
that country's right to sell land certainly escaped both the
British and the French.
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The French Foreign Minister, M. Thouvenel, said France
had no such interests and agreed to a document, signed March
10, 1862 by which both nations guaranteed that neither would
seek territory from Muscat or Zanzibar. [33] The Agreement
implicitly accepted the Canning Award. It' was short but
vital to the future independence of Oman, with the British
and French stating that:
••• taking into consideration the importance of
maintaining the independence of His Highness the
Sultan of Muscat and of His Highness the Sultan of
Zanzibar, have thought it right to engage
reciprocally to respect the independence of these
Sovereigns. [34]
In one of the stranger twists that occurred between
British officials in London and India, the Government of
India was not told of the agreement until 1890, after it
suggested a British Protectorate over Oman. The Agreement
prevented a full protectorate, and thus saved Oman from a
direct take-over by the British. It also served in part as
the basis for France's involvement in Oman at the end of the
Century. [35] Because of French treaty rights in Muscat,
Britain's influence in the Gulf did not go unchallenged.
EUROPEAN RIVALRY AND THE FRENCH FLAG
The shifting of European alliances and the settlement
of African colonial matters had, by 1890, led to a
rapprochement between Britain and Germany. This in turn,

54

strengthened the alliance between Russia and France.
Russia's primary concern was British action, mainly in the
Middle East, while France was chiefly worried about Germany.
France, however, was engaged in colonial rivalry with
Britain, and a Franco-Russian agreement was reached in
August, 1891. [36] As a part of the general entente, France
and Russia decided to act together to limit British power in
the Gulf. Both sent warships to visit Muscat. [37]
The French tried three inter-related approaches to
disrupt British influence in Oman and the Gulf. First, they
tried to gain a coaling station in Muscat; second, they
issued the French flag to Omani vessels, knowing that it
would be used to protect the slave and arms trades; and
third, they supported and encouraged the arms trade through
Djibouti and Muscat. They supported these attacks on British
influence with anti-British propaganda, printed in Arabic
and distributed throughout the Gulf. [38] The major facts of
the flag dispute are simply stated.
Around the time of the 1891 Franco-Russian agreement,
French consuls at Aden, Obock, and Zanzibar began giving
French sailing papers and flags to Omanis (mainly from Sur) •
J

The action was connected to the colonial and imperial
faction in the French Chamber of Deputies, and in 1892 a
member of ,that group, M. Deloncle, demanded the appointment
of a French consul at Muscat "to keep a register of French
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protected subjects."

Deloncle believed that a strong French

position in the Gulf would allow cooperation with Russia,
and would encourage a possible Franco-Russian alliance.
[39]
The Foreign Ministry agreed, and in 1894 the new
French Consul arrived in Muscat. Paul Ottavi was to serve in
the Gulf until 1902, when he was transferred to the Zanzibar
consulate.

Kumar describes Ottavi as "an accomplished

diplomat with a flair for intrigue", then adds: "Against him
the Government of India pitted a series of officers whose
diplomatic experience was limited to the congenial task of
twisting the tails of the princes of India." [40] Ottavi
soon began to issue French sailing papers and the French
flag to Omani dhows.
Sultan Faisal ibn Turki was at first afraid that the
French would try to establish a protectorate over the Omanis
to whom they had issued sailing papers, and that they might
try to detach Sur from the Sultanate. In early 1895,
however, Faisal was faced with a rebellion by conservative
Ibadi forces wanting to re-unite Oman and Zanzibar. The
rebels seized Muscat and forced Faisal into a harbor fort.
He asked the British for aid, and was refused on grounds
that British policy was neutrality, unless Indian interests
were involved.

Faisal appeased his enemies, but did not

forget Britain's refusal to come to his aid.

Kumar states

S6

that there is no direct evidence revealing Ottavi's role in
the 1895 rebellion, but believes that the French Consul
offered the Sultan military aid.

Soon after Faisal's

appeasement of the rebels, and their departure from Muscat,
a French warship arrived.

[41]

Landen, citing French diplomatic papers, provides more
information on these important events:
••• Ottavi offered to help the Sultan ward off
Masqat's attackers and had the gunboat TROUDE sent
to the city. TROUDE arrived too late to actively
support the sultan but the incident indicated
France's good will, as well as the power at her
disposal and ushered in a four-year period of
French ascendancy in the court of Sultan Faysal.
[42]
During these years, the arms trade grew in volume and
importance.

Anglo-French colonial rivalry threatened to

break into outright war during the Fashoda Crisis four years
after the visit of the French warship to Muscat. The Boer
War, however, pre-occupied the British between 1899 and 1902
and helped keep them from devoting time to the Gulf and
Arabia. By the time the British could again turn to the Gulf
and the arms trade, both France and Britain had begun to see
Germany as their chief danger.
The impending alliance did not, of course, end
problems in the Gulf. In May, 1903, fear of a Russian effort
to gain a port in the Gulf led the British Foreign Minister,
Lord Lansdowne, to make a declaration in the House of Lords
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on the British position in the Gulf:
••• our policy should be directed in the first
place to protect and promote British trade in
these waters. In the next place I do not •••
suggest, that these efforts should be directed
toward the exclusion of the legitimate trade of
other Powers •••• In the third place - I say
without hesitation we should regard the
establishment of a naval base or a fortified port
in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very
grave menace to British interests, and we should
certainly resist it with all the means at our
disposal. [43]
The Russian danger was soon removed.

With the

outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in January, 1904 - and
Russia's defeat in the war - Russia was effectively removed
as a significant factor in the Gulf. In addition,
negotiations had been started in 1903 by Britain and France
that led to the signing of the Anglo-French Entente in
April, 1904. While the Oman dispute was not directly
included in the Entente, it was agreed to submit the dispute
over use of the French flag by Omanis to the Permanent Court
of Arbitration at the Hague. With the German threat in
Europe, problems in the Gulf became of secondary importance,
while the Entente was primary.

[44]

The Hague Court issued its decision [45] on August 8,
1905. The result of these rulings was to void any papers
issued after 1892 to persons who had not themselves been
French proteges before 1862. The Court also ruled that the \
1844 French-Omani Treaty only extended extraterritorial

1
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protection to persons who were "in the employ of French
citizens", and that the dhow owners simply flying the French
flag were not in that classification.

[46] The Court added

that to extend extraterritorial protection to persons not
covered by the 1844 Treaty would limit the independence of
Muscat, and thus violate the 1862 Anglo-French agreement
protecting the Sultanate. However, if a dhow met all of the
conditions established by the Court and was entitled to fly
the French flag, it would be protected by that flag in
Muscati waters.

That protection, however, did not extend to

the owners or crew when ashore, and French papers could not
be inherited.
In the historical and legal dispute over naval visit
and search, the French had won.

Vessels flying the French

flag were still exempt from the jurisdiction of anyone but
the French when at sea.
on land, France at sea."

As Busch phrases it, "Britain won
[47] And this meant that

F~ance

had lost in the political struggle for influence in Oman.
Her right to issue her flag to Omani sailors had been
effectively ended.
Landen argues that the 1894-1904 flag dispute in Oman
led to two major results.

First, the Sultan was shown how

strong Britain was in the Gulf, and was forced more directly
under British influence.
arms trade.

This helped with control of the

Second, Oman remained technically independent,
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never becoming as dependent upon Britain as the Gulf states
of Arabia. Oman was saved from the direct protectorate
desired by the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon. [48]
In terms of the international politics of Europe, the
dispute was a minor obstruction to the developing
Anglo-French Entente. [49] Once the pressure of events in
Europe appeared to mandate that alliance, the dispute over
use of the French flag and French encouragement of the arms
trade were solved with relative speed.

The solutions came,

however, only after the French had significantly supported
the arms trade for nearly two decades in an effort to strike
at the British position in the area.
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CHAPTER IV
THE PRIVATE ARMS TRADE
The international arms trade had two major elements:
the private trade, between individuals and companies; and
the governmental trade, the purchase of arms by governments
or the direct distribution of arms by governments.

Of the

two, the private shippers were responsible for the largest
part of the trade to Arabia. The dealers were primarily
British or French, with Belgian and other Europeans engaged
from time to time.

Once the arms were in the region, Arab

vessels from around the Peninsula delivered many of them to
their final ports of destination.

The next three chapters

examine the private trade in detail, concluding with a
discussion of the distribution routes within Arabia.
THE EARLY PATTERN OF THE ARMS TRADE
The arms trade to the Arabian Peninsula fed through
two main entrepots: Djibouti and Muscat. The major route for
European guns was through the Suez Canal to Djibouti, and
then on to Muscat. While weapons were shipped from both
ports directly to the Peninsula, most international concern
centered not on the Arabian section of the traffic, but on
shipments to European colonies in Africa. The British became
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particularly concerned with arms reaching the Northwest
Frontier of India. It is, in fact, because of British
concern over the threat to India that we have much of the
information available on the arms traffic to the Peninsula.
The British first began to recognize the threat during
and shortly after the Third Afghan War of 1878-81. Weapons
captured from the tribesmen of the Northwest Frontier were
traced to India: they had been shipped by sea from Bombay to
the Persian coast, and then moved overland to Afghanistan.
As a result of these findings, the British Government of
India banned the export, or re-export, of arms from India,
as reported by Lorimer:
In 1880, when it was placed beyond doubt that
large quantities of percussion caps exported from
India to' Persia were reaching the Afghan troops at
Herat and elsewhere, the Government of India •••
instructed the Government of Bombay to abstain
from granting licenses for the export of heavy
consignments of arms and ammunition to Persian
Gulf Ports, and to watch carefully the import of
such articles at Karachi and on the coast to the
westward. On the 1st October in the same year a
notification was published by the Government of
India to legalize the detention at Indian ports of
cargos of arms and ammunitions of war consigned to
the Persian Gulf from other countries. [1]
While there was no "large or systematic trade ••• as,
yet ••• in the Gulf", the British encouraged the Shah of
Persia to ban the export of percussion caps from his country
in 1881. Lorimer asserts that the Shah had become interested
in "the purely Persian aspect of the question", so that
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later in the same year he also prohibited the importation of
arms and ammunition into his country.

[2] The suggestion

that the Shah acted in his own interest, and not primarily
that of Britain, is reasonable.

Keppel reports that during

this period (and until 1897) the trade was "chiefly confined
to Persia and the countries at the head of the Gulf and on
its southern shore", most of it through Bushire, and that
many of the guns imported to Persia were purchased by the
Bakhtiari tribe of the southern mountains.

[3] It was

clearly in the Shah's interest to try to stop modern arms
from reaching a powerful tribe that regularly opposed his
central authority.
Following the Shah's order, the British Resident at
Bushire warned "the principal firms doing business there
under British protection" of the arms trade ban.

Despite

the new Persian law, and the warning from the Resident, the
trade grew.

In 1884 a "Persian Armenian firm under British

protection," Messers A. and T.J. Malcom, began to import
guns at Bushire. They were joined in the trade three years
later by "Messers. Fracis, Times and Co., a Parsi and
English house."

But not all of the trade was in British

hands, for in 1881 a French company at Muhammareh imported a
shipment of breech-loading rifles and ammunition.
Strangely, the shipment was "first seized by the local
authorities, but was subsequently returned and sold off by
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the owners at a very low price."

[4] Busch confirms the

laxity, and says that the Shah's ban was not enforced.
Thus, only British and Indian firms were likely affected at
all.

[5]
The Arabian section of this early trade may have been

nearly as important as the Persian, for Keppel maintains
that:
At the same time, we may be sure that large
quantities of rifles found their way into the
possession of the semi-independent nomad tribes of
the Arabian interior, especially among those
chiefs who feared the aggressive designs of their
powerful neighbor, Turkey. [6]
The trade was growing, and shifting slowly from
percussion caps to more modern arms.

The total trade at

Muscat was "now considerable," and danger to the Northwest
Frontier was again feared.

Both the size and nature of the

trade were investigated in 1891 by Sir Robert Sandeman,
Agent for the Governor-General of India in Baluchistan.
Sandeman found that guns were being imported mainly at the
ports of Gwadar and Chahbar on the Makran and southern
Persian coasts, and secondarily at Ormara (Makran) and
Muscat. The guns were apparently being shipped from
Zanzibar, and were old smooth-bore American muskets of
-little value."

In addition, the numbers were small, for at

Gwadar only about 300 a year were being imported.

There may

have been a greater immediate threat from the residue of the
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Indian trade, for "There was also a considerable importation
of lead, gunpowder and percussion caps on the Makran coast,
chiefly from Bombay." [7]
The British reaction was to demand that the Sultan of
Muscat, who still had sovereignty over Gwadar, ban the arms
trade in that port.

On March 3, 1891, the Sultan "at the

instance of the Government of India" issued a proclamation
forbidding "the importation and exportation of arms and
ammunition at Gwadar." [8] The Shah of Iran was also led to
renew and strengthen his 1881 ban on the trade, because of
continued trade by British and Parsi arms dealers in Tehran.
Until the l890s, most of the arms trade in the Indian
Ocean had been directed toward Africa, where the demand was
large.

Demand from the Gulf, however, increasingly drew the

traders north.

The geographical shift from Africa is first

noted by Lorimer in connection with the refusal of the
Government of Bombay in 1888 to permit transshipment of
"1,477 guns, 44 pistols, and 32,050 bullets at Zanzibar for
Bahrain." [9] The shifting of the trade continued, and was
accompanied by the growth of the trade from Europe through
the Suez Canal.
SHIFT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRAFFIC TO ARABIA
Several major factors encouraged development of the
direct arms trade from Europe to Arabia, and determined the
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timing of its growth.
First, the logistics of shipping from Europe became
easier with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the
growth of trade through the Canal in succeeding years.

In

the first years after the Canal came into service, however,
Aden was the only coaling station available on the Red Sea
route, ensuring an advantage for the British. This changed
in the years immediately preceding the growth of the arms
trade in the region.
France had purchased Cbock (on the north coast of the
Gulf of Tadjoura, across from the later French base of
Djibouti) in 1859. Nothing substantial was done with the
land until the early l880s, when colonial wars in Indo-China
and Madagascar, required a coaling station under direct
French control that would end her ships' dependence on Aden.
In 1881 a trading company, the Compagnie Franco-Ethiopienne,
established a coaling station and factory at Cbock. Three
other French firms soon followed: the Societe
d'Cbock and the Factoreries

Fran~aises

Fran~ais

in 1882, and the

Compagnie Mesnier in 1883. Because of the geographical
limits of Cbock, France moved her main base across the Gulf
to Djibouti in 1888. [10] The development of Cbock and
Djibouti was spurred when the British reacted to the 1884
Tonkin affair by closing Aden to French warships in January,
1885. The French were forced to re-examine their need for a
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dependable coal station in the region, and decided to
develop Obock and Djibouti. [11) Between them, the two ports
were vital to the arms trade, with Djibouti rapidly becoming
the major transshipment point for weapons imported from
Europe.
Second, as discussed above, the design of military
rifles developed rapidly in this period, with guns recently
placed in service quickly becoming obsolete.

The major

technical change affecting the arms trade around 1890 was
the conversion from black-powder to smokeless powder.
Following the French introduction of the new powder in 1887,
all major European powers were forced to put new weapons in
service, and as with any extensive conversion, the old
stocks of weapons entered the international market.
were repaired and shipped from Belgium at this time.

Many
[12]

And many of them reached Arabia and the Gulf.
The danger from the flow of old military rifles into
colonial territory was noted by a British missionary in
Uganda, writing to the British Consul-General at Zanzibar in
April, 1888. Wh~le his comments deal with Africa, the danger
would soon extend to Arabia and the Northwest Frontier of
India.
The fact that almost all the European Powers
being at present about to adopt magazine rifles,
will not be without its effect on East Africa.
Discarded Martini-Henry, Mauser, Gras and other
breech-loaders will now be poured into the
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Zanzibar market and unless prompt measures are
taken to the contrary these will soon be in the
hands of all the tribes of the interior. [13]
Closer to Arabia, the obsolescence of the Ottoman
stocks of Sniders and Martinis, and their replacement with
Mausers between 1887 and 1893, made the older weapons
available for use by provincial forces and for distribution
to client tribes in the peninsula, as discussed in Chapter
VII. This influx of breech-loaders would have driven rival
tribes and political groups to also seek modern arms.
Third, the arms embargo imposed by the Government of
India apparently closed a major regional source of weapons,
requiring a turn to European sources of supply.

During the

mid-nineteenth century, the United States had dominated the
international arms market because of its lead in
manufacturing technology.

By the late l880s, however, the

change to smokeless powder allowed the Europeans to dominant
the mar ke t •

[ 14 ]

Fourth, the decline in the traditional shipping
industry in the Gulf forced local sailors to find other
cargoes if they were to survive.

Muscat's former prosperity

had been largely based on her role in commerce as a regional
entrepot, but European steamers made direct shipment from
India and Europe both possible and cheaper.

During the

decade from 1862 to 1872 the traditional entrepot system was
destroyed by a combination of the steamers and the split of
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the Sultanate after the Canning Award. By the l890s, a large
percentage of the local and regional trade was being carried
by the foreign steamers, and the local shippers were being
put out of business.

[15]

With the decline of Oman's "legal" shipping trade in
the 1870-1900 era, only the smuggling and slaving ports
remained prosperous.

Landen cites the examples of Wudam and

Sur:
Wudam, in 1840 a tiny al-Batinah settlement of
palm frond huts with approximately 100 people, by
1900 had become a smuggling center counting 40
seagoing vessels which frequented other Gulf
ports, India and the Yemen. More important as a
center of illicit commerce was Sur •••• After the
1860s, with the virtual disappearance of the
sultan's navy, Masqat's hold on the port became
almost nonexistent. As seamen flocked there to
escape taxes and supervision, Sur became the
largest sail port in Oman during the late
nineteenth century. Its population of 12,000 made
it the largest single city in Oman in 1900, ••• At
the time, over 100 seagoing ships were based at
Sur, but even this figure represented a drop from
the total of 300 baghalas reportedly operating out
of the port in the 1830s. [16]
Fifth, the East African arms trade began to die after
the General Act of Brussels, signed in July, 1890, banned
that section of the traffic.

Lorimer suggests the

connection:
On the East Coast of Africa the arms trade was
an auxiliary of the slave trade, and a blow was
struck at it in the General Act of the Brussels
Conference ••• The contraction of the African
market compelled manufacturers and exporters to
seek another outlet for their goods, and the
unfortunate result was the diversion of the
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African arms trade to the Persian Gulf, which,
lying altogether above the 20th. parallel of north
latitude, was not subject to the arms clauses of
the Brussels Act. [17]
Some idea of the volume of the African trade just
before it began to shift toward the Gulf is given in British
records from the Zanzibar Consulate. In the first half of
1888, over 37,000 long guns (called only "fire-arms," but
distinguished from pistols), three million caps, over 70,000
cartridges, and other military supplies, passed through the
Zanzibar Customs House. [18] The result of this high volume
of trade was clear in the interior of Africa, for one Arab
leader near Stanley Falls was reported to have 10,000 rifles
available.

[19] This flood of weapons from the Africa trade

was soon to sweep toward the Persian Gulf.
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CHAPTER V
THE PRIVATE ARMS TRADE IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND EFFORTS AT ITS CONTROL
When the arms trade first shifted north from East
Africa, it ran primarily from Zanzibar to Muscat. Between
April 1890 and June 1892 some 11,500 guns were landed at
Muscat. Lorimer outlines the trade:
A large proportion of these were brought by the
Sultan of Zanzibar's steamers, and the three
principal Khojar merchants at Matrah were now
engaged in the trade. Direct shipments from
Europe had also begun, and at the end of 1890 a
consignment of 420 Enfields from Austria-Hungary
for Khojar merchants at Gwadar was stopped at
Karachi. More than half the arms received were,
even at this period, re-exported from Masqat to
Kuwait, Bahrain and other ports in the Persian
Gulf: thus early was the development of Masqat
into the chief arms emporium of the Middle East
foreshadowed. [1]
The trade became far more complex as time passed, and
in 1913 Lt. Col. C.C.R. Murphy, then British naval and
military intelligence officer for the Gulf, wrote about the
years immediately before the opening of a bonded arms
warehouse at Muscat (1912):
The arms traffic problem in the Gulf was like a
jig-saw puzzle, with pieces scattered about up and
down the Persian and Arab littorals, in Mekran,
Fars, Arabistan, and Mesopotamia. [2]
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To trace the traffic in the Gulf, and to try to
determine the numbers and types of weapons remaining in
Arabia, Muscat, and general activities and controls
throughout the Gulf will now be examined.

Chapter VI will

review the arms trade in the other Arabian ports of the Gulf
and in the Red Sea.
THE ARMS TRAFFIC THROUGH MUSCAT AND THE OMANI PORTS
AND GENERAL CONTROL MEASURES
Sir Robert Sandeman had found the arms trade
insignificant, and still anchored at Zanzibar, when he
investigated about 1889. Matters changed quickly as the
direct Europe trade grew.

By 1891 over a quarter of

Muscat's import income, worth about 1,000,000 Rupees, came
from the arms trade, and firms engaged in the trade could
make a profit of between 20 and 30 percent.

[3]

Lorimer stresses the Sultan of Oman's motives for
allowing the arms trade:
Year by year the trade continued to expand at
Masqat, where it was in all respects legal and was
favorably regarded by the Sultan on account of the
large profit he derived from the import duty on
arms. (4)
The only immediate British reaction came because of
report~

that arms from Muscat were being re-exported to the

Somali and Banadir coasts of East Africa. The British
pressured the Sultan, and he acted "to satisfy the scruples
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of the British Government" by prohibiting - in April, 1892 
the re-export of arms from "his territories" to Africa.
International politics began to playa part in the traffic,
however, when the Sultan refused to grant British war-ships
the right to search Omani vessels for arms "from a fear that
his subjects might be led to seek French maritime protection
in increasing numbers."

[5] As a result of this, the ban on

the Muscat to Africa traffic had little effect.
The arms traffic at Muscat increased rapidly, and by
1895 was considered by the British to have assumed
"formidable dimensions," for during 1895-96 an estimated
4,350 rifles and 604,000 cartridges were imported there.

In

the next year, 1896-96, the trade grew further to some
20,000 rifles and approximately 2,777,000 cartridges.

All

~

of the rifles entering Muscat were breech-loaders, for the
old muzzle-loaders could no longer be sold in the region.
Lorimer mentions specifically that Sniders and
Martini-Henries were among the guns shipped to the Gulf. The
timing of this European sale of older single-shot
black-powder weapons is consistent with the earlier
conversion by European armies to magazine-fed rifles and
smokeless powder, and the resulting availability of surplus
arms for the international market.

The "cost price of a

rifle was at this time £3.10.0 to £4" with a "selling price"
at Bushire of between £8 and £10. Two pounds of this was

77
used tobr ibe local Persian officials.

[6]

The guns imported into Muscat during these years
(1891-97) were almost "entirely of British origin," with,
however, a "good many Belgian rifles made at Liege" and "a
small number" of guns from France. [7] The main arms dealer
in Muscat was the British firm of Joyce and Kynoch.
Two-thirds of the British weapons were imported directly
from London, likely through the Canal with a possible stop
at Aden, while the remaining third were transshipped from
Bushire. The German Government, it is interesting to note,
apparently prohibited Germans from joining the Muscat trade
for fear that the guns would end up in Africa. [8] France,
with no major colonies on Africa's East Coast would not have
felt a similar danger in that part of the world.

Lorimer

reports the distribution of the weapons imported at Muscat:
Some were disposed of locally to tribesmen from
the interior of 'Oman, some to visitors from other
parts of the Gulf, and some to Nakhudas (i.e.,
captains: author's comment) of coasting vessels;
but the greater quantity were re-shipped to
Trucial 'Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait, or were
smuggled into Persian and Turkish territory in the
Gulf concealed in bales of goods and cases of
Halwa or dry limes; while a few were even
dispatched to minor ports in the Red Sea at which
there were no customs houses. [9]
After its first flurry of activity against the arms
traffic in 1880-81, the Government of India largely ignored
the arms trade in the Gulf. The rapid growth in the number
and quality of arms imported in the l890s soon drew the
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attention of the Indian military command.

In late 1896,

following a revolt by the tribes on the Indian-Afghanistan
border, the British "became desirous of knowing the
destination of the enormous quantities of military material
which were now being poured into the Gulf." [10] It was
found that 60 percent of the arms entering the region ended
up in Persia, 25 percent in the "Turkish possessions in the
Gulf," and 15 percent in "non-Turkish Arabia."
While the investigation was underway, London and
Government of India officials debated whether or not large
numbers of guns were reaching the Northwest Frontier. The
men in the Gulf, however, saw a clear danger.

The British

Persian Gulf Resident at Bushire, Lt. Col. M.J. Meade, wrote
unofficially to Curzon (who was not yet Viceroy of India),
that "the blood of our poor fellows lies at the door of
those who have carried on this traffic."

[11] He officially

reported to W.J. Cunningham, Secretary of the Foreign
Department of the Government of India, on the danger to the
Gulf itself:
Unless the arms trade is put a stop to, the
whole of the population on both sides of the Gulf
will very shortly be armed with breach loaders,
and have plenty of ammunition, and this will ere
long become a serious danger to the peace of the
country, and possibly to ourselves. [12]
Figure 3 shows the growth of that part of the Muscat
trade that passed through Omani customs between 1895 and
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1914. As Busch notes, this represents the legal trade, and
does not include the unreported smuggled arms.

[13] This

information does, however, give a general feel for the
growth of the arms trade through Muscat.
The situation was, indeed, becoming more serious as
the volume of the trade grew.

Phillips, who was an advisor

to the Sultan of Oman in the 1950s and may have based his
figures on Omani records, states that in 1897 over 30,000
breach-loaders were imported into Muscat. He identifies the
arms as coming mainly from British and French traders, and
mentions by name "Messrs. Joyce and Kynoch" and "the
notorious Baluchi arms trader Ali Musa Khan." Phillips
states that the traders made an eventual profit of twenty to
thirty percent on the arms.

The trade brought the Sultan of

Oman revenue of about $MT 4,000 per.

month.

[14] Muscat

had become, in Lorimer's words, "the greatest market for
arms of precision in the Middle East." [15]
Using the British estimates cited above, this would
mean that some 7,500 rifles were imported through Muscat to
the "Turkish possessions in Arabia," while another 4,500
reached "non-Turkish" Arabia. However, as the estimated
division of the arms in the region was made at a time when
shipments were still being made directly to Persia, it is
likely that a higher percentage of the 1897 shipments ended
up in Arabia. It is clear, however, that the majority of the
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guns reaching the Gulf were Martinis, and Lorimer even
identifies one tribal leader of southern Persia as a
"Martini Khan." [16]
The theft of ammunition from Royal Navy ships at
Muscat gives additional information on the types of rifles
then on the market in Oman. In 1898 the British authorities
recovered, "chiefly from the bazaar," 3,800 Martini-Henry
and 100 Lee-Metford cartridges.

Lorimer does not say how

much ammunition was stolen and not recovered.

The Martini

still predominated, but the new magazine-fed Lee-Metford had
now entered the market.

[17]

The British moved against the arms trade, with their
main attack at first directed against the trade between
England and Persia that endangered the Northwest Frontier.
The Shah of Persia, concerned about the power of the
gun-running tribes of southern Persia, agreed to enforce his
earlier ban on the importation of arms.

In December 1897 he

agreed to the confiscation of all arms that had been
illegally imported into his country, and granted the British
the right to search Persian merchant ships in the Gulf for
arms.

Any confiscated weapons were to be given to the Shah.

[18]
The Shah then joined the British in warning the Sultan
of Oman that the import of arms into Persia was illegal.
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The Resident, Lt. Col. Meade, approached the Sultan to
obtain his consent.

The Sultan was reluctant to issue a

proclamation because it would reduce his revenue from the
import duty on arms.

Strong British pressure, and the

expectation that he would be given the confiscated weapons,
led the Sultan to comply.

In January 1898, Sultan Faisal

issued a proclamation that allowed British and Persian ships
to search vessels flying their own, or Omani, flags when in
Omani waters, and allowed the search of Omani vessels in
Persian or Indian waters.

Further, "if these arms and

ammunition are intended for Indian and Persian ports, and if
they are the property of British, Persian or Muscat
subjects" they could be confiscated.

[19]

The timing was important, for the steamer BALUCHISTAN
was known to be on the way to Muscat with a large shipment
of arms: British officials wanted the authority to intercept
her.

[20] The vessel was owned by the London firm of F.C.

Strick & Company "(the Anglo-Arabian and Persian S.S. Co.),"
and was a respectable 2,409 tons.

The weapons were owned by

Fracis, Times and Company. The arms had been "partly
consigned to Persian ports," but because of the Shah's
decree, the destination was changed to Muscat. The ship was
intercepted by H.M.S. LAPWING outside of Muscat harbor in
late January 1898, and the arms seized.

Five hundred cases

of arms, a total of 7,856 rifles and 700,000 rounds of
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ammunition, were removed to the British Consulate. After
several years' delay because of a legal challenge from
Fracis, Times and Company, they were handed over to the
Sultan. The Company lost two suits against the British
Government, and was driven into bankruptcy.

[21]

The private arms merchants in Britain responded to the
attacks on the trade by protesting to the Foreign Office in
London. They were joined in the protests by ship owners,
manufacturers, exporters, underwriters and others with a
financial interest in the trade.

Lorimer's disgust is clear

from his reaction:
The nefarious business itself was even depicted
in moving terms as an 'honest trade, carried on
for nearly twenty years, and now threatened with
extinction by the action of the British
Government.' [22]
The protests failed to prevent further attacks by the
British government, and customs records at Muscat show a
drop in the value of arms imported from Britain from £81,000
in 1897-98 to £18,000 in 1898-99. [23]
To control arms traders under their authority, the
British passed two Acts in 1900. First, the Government of
India issued an Arms Act that "prohibited the consignment of
arms and ammunition to the Persian Gulf through Indian ports
without transshipment, transshipment having already been
made illegal in 1880." [24] There was little effect from
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this action: the "bulk" of the weapons reaching the Gulf
were shipped directly from Europe, and it was easy to ship
all of them without stopping in Indian territory.

Thus, the

British Government itself passed the Arms Exportation Act,
allowing "the Sovereign to prohibit by proclamation the
export of arms and ammunition from the United Kingdom" to
any place where "they might be employed against British
troops or subjects."

Enforcement was hampered, however,

because the Admiralty ruled that it did not have the power
to search "even British vessels for arms on the high seas,"
but could only act in British, Persian or Omani waters.
The effect of the acts is not certain.

Between

1900-01 and 1902-03, Muscat customs records show a sharp
drop in the numbers of British arms reaching the Gulf.
British participation in the arms trade appears, however, to
have then risen and fallen several times in the next decade
and a half.

(Figure 4) Busch, does not define the customs

term "British", but implies that it refers to the ownership
of the arms and the nationality of the importing firm, and
not to the nationality of the delivering ship or to the
national origin of the arms themselves.

Busch took the

customs records from the administrative reports of the
British Persian Gulf Resident and the Political Agent at
Muscat, and notes that they can give only a rough indication
of the course of the trade because of fluctuations in
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exchange rates, smuggling, and misleading or incomplete
reporting of data.

He believes, however, that the general

trends and the relative trading positions of the European
powers is accurate.

[25] Used to compare the arms trade of

.the European nations, the customs data casts a doubt upon
Lorimer's repeated statement that British firms were being
driven out of the Muscat arms trade.

In all years reported,

British trade exceeds that of France. And after French trade
was effectively ended in 1911-12, British trade increased
sharply.

The apparently significant Belgian trade is

scarcely mentioned by Lorimer, and the German is not
mentioned at all.

Both came after the main years covered by

his work.
The two British arms control acts had, in any case,
little effect on the number of arms reaching the Gulf, and
the main result was to ensure that arms would not be carried
on British ships.

The weapons imported to the Gulf, even

when carried on British ships, were increasingly of
non-British manufacture.
hindered.

The trade was not seriously

It simply shifted to firms and vessels not under

British authority.

[26] The French were eager to pick up

the trade abandoned by the British.
In March, 1899, Monsieur Goguyer, a man who became the
major French arms dealer in the Gulf, arrived in Muscat and
opened his business.

Goguyer had been a French diplomat in
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Tunisia, and spoke Arabic, and his arms dealings "was backed
by French newspapers and some influential politicians of the
Colonial Party in Paris." [27] His background clearly raises
the possibility the Goguyer was acting in a semi-official
role in the Gulf, as part of a general French desire to
discomfort the British. Goguyer told Indian merchants in
Muscat that: "his operation would be exempt from British
interference, as he would export arms purchased from him in
native vessels flying the French flag."

[28] In May,

Goguyer traveled to Bahrein, apparently in an effort to
expand his markets.

His business was slowed by a lack of

capital, but by 1901 it was increasing rapidly, and by 1903
he had competition from a Russian firm and another French
firm operating out of Djibouti. [29] The entry of the French
firms into the arms trade in the Gulf was soon reflected in
a shift of the nationality of manufacture of the weapons.
When the trade began at Masqat the arms and
ammunition imported, though a proportion were of
Belgian manufacture, were exclusively of British
provenance, but in 1899-1900 about one-seventh of
the imports were from France, and by 1905 the
proportion of French arms had risen to
four- ten ths. [30]
According to British diplomats at the Brussels Arms
Conference, by 1908, the French share of the Muscat trade
had risen to 49% of the total, the British had fallen to 24%
while the Omani sector stood at 27%. Goguyer's firm was
responsible for 60% of the French trade.

[31] These figures
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are different from those provided by the customs data.

For

1907-08, they show French trade as equal to 9.4% of the
total arms trade; and for 1908-09, equal to 8.4% of the
trade.

The highest percentage of the arms passing through

customs in these years are, in fact, attributed to Belgium a
point not mentioned by Lorimer. The conflict may well be in
appearance only, for a high proportion of the French trade
was carried by dhows from Djibouti, and probably did not
pass through customs.
The size of Goguyer's operation in Muscat lends
support to the diplomatic estimates that his share of the
arms trade equalled 30% of the total trade (60% of the
French 49% share of the trade).

General B.H. Austin,

assigned as British Naval Intelligence Officer in the Gulf
in 1909, reports that in that year British authorities
estimated that Goguyer's warehouse held "not less than
100,000 arms of many different types, including most
patterns of modern magazine rifles, and certainly not less
than 10,000,000 rounds of ammunition for these arms."

[32]

This large a stock of weapons would have allowed the firm to
continue in business after its imports declined during these
years.
As the nationality of the traders began to shift, the
volume of the trade itself increased.

For the five months

from June through October, 1899, Lorimer reports that
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"British subjects alone" sold at least 3,792 rifles at
Muscat. During the first half of 1902, import duty was paid
at Muscat on 8,732 rifles and 726,110 cartridges, and in
"the year" 1904-05 Lorimer estimates that over 20,000 rifles
were imported.

[33]

The trade also appears to have shifted slightly.

In

1896, as noted above, 60% of the arms entering the Gulf were
shipped to Persia. In 1899 a British study at Muscat found
that 55% of the weapons imported there had been shipped to
Persia, while 5% were still in Oman and the remaining 40%
had been shipped to Kuwait and Trucia1 Oman, presumably
including Bahrain. [34] While this indicates a growth in the
Arabian section of the trade, it must be remembered that
many weapons shipped to Arabian ports were later exported to
Persia.
The Government of India proposed in 1902-03 that an
international effort be made to control the arms trade.
They suggested that those states with treaty rights in
Muscat - France, the United States, and Holland - be asked
to modify their treaties with the Sultan so that he could
act to control the arms trade.

The dispute over the use of

the French flag by Omani vessels made this impossible, and
the British turned to imposing such controls as they could.
It was now generally illegal for arms to be imported into
India, Persia, "Turkish" Arabia, Bahrein, Kuwait and British
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and Italian Somaliland. For the British, then: "the contest
resolved itself into a crusade against smuggling from Masqat
to all neighboring countries."

[35] The crusaders, of

course, could not touch vessels protected by the French
flag.
Efforts to control the arms trade by requiring first
British subjects (in 1898) and then Omani subjects (1900) to
report any sale or purchase of arms failed to cut the trade,
and seem only to have further shifted the trade to other
nationalities.

Even an order by the Sultan requiring a

special permit for arms being shipped legally from Muscat to
other Omani ports did little.

In 1899, the British reported

that "hardly a vessel left the harbor (i.e., Muscat) which
did not carry arms for places abroad."

[36]

Possibly because of controls at Muscat, the main Omani
port for the internal trade of the Batinah coast north of
Muscat, and areas inland of the coast, appears to have been
"Masna'ah." A caravan route then ran inland from the coast
to Rustaq and Nizwa. In addition, Persian trade was often
transshipped through Sohar. The Muscat trade was so vigorous
that if there was not a Royal Navy ship at Muscat, there was
a "general exodus" of native vessels carrying arms.

[37]

The level of the smuggling illustrates the difficulty with
the customs information.
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French activity in the Gulf was centered in Oman, and
was tied in with the dispute over use of their flag and with
the various Muscat treaties, discussed above.

The French

had, however, a more direct method of influencing the
Sultan. Faisal ibn Turki, Sultan from 1888-1913, was seldom
on good terms with the British, who regularly used the
Canning Award subsidy to try to enforce their will.

The

British establishment of a Protectorate over Zanzibar in
1890 had further increased Faisal's concern over British
ambitions against his own territory.
To meet his constant need for money, Faisal obtained
numerous loans.

By 1905, he was about $MT 100,000 in debt.

When the British offered him $MT 20,000 to send his son on
the pilgrimage to Mecca, he rejected their offer.

Faisal

turned instead to the non-British arms dealers of Muscat for
money.

In particular, he took loans from Goguyer several

times.

Even after the British Agent at Muscat was allowed

to lend up to 20,000 rupees on his own authority, Faisal
continued to borrow from the local market.

The Sultan

wished to avoid British control, and the arms dealers gave
him an alternative source,of money.

[38] The French loans

also strengthened Faisal's interest in a continuation of the
arms trade.
Muscat's arms trade flourished.

In 1906, some 45,000

rifles and a million cartridges passed through the port.
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British concern continued to center on the number of rifles
that left Muscat and passed through Persia on the way to
Afghanistan. In 1907, the Muscat Agent estimated that 200
rifles a week were shipped to Makran (or 10,400 for the year
through one section of the coast alone), and the total trade
was high enough in 1908 for the Indian Chief of Staff to
estimate that 30,000 rifles reached the Northwest Frontier
in that year.

[39]

Other factors were at work, too, for following the end
of the

Boe~

War (1899-1902) , an old Lee-Enfield could be

purchased from South African surplus for £ 6, and resold on
the Northwest Frontier for £65-80. [40] The trade in the
Lee-Enfields illustrates again two of the major aspects of
the arms trade: the sale of surplus arms at the end of a
major war1 and the disposal of obsolete weapons, for after
the Boer War, the long Lee-Enfield was replaced (1907) in
British service by the Short Model Lee-Enfield. [41]
The arms control provisions of the General Act of
Brussels (1890) were scheduled to be reviewed soon, and the
Foreign Office began to look toward that conference for
relief from the arms trade.

Officials on the scene in the

Gulf, however, did not see much real hope in an expansion of
the arms control zone to the Red Sea and the Gulf. The
Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Navy's East Indies Station,
for example, advised the Admiralty not to expect an expanded
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zone to have any effect, and noted that the presence of
Djibouti within the existing Zone failed to hinder the
traffic in that Port. [421 Without French co-operation, the
trade could not be stopped.
Even after the conference reconvened in 1908, there
was a sharp division of opinion between the Foreign Office
and officials in the Gulf. The British in the Gulf wanted to
keep any international control group out of the region,
which they saw as a primarily British area of concern.

They

also warned London that any real limit on the trade would
require the approval of Sultan Faisal at Muscat, and that
his assistance would only come if he were compensated for
the loss of his income from the trade.

When Italy pressed

for the extension of controls, the British delegate sharply
discouraged the proposal.

However, if the French could be

made to come around on the issue, it was clear that the
British would agree to the extension of the control zone.
[431
The importance of the French role in the trade was
made clear by the British delegate, Sir Arthur Hardinge, in
a conversation with the French delegate, Count d'Ormesson.
The Count responded that Goguyer had strong support in the
Chamber of Deputies and in the French press, and that any
discussions should be in private.

Hardinge noted that only

France stood in the way of an extension of the control
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zone.

[44] Goguyer's political protection was vital, in

view of the important roll he played in the Muscat trade.
During a recess in the conference, discussions centered on a
French proposal to trade the British African colony of
Gambia for French help in ending the arms trade at Muscat.
This was not acceptable to Britain. The conference
reconvened in May, 1909 long enough for an announcement that
no agreement had been reached, and adjourned until fall.
Private discussions failed to break the deadlock, and the
conference finally ended on December 30, 1909. [45]
The French appear to have been chiefly motivated by
their political rivalry with Britain, though economic
interests clearly played a part.

Abdullah summarizes French

action during the period:
French citizenship and the French flag were
granted to the inhabitants of Sur1 the French
attempted' to establish a coal depot in Bandar
Jissah, south of Muscat, for their maritime line1
they conducted extensive anti-British propaganda1
and they played a large part in the flourishing
arms trade in Muscat. The principal aim of the
French in all four activities was to undermine
British influence and extend their own. [46]
Undercutting another power's political position was
not uncommon in Colonial rivalries.

For example, during the

l880s in East Africa, the Germans and the British apparently
armed the tribes each other'S areas of interest.

[47] The

French were following an old tradition, as, it seems, were
the British.
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During the discussions of 1908-09, the British could
not understand why the French were so willing to protect the
activity of their arms dealers at Muscat. Part of the answer
was found in the economic motive alone, for the dealers were
wealthy and had high political connection.

[48] There

appears, however, to have been a special reason for the
French support the arms trade in the Gulf:
The French (i.e., the French Government)
tolerated arms trading in the Gulf because of a
similar British trade in Morocco, which allowed
the infiltration of weapons through the Algerian
frontiers. [49]
Thus, France had apparently linked the Gulf trade with
wider issues, and tit for tat has always been fair in power
politics.
Regardless of the Fr,ench motives for delay, India did
not wait for diplomacy in Europe. At the end of his Appendix
.on the Arms Trade, Lorimer reviews the status of the Gulf
and Muscat trade in 1907:
Since 1902 the arms trade has been nominally
prohibited at every port, except Masqat, in the
Gulfs of Persia and 'Oman; but smuggling and
connivance at breaches of the law are so
universally prevalent that arms and ammunition
continue to be distributed from Masqat over the
length and breadth of the Gulf region, ••• the
importations at Masqat ••• are still on the same
scale as before the general prohibition of the
trade in 1902; but they now represent the whole,
or nearly the whole, instead of part only of the
trade. It has been proved, at the cost of immense
expenditure of energy by British establishments,
that the illegal dissemination of arms from the
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free port of Masqat cannot be prevented, or even
appreciably hindered, by naval means; also that
measures, however efficacious, taken in British
Baluchistan do not and cannot influence the course
of the Afghan traffic; while officers who have
studied the question on the spot in Persia agree
that the Government of that country are incapable
••• of putting down the trade across Persia
between Masqat and Afghanistan. [50]
With the total trade at Muscat in 1908 of about 80,000
rifles, India felt it could not wait for international
negotiations: the number of imports reaching the Northwest
Frontier had cut the price of a rifle in half, and the fears
of well armed tribesmen fighting the frontier forces was
growing.

Early in 1909, the India Office asked for an

increased Naval force to carry out a truly effective the
blockade of the Persian coast.

By the end of the year, the

new ships were beginning to impose fairly effective controls
against the trade, [51] and customs records show a drop in
the trade from £237,650 in 1908-09 to £101,850 in 1901-10.
The trade continued to fluctuate widely.

[52]

Lorimer's judgment of the blockade remained valid,
however, particularly in view of its high cost.

(In 1910

the blockade cost £175,000). [53] The naval expenses can be
compared with the value of the trade shown in the customs
records.

In 1907-08, a peak year, the legal trade was

valued at £ 279,000, while in 1910-11 it fell to £ 68,000, a
reduction of £ 211,000. [54] The naval blockade helped, but
it was not cost effective.

As long as the arms market was
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open at Muscat, a large number of weapons would slip
through.

The new approach was to use the blockade to show
,

the Sultan that Britain could, if it chose to devote
sufficient naval power tQ the, job, end the arms trade by
itself, and then pressure him into concessions.
I

At the

same, the growing Anglo-French alliance against Germany was
aiding diplomatic action to end the arms trade: in 1910
"

France agreed to a one year prohibition of the Muscat
trade.

As a part of any final agreement, however, the

French demanded
In

compensati~n

~ecember,

for their arms dealers.

[55]

1910, an armed clash occurred at Dubai

between sailors from H.M.S. HYACINTH and local Arabs.
(Discussed below in Chapter VI.) One result of this crisis
was to show the French how serious the British were about
the arms trade in the Gulf. Early in 1913, France dropped
the proposal to exchange of Gambia for helping end the arms
trade, and suggested that the matter could be settled
locally through compensation for the arms dealers.

Before

this offer could be fully considered, it was withdrawn, and
the exchange of Gambia again demanded.
unacceptable, and matters stalled.

This was

[56]

Action was needed, for the French were responsible for
a higher and higher percentage of the arms trade.

Sir

Arnold T. Wilson summarized the observations he made in 1911
on the national origin of the arms and the arms traders in
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the Gulf:
I had ascertained, by examlnlng rifles and boxes
of ammunition, that practically the whole trade
was conducted by French firms, though many of the
rifles and some of the ammunition were made in
Germany. There was little British-made ammunition
and very few British rifles. The few I saw
antedated the South African war by several years
and had probably passed through several hands and
many countries. [57]
with the French unwilling to help, even with the
anti-German alliance in place, Percy Cox suggested a local
solution.

Be proposed that the Sultan of Muscat establish a

bonded warehouse, effectively under British direction, to
control the export of all arms from Muscat. After receiving
approval, Cox wrote to Sultan Faisal in November, 1911.
Cox's letter threatened to end "those cordial relations
which have now so long existed between the British
Government and Your Highness and your ancestors" if Faisal
Qid not break relations with the arms dealers.

The Sultan

agreed to the warehouse and the new control regulations on
condition that the British deal with any resulting action
from the French; that the regulations not violate any of
Oman's existing international treaties; that he be given
time between the the announcement and enforcement of the
regulations; and that he be compensated for the reduction in
the income he received from the duty on arms.

[58]

After the preliminary agreement, it still took time to
work out the details of the regulations, and to obtain
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Faisal's signature.

Cox was forced to promise, in writing,

that Britain would "dispose of" any problems that might
develop with other states: that the Sultan would be
compensated for his losses: that the regulations would not
hinder the importation of arms needed by Omanis: and that
the agreement would not extend British rights to act within
Omani territory.

[59]

The internal politics of Oman impelled Faisal's
agreement to the warehouse.

Underlying tribal and religious

splits in the country were easily inflamed by events, and
the tribes of Oman were already angry with the Sultan
because of his co-operation with the British in ending the
slave trade.

Gertrude Bell, in an intelligence dispatch

written in 1916, reported that one of the reasons Faisal had
issued the regulations was to stop weapons from reaching his
internal enemies.

Faisal: "saw in the suppression of the

arms trade ••• a distinct advantage to himself, since his
rebellious subjects became unable to furnish themselves with
weapons to use against him."

[60]

After additional details of the arms control measures
were clarified, the Sultan issued the regulations for the
warehouse in late June, 1911:
Whereas large quantities of arms and ammunition
are at present stored without proper control in
private buildings distributed in this our town of
Muscat ••• have resolved to remedy this state of
affairs ••• by the construction and establishment
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~f a special Customs Warehouse ••• for the storage
iof arms and ammunition under safe precautions •••
IFirstly, on or about the 1st September next all
iarms and ammunition or parts thereof imported into
Imy territories will be taken directly from the
isteamer to the Control •••• Secondly, similarly
iall arms dealers in my territories will be
irequired to deposit stocks remaining in their
ihands on 1st September in the said warehouse.
i ••• [Thirdly, payment of duty] ••• Fourthly, the
iwithdrawal of arms from the warehouse will be
I regulated by the issue of special licenses,
i prepared by the super intendent [of the warehouse]
I and signed by myself.
Fifthly, such licenses will
I not be granted to traders, but only to approved
_individual purchasers ••• on the production of
, satisfactory proof that the number , quantity, and
destination of the arms and ammunition, etc., to
be withdrawn from the warehouse are free from
justifiable objections. • •• [61]
~ocal

reaction to the controls was strong.

The Sheikh

of the Ibadhi sect: "roused the country by his preaching, in
which he represented the arms warehouse as a device of the
English to deprive the tribes of Oman of modern weapons

.. ."

In May, 1913, the Imam of the Hinawa tribes joined the
rebellion.

[62] The British sent two Rajput regiments from

India in July, 1913, to defend Muscat and the-Sultan. The
city was safe, but the Sultan clearly had little authority
far beyond its gates.

The civil war lasted until 1920. [63]

Still, local problems could be controlled
The French Consul also objected, however.

He

maintained that restrictions on trade were as illegal under
the various Muscat treaties as complete prohibitions would
be.

His view was repeated by the French Ambassador in

London. Their initial reaction quickly mode,rated, and the
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Ambassador made it clear that compensation for the French
arms dealers was the vital issue.

[641 with the growing

tensions in Europe, both parties felt strong pressure to
settle the Muscat dispute, particularly as the Muscat Dhows
issue had been resolved at the Hague. Germany had become the
common threat to both Britain and France.
As the September deadline set forth in regulations
approached, the British feared that any action to enforce
them against the French would lead to a real clash between
the two allies.
quickly.

But the dispute could not be ended that

The regulation was considered to have come into

effect in September, but no action was taken against the
French arms merchants.
stocks of weapons.

They continued to hold their own

The new dispute involved the nature of

any compensation granted: the British were willing to
compensate French arms merchants for business 10ssesJ they
were not willing to compensate France for a loss of treaty
rights.

Tension grew and France demanded full compensation,

while Britain was not prepared to admit that the treaties
had been violated.

[65] Both nations claimed to see the

issue as a point of honor.
The Entente proved, however, more important to France
than the Muscat arms trade.
assured, was avoided.

A real crisis, otherwise nearly

In May, 1913, France agreed to delay

consideration of the treaty rights if compensation were paid
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to the arms dealers.
settled.

After some squabbling, the matter was

Britain paid the French firms of Dieu and Goguyer

£ 64,494 for their stocks of arms and their predicted

profits.

At the same time, France renounced:

the right of invoking, on behalf of French
citizens, the privileges conferred on these by the
Treaty between France and Muscat, 1844, in so far
as such privileges and immunities are opposed to
the regulations and laws for the prevention of the
contraband trade in arms and ammunition in Mascat.
[66]
Some 9,000 rifles were confiscated from the arms
merchants in Muscat. Along with ammunition seized, the value
of the weapons was estimated to be £ 40,000. Many of the
rifles proved useful during the World War: 3,000

~ere

used

to help defend the Mohammera oilfields in Persia, 2,700 were
shipped to India, 2,600 were sent to England and used for
training, while the remainder were destroyed or sold in
Oman. The naval blockade remained in effect until after the
start of the World War, and was finally ended in August,
1915. [67]
The new controls at Muscat seem to have finally
succeeded in stopping the arms traffic through Muscat. In
addition to the purchase of European owned stocks, firmer
action was taken against dealers not protected by a European.
power, including "the banishment for 5 years of the
notorious Baluchi arms trader Ali Musa Khan." The warehouse,
and the related measures, "stopped 90% of the former illegal
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trade" at Muscat. [68] The customs records, for example,
show that the value of arms imported at Muscat fell
dramatically from £ 184,050 in 1912-13, to £ 13,550 the next
year.

The French trade had all but ceased in 1910-11, while

British trade rose sharply in 1912-13, before nearly ending
i tse 1 f in 1914. [ 69]
Figure 3 charts the rises and falls in the Muscat arms
trade compared with the non-arms trade.

For most of the

1895-1914 period there is a general correlation between the
two figures.

In 1913-14 they part sharply, however, with

the level of the arms trade dropping to the lowest level of
the entire period while general trade rose dramatically.
Ironically, the flow of private arms had been stopped just
before for the massive influx of weapons during World War I.
The spoils left by the Turkish and British armies, or given
to the tribal allies of both, would soon dwarf the former
private trade.
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CHAPTER

VI

THE PRIVATE ARMS TRAFFIC IN THE SECONDARY GULF PORTS
AND THE RED SEA AND THE INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
OF ARMS IN ARABIA
While Muscat was the major arms entrepot in the
Persian Gulf, the secondary ports of Arabia served as the
final points of entry to the Peninsula north of Oman. Thus,
as the trade developed in Oman, it also developed along the
Arabian coast to the north.
SECONDARY GULF PORTS
Bahrein
During the later l890s, Bahrein became a major
secondary port for arms sold in the Gulf. Shipments from
Europe were generally transshipped to the Sheikhdom via
Muscat, and then sold to Arab or Persian tribesmen and
traders.

In 1894-95, the question of whether the Al Bu Ali

tribe of Qatar owned Bahrein, or whether the island was
independent, arose as it had at various times in the past.
Sheikh Isa of Bahrein was threatened with an attack from
Qatar, and it took the destruction of the Al Bu Ali's boats
by a British warship to prevent an invasion.

(1] The danger
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faced by Sheikh Isa now helped drive the growth of the arms
trade in the central Gulf.
The Sheikh was, understandably, disturbed by the
danger.

During the threatened attack, there had been fewer

than one hundred rifles in his territory.

In January 1896,

the Sheikh acted to improve his supply of arms.

He issued a

proclamation establishing a special fine (customs duty) on
any arms imported to Bahrein equal to one-fourth of their
value.

Then, he granted a special exemption, amounting to a

monopoly on imported arms, to his Wazir. The concession
prevented the

re~sale

of arms to residents of Bahrein, Qatar

or the Arabian coast north of Oman. The conditions of the
monopoly were designed to insure a steady supply of arms for
the Sheikh, for it required the concessionaire to pay "an
annual royalty of 30 Martini rifles and 6,000 cartridges in
addition to customs duty in kind at a rate of three rifles
in every hundred and 200 cartridges per rifle."

[2] Again,

the rifle is the Martini, by 1896 clearly the standard arm
of the region.
The concession was transferred first to an Arab
merchant, Agha Muhammad Rahim, and by him to Fracis, Times
and Company. The trade increased "with phenomenal
rapidity."

Lorimer traced the increase in the arms trade at

Bahrein by its value: in 1894-95 it equalled £990; in
1895-96, £6,360; in 1896-97, £94,725; and in 1897-98,
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£311,386. [3] within four years the arms trade increased by
over 300 times.

Without giving percentages of the trade

going to each place, Lorimer states that the arms imported
to Bahrein were sold to visitors from various Persian or
Arabian regions.

For Arabia he mentions Kuwait, Nedj and

Oman as the major destinations, with Bahrein itself and
Qatar as secondary destinations.

A substantial number of

arms were clearly reaching Arabia by way of Bahrein. [4]
The trade through Bahrein was soon disrupted by the
Sheikh himself.

In April, 1897, Sheikh Isa "became alarmed

at the growth of the trade" and ordered that it be suspended
for four months.

Shortly thereafter, a disagreement

developed between Agha Muhammad Rahim and Fracis, Times and
Company over the distribution of profits, and in January
1898 the Sheikh "attached" the Company's entire stock of
weapons.
seized.

Some 2,667 rifles and 637,500 cartridges were
[5]

Isa appears to have had several reasons for his
actions.

In his Appendix on the Arms Trade, Lorimer assigns

two possible motives: first, that the Sheikh was concerned
over the selling of arms to his own peop1e1 and second, that
Agha Muhammad Rahim had asked the Sheikh to act because of
his dispute over profits with Fracis, Times and Company.
Rahim was, however, also the British political
representative in Bahrein, and Lorimer notes that while the
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Sheikh's:
action was not in any way prompted by the
British authorities, but it may have been
instigated by Agha Muhammad Rahim, who, ••• had
recently become aware that the British Government
, ••• viewed that traffic with disfavor.
Lorimer then notes that Lt. Col. Meade, visited
Bahrein in February, 1898, examined the arms, and refused to
either take control of the weapons or intervene for Fracis,
Times and Company to gain their release.

[6]

Lorimer's position that the British were not behind
the seizure of the arms is undercut by a statement he makes
elsewhere.

An incident in 1899 made the British question

the "power" and "loyalty" of Sheikh lIsa of Bahrein.
A warehouse belonging to the Shaikh, in which
had been deposited a quantity of arms, the
property of the Anglo-Parsi firm of Fracis, Times
and Co. BUT AT THE TIME UNDER SEQUESTRATION AT THE
INSTANCE OF THE BRITISH POLITICAL AUTHORITIES, was
feloniously entered by night; [7]
Two Hindus guards, who were British subjects, were
wounded.

The "ringleaders" were one "Sharidah," a

"high-handed official of the Shaikh ••• his son Fahad, and
one Amir Salih-bin-Rashid, an old favorite servant of the
Shaikh." After British pressure, the men were exiled from
Bahrein for a year and indemnity paid to the injured men.
[8] Despite Lorimer's denial in his Arms Appendix of any
British role in the Sheikh's seizure of the arms, it is
clear that they in fact helped bring about the
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confiscation.
The arms were held until 1906, when the Sheikh
returned them to Fracis, Times and Company "in a much
damaged condition, on the understanding that they should not
be sold in Bahrein, or Qatar, or on the Arab Coast." [9] By
this time, however, the company may already have been
bankrupt as a result of losing its legal cases against the
British Government. The arms trade at Bahrein was further
I

damaged by concerted British action.

During his February,

1898 visit, Lt. Col. Meade pressured the Sheikh into signing
an agreement banning the import and export of arms in
Bahrein. Any arms were to be confiscated, and British and
Persian war ships were given the power to search Bahreini
vessels in Bahreini, British or Persian waters.

The

agreement was effective, and only "small seizures" were made
after this.

[10] A major secondary arms port had been

closed for the moment.
During 1904-1905, political and commercial activity
again picked up in Bahrein. A clash developed involving the
British, French and the Sheikh. In 1904, the French
Ambassador in London, supporting French subjects interested
in pearling in the Gulf, asked "if there would be any
objection to inclusio~ of Bahrain in the jurisdiction of the
French Vice-Consulate at Bushehr." The Government of India
suggested that London delay an answer until related issues,
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presumably the problems at Muscat, had been settled.

The

French traders soon left Bahrain, and the French Government
did not ask again.
however.

[11] This was not the entire picture,

Lorimer later reports on what was probably the

same group of French merchants:
In the summer of 1905 Baharin was visited by a
French family interested in the pearl trade, who
were joined there by M. Goguyer, the notorious
Anglophobe arms dealer of Masqat. A memorial
against his own treatment by the British
Government, which was sent by Shaikh 'Isa a little
latter to the Secretary of State for India and to
the Viceroy of India, was probably inspired by M.
Goguyer. [12]
British officials either believed that there was a
link between the, French pearling interests and the arms
trade of M. Goguyer, or were simply reacting xenophobically
to the presence of the French in the Gulf. Lorimer's
thinking is interesting because of his apparent belief that
Sheikh Isa would only object to British action if he were
put up to it by a third party.
As the direct trade with Persia became more difficult,
a number of arms were shipped first to Qatar, then on to
Bahrein where they were sold to Persian buyers.

While

technically outside of the Arabian trade, the process is of
some importance in showing local resistance to the British
control efforts.

The main traders involved were based in

Qatar, but neither they nor their Persian customers would
directly visit each others ports.

Instead, they used
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Bahrein as a transshipment point.

The new British Political

Resident, Major Percy Cox, was not able to stop the trade,
for it seems that both Sheikh Isa and his son gave it
protection.

[13]

Communications in 1905 provide insight into the likely
operation of the smaller arms smugglers.

A number of

British dispatches decried acts of piracy committed by
"Ahmed-bin-Selman" in the Gulf near Bahrain. They
specifically note that he took refuge in "Turkish territory"
with the approval of the Ottomans. (The Arabian coast north
of Qatar was clearly Turkish territory, and Qatar was
claimed by the Ottomans.) While the piracy seems to have
been a very small affair, it nevertheless gained the
attention of the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, and the
military Commander in Chief, Lord Kitchener and precipitated
questions regarding the failure of Sheikh Isa to deal with
the pirate.
prestige.

The piracy was seen as threatening British
[14] Arms shipments are not specifically

mentioned, but the link between the two was generally firm
enough to

b~

likely in this case.

The pattern of the arms

trade thus involved shipments between Bahrein, el Basa, and
other areas of the Gulf, with the pirates probably stationed
on the mainland.
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Kuwait
The arms trade at Kuwait began later than that of
Muscat: only after Sheikh Mubarak took power from his
brother in 1896 did it start at all.

The volume was so

small at first that the trade did not attract British
attention until 1899, when "fairly large quantities of arms"
were reported being shipped from Muscat to Kuwait. The
"customs contractor of Kuwait port" attached a duty of $MT 2
per rifle, and Sheikh Mubarak added a "royalty" of $MT 4.
The volume of the trade was still apparently small, but the
British were concerned.

[15]

The British feared that Kuwait would replace Bahrein
as "the principal arms mart of the upper Persian Gulf." The
new Political Resident, Lt. Col. C.A. Kemba11, visited the
Sheikh in May, 1900, and gained a control agreement similar
to that signed earlier at Bahrein. The agreement banned the
arms trade at Kuwait and allowed for the search of Kuwaiti
vessels.

Even though Sheikh Mubarak "entered into these

agreements with unexpected readiness," they failed to limit
the trade for several reasons, according to Lorimer. Kuwaiti
vessels were still sailing under the Turkish flag, making it
"inexpedient" for the British to search them.

In addition,

the British felt that to limit the trade at Kuwait would
have "been to influence materially the course of Central
Arabian affairs."

[16] And the British consistently
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resisted taking action that would draw them geographically
and politically deeper into Arabia. It is certain that
Sheikh Mubarak was fully aware of the inability of the
British to enforce the agreements when he signed them.

[17]

The British fear that stopping the trade at Kuwait
would affect internal Arabian affairs is important, for it
reveals a major arms route to central Arabia. Lorimer states
that:
Ibn Sa'ud of Southern·Najd drew h~s supply" of
arms from Kuwait, and that "It is probable that,
with the exception of .those received through
Qatar, nearly the whole of the arms and ammunition
imported into Najd for use in the wars of
1900-1904 were brought into the country through
Kuwait. [18]
The arms entering Kuwait that did not pass on to Nejd
were smuggled into TU,rkish and Persian territory.
The Saudi need for arms caused additional concern to
the Br i tish, for it gave, an opening to other powers wishing
to enter the Gulf. In 1903, the Russian cruiser BOYARIN and
the French cruiser INFERNET visited Kuwait; Abdul Aziz ibn
Saud was in the Kuwait at the same time.

The Captain of

BOYARIN, joined by the Russian Consul from Bushire, visited
Abdul Aziz twice, and the Saudi leader's brother visited the
Russian ship, where he received a five gun salute.
Commander Kemp or H.M.S. SPHINX "suggested" to Abdul Aziz
that it was:
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••• undesirable that foreign European countries
should interfere in the affairs of Nejd, and
suggested that he should refuse any offers made to
him on behalf of the Russian Government, and that,
as Great Britain was the predominant Power in the
Persian Gulf, and intended to remain so, it would
not, in the end, pay him to do anything of which
she disapproved.
Abdul Aziz ••• pointed out the Arnir of Nejd
(i.e. Ibn Rashid) received money and support from
the Turkish Government, and that it was necessary
for him to have money to retain the support of the
Arab tribes in his efforts against the Arnir.
I think it likely that Abdul Aziz will take
anything from the Russians he can get, and that
Mubarak will back him up in doing so, and it is
possible that some definite arrangement was
entered into on this occasion. [191
No direct evidence that the Saudis received Russian
arms has been found, though the Russian steamer TROUVER did
deliver a large shipment (25 cases of arms) to Kuwait
several years later.

The TROUVER shipment may have been the

result of the 1903 conversations between the Russian
officers and the Saudis. [20] In any case, the threat was
enough to worry the British, and it may help explain why
they were willing to aid the arms supply through Kuwait to
Nejd: better the private arms dealers, than the Russian or
French Governments.
Kuwait continued to be a major supply point for the
Saudis, and in September, 1904, Percy Cox reported that
"Small supplies of food, arms, and ammunition proceed to the
interior almost weekly," thus giving a steady source of
suppl ies.

[21]
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The trade through Kuwait increased rapidly, it seems,
after a

vi~it

by the "ubiquitous" French dealer from Muscat,

M. Goguyer. Goguyer stayed in Kuwait "practically as the
guest of the Sheikh." He began shipping arms from Muscat "as
the Shaikh's private property."

In August, 1904 over 40

cases of rifles were landed at Kuwait, and stored in the
Sheikh's warehouse.

Early in 1905, the rate of import was

estimated by the British to be about 1,000 rifles per
month.

Of these, about 42% arrived by steamer, while 58%

were shipped by "native vessels."

[22) Captain Knox,

British Political Agent in Kuwait, reported in February,
1905, that every two weeks the British India steamer
delivered 200 rifles to Kuwait. Dhows carried the rest of
the 12,000 rifles imported each year.

All came from Muscat.

A Martini sold at Kuwait for $MT 36 and a Mauser for $MT 42.
A good rifle could be resold to the bedouins for $MT 100.
[23) Lorimer estimates that Sheikh Mubarak received an
annual income of some $MT 50,000 from the arms trade.
Mubarak "denied" that there was any arms trade through
Kuwait, while Goguyer "asserted that he held written
authority from the Sheikh to import arms into Kuwait." [24)
Half of the Kuwaiti imports were resold to buyers from
Persia, half to buyers from "Turkish" territory, including
Nejd. While Kuwait was vital to Nejd's supply of arms, Nejd
was not as important to Kuwait's arms trade.

Most of the
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arms sold to "Turkish" territory went to the area of Iraq
between Basra and Baghdad. [25]
Captain Knox's report gives an insight into the nature
of Goguyer's organization and activity in the Gulf. Goguyer
had a permanent agent in Kuwait, Haji Abdullah Thahaba, to
oversee the market in the sheikhdom.

Apparently, Thahaba

charged so high a price for his guns that he sold few if any
directly.

Knox stated that: "He is not a fool, and it is

more likely that his trade is a blind, while the information
that he sends to Goguyer at Muscat is no doubt useful in
regulating Muscat prices."

[26] If Knox was right, Goguyer

maintained a complex and sophisticated organization in the
Gulf.
Despite official objections to the Kuwaiti arms trade,
there is evidence that the British tolerated, and may have
actually supported, the shipment of guns to Sheikh Mubarak
and then to the Saudis. They were not, however, as
interested in arming the Al Saud, as they were in
safeguarding Kuwait's independence from the Ottomans. A May
1904, dispatch from the Government of India to the Secretary
of State for India noted that:
Our influence with the Sheikh of Kowait has
increased concurrently with the success of his
friend, Bin Saoud, and if, as a result of active
intervention on our part for the purpose of
preventing Mubarak from helping Bin Saoud, and of
preventing the importation of arms, Turkish
influence were allowed to determine the supremacy
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of the Turkish nominee against Bin Saoud, our
prestige at Koweit must suffer materially, and it
would probably ••• mean absorption of Nejd by the
Turks. [27]
If Nejd fell to the Ottomans, Kuwait would be
out-flanked, and could easily be attacked by the Ottomans or
their surrogates, the Al Rashid. Thus, the British "might be
compelled once more to render Mubarak active assistance
against the Turks." The authorities in India wished to
influence events in central Arabia by allowing the Saudis to
continue importing weapons.

[28]

British actions regarding the Kuwaiti arms trade did
not escape public attention in the Gulf. An article appeared
in the September 16, 1904, issue of the Cairo paper
Al-Ahram, signed by its "Special Correspondent at Muscat",
A. Rahim. Major Grey, the Political Agent at Muscat,
believed the true author to be Goguyer. [29] The general
tone of the article is strongly anti-British.

Throughout,

it accuses the "English" of conspiring to separate Kuwait
and Iraq from Ottoman authority.

(Irony rings through the

twelve years between the Al Ahram article and the
Anglo-French Sykes-Picot Agreement dividing the middle east
between them.)

The heart of the article, however, is a

description of the method supposedly used by the British to
ship arms to Sheikh Mubarak for the Al Saud and other groups
in "rebellion" against the Ottomans.
All that he (i.e. Mubarak) requires comes from
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India, ••• Mail steamers call once a week at
Koweit via Muscat, and the Koweit merchants ship
every week hundreds of, rifles and ammunition, 'c.,
to Koweit •••• they write on the cases containing
fire-arms 'cases containing sweetmeats,' and those
holding cartridges, 'dried limes.' The Customs
officials at Muscat do not inquire about the
contents of the cases, while the English officers,
who last year made such a noise, when they found a
Frenchmen carrying six revolvers, shut their eyes
when these cases are concerned. • •• Thus
Ibn-i-Saood obtains his arms from Koweit and the
latter from the English1 and so the English are
the agents who supply the Arabs with arms. [30]
After this description of a semi-official arms trade
through Kuwait, the article charges that the British had
incited most of the inter-tribal trouble in Iraq and
northern Arabia, all with the goal of seizing control of
Kuwait and Iraq itself.

The Ottomans were urged to "seek

the aid of the French and the Russians, in order to defend
yourselves against this aggression, nothing else will
prevent their (i.e., the English) intrigues."

[31]

While much of the article is an anti-English
philippic, its description of the arms trade at Kuwait rings
true, and is generally confirmed by Major Grey, in a
dispatch analyzing the article.

He first states that he

believes the article to have been written by Goguyer, then
tacitly admits the general truth of Al-Ahram's report on the
arms trade.
(3.) The article clearly implies that arms are
imported into Koweit by the English. M. Goguyer
knows well that the (apparent) inconsistency of
publicly forbidding and privately encouraging the
importation of arms by us would be thoroughly
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understood by the natives in the present
circumstances, and the manner in which the ideas
are expressed in this extract bears the stamp of
his ingenious manipulations.
(4.) It is possible that the writer's remarks
concerning the conveyance of arms to Koweit by
merchants in mail steamers are made in the hope of
inducing action to be taken, which will leave the
Koweit field in possession of those who send their
consignments in dhows, as M. Goguyer does ••• [32]
This semi-official British role in the supply of arms
to Arabia through Kuwait is not directly supported by other
British sources, and few non-British sources have been
available.

It is reasonable, however, to believe that the

British did approve of the Kuwaiti trade, and Muscati
customs records show a substantial British involvement in
the trade throughout the period.

[33} The British had no

reason to prevent British arms and influence from reaching
Nejd. Their primary reason for acting against the arms trade
was to prevent weapons reaching tribes or groups overtly
hostile to them - whether on the shores of the Gulf, or on
the Northwest Frontier.
The arms trade continued to be extremely active at
Kuwait through Lorimer's final comments on the 1905-1907
period.

In 1906 the Kuwait Political Agent, Captain Knox,

pressed the Sheikh to stop the trade, but there was only a
·slight lull n as a result of the protest, and "by the month
of September, 1906, it was once more in full vigour.n

[34]

Even if the British had acted consistently in opposition to

122

the arms trade at Kuwait, it could not be ended as long as
"the tap at Muscat was not shut off."

[35]

"Turkish" Arabia: Iraq and el Hasa via Kuwait
Information on the private arms trade into these
regions is limited.

Lorimer mentions the 1901 capture by

the Ottomans, just off the Qatar coast, of arms "intended
for Shaikh Jasim-bin-Thani." During 1904-05 some arms
apparently reached Iraq from Persia and Kuwait. In these
years, at least, the Gulf ports do not appear to have been a
supply point for the Al Rashid, for Lorimer notes that:
The Turks seem to have done nothing to
facilitate the obtaining of rifles and ammunition
from the Gulf by Ibn Rashid of Jabal Shammar,
their nominal representative in Central "Arabia,
during the war in Central Arabia. [36]
It was clearly in Ottoman interests to control as much
of the arms supply reaching their client as possible.

They

would not have wanted the Rashidi to develop a reliable,
independent, source of supply.

In any case, the Ottoman's

supplied the Al Rashid from Iraq and Syria. [37]
THE TRUCIAL COAST PORTS AND SMALLER PORTS
The arms traffic along the Trucial Coast was closely
linked to the traffic at Muscat, and developed during the
same years, reaching its peak between 1896-98. According to
Lorimer, the trade appears to have been mainly for internal
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consumption, but with some export to Persia. Lorimer
specifically credits the decline of the Trucial Coast arms
trade to the "glutting of the local market and to the
absence of communications with profitable markets in the
interior."

The trade was first centered at Ajman, then

became "general" along the coast, being carried on mainly by
Dubai. [38]
During its short period of operation, the arms trade
on the Trucial Coast is described by Heard-Bey as a
"sizeable" part of the region's imports.

She notes that

rifles were the "most treasured possession" of tribal Arabs,
and that there was a high demand for modern arms.

She,

however, states that many guns were re-exported to the
"tribes in Makran and other areas of the Persian Coast."
[39]
Even though the trade along the Trucial Coast appears
to have been fairly modest in size, controls were soon
imposed by the British. In 1902 the sheikhs of the Coast
signed agreements to prohibit arms and ammunition from being
imported to or exported from ·their territories.

The

agreements were motivated in part by the sheikhs'
apprehension over the arming of their own people, and in
part by pressure from the British Resident, Col. Kemball.
Compared with the thousands of weapons seized at Muscat,
only a few hundred Martini-Henries are mentioned by Lorimer
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as present in 1902. [40]
In the 1905-07 period, the arms trade along the
Trucial Coast was at "a standstill" [41], despite local
political trouble and the visit of M. Goguyer. In 1906
Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi was involved in a territorial
dispute with Sheikh Rashid of Umm al-Qaiwain.

Zayed was

trying to make his state dominant on the Trucial Coast,
while Rashid was trying to weaken the alliance headed by
Zayed. In 1906 Zayed "collected and armed his adherents" in
preparation for an attack on Umm al-Qaiwan territory."

The

matter took on wider dimensions from the British point of
view when it was reported that Goguyer " ••• had visited Umm
al-Qaiwain."

Percy Cox entered the dispute, and forced a

settlement of the political dispute between the Sheikhdoms
after threatening a bombardment of Abu Dhabi. [42] The
ending of the crisis further undercut the local market for
arms, again cited by Lorimer as a factor in the failure of
the Trucial Coast trade.

[43]

The trade on the Trucial Coast flared to notice with
an incident on December 27, 1910, that played a part in the
ending of the Muscat trade.

[44] H.M.S. HYACINTH was

patrolling along the coast when her captain learned of a
cache of arms at Dubai. He sent men ashore to search the
town, and was met with armed resistance by some of the local
population.

Before the fighting was over, thirty-seven
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Arabs had been killed.

In addition, four sailors died while

ten were wounded or missing.

The Gulf Resident, Percy Cox,

and the Commander-in-Chief East Indies arrived quickly to
clean up the mess.

[45]

The British, typically, demanded compensation from the
Sheikh, to the tune of 50,000 Rupees (Rs.) and 400 rifles.
They also demanded that the Sheikh accept a british agent
and facilities.

The Sheikh's reaction was strong.

While he

would pay compensation, he would not accept an agent, and
even protested to the American Consul in Muscat, presumably
in the hope of assistance.

Before Cox and the Royal Navy

could enforce their demands, however, London ordered them to
drop the idea of a British agent and facilities, lest these
demands disrupt Anglo-Turkish negotiations over Qatar. The
matter was resolved when the Sheikh handed over the money
and the guns.

[46] Britain was generally reluctant to

extend its influence or control inland, but the arming of
the sheikhdoms and tribes of the Trucial Coast was seen as a
possible threat to their maritime interests in the Gulf.
Thus, unlike the situation at Kuwait and in Nejd, they moved
quickly to stop the trade on the coast.
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Qatar
The small ports of Qatar together formed one of the
most important routes for the import of arms into southern
Nejd during the period of 1898-1905. The Ottoman claim to
Qatar prevented the British from taking any direct steps to
stop the shipment of weapons through the peninsula.

Lorimer

gives no hard information on the volume of the early trade.
[47]

By the end of 1906, the British appear to have gained
more solid information on the Qatar trade.

There was a

"flourishing trade" at the port of Dohah on the west coast
of the peninsula, where some 2,000 rifles a month were
delivered by "native craft" sailing from Muscat. The arms
cost about Rs 15 more per rifle than at Muscat, and an
import duty of Rs 3-8-0 was charged by the Sheikh of Dohah.
The bulk of the arms, some 75%, were sold to the "Central
Arabian market," with the remaining 25% going to Bahrein for
"sale to Persians." [48] Thus, some 1,500 rifles a month
were passing through Qatar for Nejd in 1906.
Mesopotamia and Kuwa'i t
The Ottomans maintained fairly tight control of guns
in Iraq, and except for the official transfers to client
tribes, the region does not seem to have been a major source
of arms, excepting those imported through Kuwait, until
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World War I. British interest, in fact, centered on Ottoman
imports later used in the War. Murphy discusses the arms
trade in Iraq under Turkish rule, and notes:
As far as gun-running was concerned, the center
of interest was not Basrah itself, but a place
called Magil, on the right bank of the Shatt
al-'Arab about four miles above that city. By
arrangement with the Turkish Government all
materials for the Baghdad railway arriving at
Basrah from overseas were dumped here without
being examined by the Turkish customs officials.
A good many rifles were smuggled ashore with the
railway material, and no doubt most of them were
used against us in the Great War. [49]
The Persian Coast
Information available about the arms trade along the
Persian coast gives a general indication of the volume of
trade, and of the types of weapons imported to the Gulf. In
his Appendix on the Arms Trade, Lorimer deals extensively
with the arms imported along the Persian coast of the Gulf,
and into Persian Makran. Referring to the 1898-1905 period,
he notes the capture of shipments ranging from a few hundred
to over 1,500 rifles.

Lorimer repeatedly mentions the

Martini-Henry as the weapon being imported.
named.

No other gun is

[50]
Slowly, it seems, the major Persian ports in the Gulf

were brought under control by the British and the Imperial
Persian Customs, and by 1905-1907 results were noticed.
While the controls may well have slowed the arms traffic in
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persia, the main effect was to shift the trade to the
smaller ports, where control was not possible.

In

particular, the central section of the Persian coast,
opposite Bahrein and Qatar, became a major area of
activity.

[51]

Persian Makran, the district of the Persian coast
bordered by the Gulf of Oman, was important to the trade
with Afghanistan, and was thus carefully investigated.

In

1906, Captain McConaghey, Assistant Political Resident in
British Makran, investigated the Karwan District (inland
from the coast) and found that:
••• almost every inhabitant ••• was armed with
some sort of breech-loading rifle: ••• The weapon
most prized was the Martini-Henry rifle or carbine
of English manufacture: but the .303 carbine
(i.e., the magazine-fed, smokeless-power
Lee-Metford) had begun to find favour with the
well-to-do classes. The arms carried by the poor
were generally obsolete military rifles of
Russian, French or German models, ••• [52]
DJIBOUTI AND THE RED SEA PORTS
OF ARABIA
Much less information on the arms trade in the Red Sea
is available than for the Gulf. Fortunately, Bidwell has
reprinted a number of British diplomatic dispatches that
give some information on the Red Sea trade.

The major

British concern was with the general pattern of the trade,
involving the shipment of arms from Djibouti to Arabia, and
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then back to Africa. The trade was considered a problem not
because of the entry of weapons into Arabia, but because of
their re-exportation to Africa. Beachey discusses the
pattern of the trade shortly after its shift from southern
Africa:
This new pattern of the arms trade, as seen by
British Residents at Aden, Muscat, and Berbera,
was as follows: Suri Arabs, from Sur, south of
Muscat, were engaged in carrying dates from Sur,
Bussorah, and other ports on the Arabian coast, to
Aden and then to the North Somali ports. After
discharging their dates, they would proceed to
Jibouti, where the trade in arms was practically
unchecked, though no doubt contrary to French
orders. At Jibouti the dhow masters purchased
arms with the proceeds from their sales of dates.
These arms were then taken down and sold at the
Benadir coast ports on the way to Zanzibar, where
they usually went for a return freight for the
south-west monsoon, which gave the dhows a fair
wind back to Sur and the Persian Gulf. The whole
operation might entail up to a year. It was
lucrative and the work was not arduous. Profits
were high. [53]
The winds may have played a major part in the pattern
of the Djibouti trade.

The local captains thought it better

to sail from the French colony to Arabian ports such as Ras
al Ara, Mokke, and Macullah, in Yemen or Aden for
transshipment to vessels from the African coast than to sail
directly down the coast.

Beachey suggests that one group of

dhows exported the arms from Djibouti, while another group
carried some of the guns back to Africa by way of the
monsoons.

This pattern clearly supported the substantial

Arabian section of the business: the British Resident at
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Aden, in fact, reported in 1901 the capture of French Gras
rifles, early single-shot breech-loaders, those captured
being dated 1874. [54] By sailing first to Arabia the native
vessels gained an additional benefit, evading any French
attempts to enforce the Brussels Act. This, of course also
allowed the French to claim that they did not allow arms to
be. shipped to Africa.
Much of the trade was apparently carried in dhows
flying the French flag.

Captain Dugmore reported in 1894

that weapons could easily be purchased from a company in
Aden for later delivery on vessels protected by the French
flag.

The Captain implies a direct French military role in

the trade at this time, noting talk at Aden that "there can
never be any difficulty in getting arms into the country so
long as there is a French man-of-war at Zanzibar." The Arab
sailors captured with arms reported that there was no
official inspection at Djibouti, in any case, to stop the
export of arms.

And Suri vessels were now gaining the

protection of the French flag through a method similar to
that used earlier during the height of the slave trade.

The

owners simply purchased plots of land at Djibouti which they
visited once a year, and were issued French papers.

[55]

This was eight years before Ottavi began distributing the
flag at Muscat.
The volume of trade through Djibouti was very high,
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and while many of the arms imported there were transshipped
to Africa, a high proportion clearly ended up at Muscat or
other Arabian ports.

Beachey reports that in the four weeks

from August 7, to September 3, 1902.five steamers arrived at
Djibouti: three were French, one British and one Belgian.
They delivered 985 cases of arms, normally loaded with
twenty rifles per case, for a total of about 20,000 guns,
and 625 cases of cartridges, at about 1,600 per case, for a
total of some one million rounds of ammunition.

In

addition, a large amount of lead was delivered.

All within

a month.

During one nine day period in August, 1902, ten

dhows left Djibouti, each shipping an average of 80 to 100
rifles with some 100 rounds per gun.

[56]

The Italians had started their conquest of Eritrea in
the l880s, and despite their defeat by the Ethiopians in
1896 at the Battle of Aduwa, they continued to occupy the
coastal region.

Both the British and the Italians faced

raids and armed resistance from Mohammed bin Abdullah (the
Mad Mullah) in their respective Somaliland colonies.

The

fighting lasted from 1899 till 1905, when he gained
recognition for a semi-independent region in the Italian
colony.

Despite this settlement, fighting continued at

various levels of intensity, and only ended after Abdullah's
death in 1920. [57] Both powers thus faced military
opposition in African colonies easily supplied by arms
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traders from Djibouti.
Throughout the first years of the century, the British
and the Italians expressed considerable concern about the
shipment of arms from Djibouti to Arabia, and then back to
Africa. During 1905, the British and Italian ambassadors to
Paris approached the French government hoping to obtain
French cooperation in controlling the Djibouti trade.

On

June 20, 1905, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord
Lansdowne, wrote to the British Ambassador to France to
report the French reply.

The French Minister of Marine

claimed that control measures on the African coast were
adequate, and that a French warship was not needed in the
area:
Moreover, the Governor of the French Somali
Coast reports that since his arrival in the Colony
on the 5th. August, 1904, no native vessel flying
the French flag has been reported to him as
carrying arms or ammunition intended to be landed
at any point of the French Coast, or of the
neighboring Italian or British Colonies. [58]
The transshipment of arms via Arabia allowed the
French Government to deny any knowledge of the illegal
African arms trade, while still protecting that trade, and
the trade to Muscat. Lansdowne understood what the French
were doing, and continued:
Your Excellency will perceive that the above
observations of the French Ambassador contain no
allusion to the export of arms from Jibouti to the
opposite Arabian Coast for re-exportation to that
of Africa. As this is the manner in which the
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traffic is chiefly conducted, it will doubtless be
necessary again to approach the French Government
on the subject. Before doing so, however, I have
thought it advisable to consult the Italian
Government, ••• [59]
Given French failure to respond to the problem as seen
by the British, the Foreign Office agreed to an India Office
proposal to send the British Resident at Aden to Djibouti
and Berbera to directly investigate the arms traffic.

It

was expected that the French would cooperate with the
investigation.

Later, however, they rejected the contention

that any further regulations were needed to control the arms
trade.

[60] Unfortunately, Bidwell fails to print the

Resident's report which probably includes detailed
information on the Djibouti arms market.
Throughout the seas surrounding Arabia, there was
continued trouble with piracy, and the general pattern
ind,icates that those native vessels engaged in occasional
piracy were also involved in the slave trade and the traffic
in arms.

British diplomatic dispatches, printed by Bidwell,

contain repeated mention of piracy along the Yemeni coast.
And British authorities appear to have used the excuse of
suppressing pirates to attack slavery and the arms trade, in
both the Gulf and the Red Sea.
The charge that the native craft were pirates was of
considerable practical importance to ,the British, for if
upheld, it stripped the vessel and crew of any real legal
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protection against search and seizure.

Lauterpacht states

the international law that applied, and still applies, to
pirates:
A pirate and his vessel lose ipso facto by an
act of piracy the protection of their flag State
and their national character. Every maritime
State has, by a customary rule of the Law of
Nations, the right to punish pirates. And the
vessels of all nations, whether men-of-war, other
public vessels, or merchantmen, can chase, attack,
and seize the pirate on the open sea, and bring
him home for trial and punishment by the courts of
their own country. [61]
In late September, 1905 H.M.S. FOX was sent to the Red
Sea, with orders to cooperate with the British Vice-Consul
at Hodeida, Yemen. They were to obtain compensation for
certain recent acts of piracy and "unless local authorities
immediately destroy pirate boats, this had better be done by
His Majesty's ship."

[62] The FOX, with the aid of Turkish

troops, entered the pirate harbor and seized ten boats, but
had to return for reinforcements before attacking the
villages.
action.

[63] The Ottoman Government objected to the Fox's
[64] It is not clear as to whether the vessels were

actually pirates, or if the British were using an excuse to
destroy boats engaged in the arms trade.
A full report on the operation was sent on October 7,
1905, by Captain J.B. Eustace, Senior Naval Officer, Aden
Division, from aboard H.M.S. FOX. The events had been
precipitated by the destruction in June of the sambok
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ALWANI, a boat under British protection, by pirates from the
Yemeni coast.

Captain Eustace issued three demands to the

Ottoman military and civil authorities of the Hodeidah
district.

First, he demanded the payment of compensation,

$MT 3,717 plus

£

4907 second, and most important for the

subject of this paper, he demanded "destruction of all
piratical boats between Hodeidah and Ras Mutenina, (i.e.,
Ras Miteina) belonging to the Zaranikhs or Karashias"; and
third, the arrest and punishment "as soon as possible" of
the culprits.

He then began planning a combined

military-naval expedition against the "pirates" at
"Ghuleifaka" (i.e., Gulfeika, some ten miles south of
Hodeidah.) [65]
The compensation was fully paid, in part immediately,
in part after H.M.S. FOX informally blockaded Hodeidah. The
first military operation, undertaken by FOX and two Turkish
gunboats with 100 Ottoman troops, was only able to capture a
few Yemeni samboks (small coastal vessels).

After returning

to Hodeidah, the British determined that the Mayor of
Hodeidah, Seyyid Ahmed Pasha, had warned the tribesmen of
the expedition.

A second expedition on October 2-5, using

the Turkish gunboats and British launches armed with Maxim
machine guns, captured or destroyed a number of samboks.
Captain Eustace specifically mentions the capture of the
sambok MOTASSAHIL, "belonging to the Chief of the Karashia
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tribe."

The boat was involved in the arms trade:

As she had evidently just landed a cargo of arms
(an arms chest with a newly-broken lid was found
in her), at the request of Commodore Arif I
ordered her seizure. • •• Subsequent information
at Hodeidah showed that this sambok "Motassahil"
is a well-known gun-runner. When searching her
the Turkish officials with me told the interpreter
not to report or see any of the evidence of
gun-running. I, however, personally assisted, so
they were unable to deny the facts I pointed out.
[66]

The expedition was not a great success, because the
samboks were small enough to be pulled inland and many had
been hidden.

Captain Eustace did not believe that the

problem of piracy could be ended without a fairly large land
force to search for and destroy the boats.

This would have

to await the subjugation of the region by the Ottomans, who
were then fully involved inland with the revolt of the Imam
Yaya. Because of this, and the poor quality of the Ottoman
naval officers, no further action could be taken.

Captain

Eustace reported, however, that the Governor of Hodeidah
was:
••• most grateful for my information upon the
arms traffic and smuggling of arms now going on
into Yemen. Upon my showing him a telegram from
Perim of the 6th October, with the names of two
dhows carrying arms, the dates of their departure
from Jibuti, and destination, the Governor ordered
the dhows seized. [67]
The general pattern of the Yemen trade was reported by
Captain Eustace in a dispatch, unfortunately not reprinted
by Bidwell, but discussed in a letter from Lord Lansdowne to
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the Italians on November 13, 1905:
From this (the Eustace report) it would appear
that canoes (i.e., samboks) leave Obokh frequently
for Kadduha, southward of Mukha, with from 80 to
100 rifles in each, and although no arms can
officially leave Jibuti, there is said never to be
any difficulty in obtaining a clearance from Obokh
by vessels engaged in this trade. • •• owing to
the disarmament of the Arabs of Yemen by the
Turks, the former are now endeavoring to rearm
themselves, and find Kadduha a very suitable
place, as the Turkish troops did not stop at
Mokha, and never visited Kadduha. [68]
The interesting aspect of the Lansdowne note is that
it shifts the emphasis from the re-export of arms from
Arabia to the internal Arabian demand for weapons.

It is

important to remember that the Imam Yaya, in leading a
revolt against the Ottomans, was also protesting the British
position in the Aden Protectorate. Thus, Lord Lansdowne had
to be concerned over the possibility that some of the
smuggled arms would reach Aden. At the very least, this
would have threatened order in Aden, and at worst, British
control.

British concern over the arms trade was great

enough for Lord Lansdowne to order the Resident in Aden to
investigate and report on the trade.
again fails to reprint this report.

Unfortunately, Bidwell
[69]

The Ottomans were clearly aware of the threat to their
position in Yemen posed by the arms trade.

In November,

1905, the British Military Attache in Constantinople
reported the reorganization of the coastal districts of
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Yemen, and an order to increase the size of the Turkish
naval flotilla guarding the coast against gun-runners.
Several weeks later, the Ambassador reported the departure
from the Golden Horn of the ships to be stationed in Yemen.
[70]
DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS WITHIN THE PENINSULA
After weapons had been landed at Muscat and the other
ports of Arabia, local t.raders distr ibuted them throughout
the Peninsula. In addition, Ottoman troops in need of money
frequently sold their own weapons on the blackmarket, while
still other weapons were distributed directly by the Ottoman
Government to client tribes.

[71] Many of these weapons

were later sold or captured, and thus spread further.

The

distribution routes were complex.
Local traders, stationed throughout the Peninsula,
were a major source of arms for the tribes.

Musil discusses

the operations of one trader operating in the northern edge
of the Nefud of north-central Arabia during

M~y,

1909. A

Sulabah tribesman brought news to the Ruwala camp that a
trader, with "eight camels carrying weapons and goods for
clothing" had arrived from Karbala (called by the messenger
"al-Mashad") and was staying with the Slejb in al-Bwejtat.
The trader was based in the Iraqi city, but when operating
in the desert lived with the Krese clan of the Sammar tribe
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in the northern section of the Skara oasis, and the Krese
were enemies of the Ruwala. [72] The Iraqi trader probably
obtained his goods from the arms market in Kuwait.
Tribal political alliances placed the arms trader in a
bind: he wanted to continue selling to the Krese and the
Sammar, as he had been doing, and still expand his market to
the Ruwala and their allies, the Maazle clan that lived in
the southern part of Skara. In dealing with the Krese the
trader "alienated" the Ruwala and Maazle. (Musil does not
show the Maazle as belonging to either the Ruwala or the
Sammar on his lists of those tribes.)

[73]

The trader sent a number of messages to the Ruwala
Prince, al-Nuri, asking to trade.

The dilemma was clearly

drawn in quotes given by Musil:
"Should we not sell arms to the Krese, how would
they treat us?" they pleaded. "They would
demolish our houses and rob us of our propertY7
and whether they would spare our necks Allah only
knows."
DYe supply our
therefore ye are
I do not want to
an-Nuri curtly.

enemies with arms and ammunition,
to blame for their defiance, and
mediate with ye," responded
[74]

The Ruwala tried to capture the small caravan, but the
Sulabah (Slejb) were friendly with both the Ruwala and the
Sammar, and helped the trader hide.
to track them over the rocky ground.

The Ruwala were unable
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In his general work on the Ruwala, Musil first reports
the types of weapons used by the tribe [75], then discusses
the shipping of arms within northern Arabia, revealing the
pattern into which the above incident can be placed.
Unfortunately, material in this particular book was drawn
from both Musil's 1908-10 and 1913-15 travels, 'and he does
not date the shipments he reports.
All arms were brought from the seaports of Jidda
or al-Kwejt. During my stay with Prince an-Nuri
he was visited by six trade caravans with war
munitions. One of the caravans numbered 210
camels carrying more than a thousand rifles with
many thousand rounds of cartridges as well as much
lead, gunpowder, and many caps. [76]
The report makes it clear that the Ruwala were still
using many old percussion cap rifles, and that they obtained
their weapons from ports on both the Gulf and Red Sea
coasts.

Lorimer, reporting generally on the 1905-06 period,

provides important information on the arms route into
central Arabia. Talking about the' district he called
Southern Najd (Nejd), then under Saudi influence, he says:
The trade in arms is of an exceptional character
••• at present it is conducted by Najdi merchants
who visit Masqat at least once a year and, after
purchasing a stock of arms, introduce them into
Southern Najd by way of Qatar, ••• [77]
In late 1906, the arms flow through Qatar was
substantial, with 1,500 rifles a month, or a rate that would
yield some 18,000 a year, entering central Arabia through
the port of Dohah alone.

[78] In addition to the shipment
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of arms through Qatar, a large number of the arms imported
at Kuwait were intended for the Saudi forces, and, after
Qatar, that port appears to have been their most important
point of supply.

[79] While 200 to 300 camels a week

carried goods from the Hasa port of Oqair Nejd, [80] it is
unlikely that many arms entered through this route until
after Abdul Aziz ibn Saud drove out the Turks in 1913.
Other arms entered Arabia through the small ports of
the Red Sea coast.

Lorimer specifically notes that the Harb

tribe of Nejd and the Hijaz imported its breech-loaders by
way of Yanbo. [81] In addition, Musil reports that old
British guns were imported from Egypt, [82] probably through
Jedda or other Red Sea ports.

Lack of information on the

Red Sea ports unfortunately prevents a detailed analysis of
that section of the arms trade.
CAPTURE OF OTTOMAN WEAPONS
The capture of weapons in war has always been one of
the major sources of supply for groups or nations that do
not have easy access to manufacturers.

Lt. Col. C.C.R.

Murphy reported on the the capture of Ottoman weapons after
the fall of Kerak in 1910, as discussed in Chapter VIII.
Weapons were clearly lost in various Ottoman expeditions
against the Saudis, and there would have been a steady
leakage of arms during small engagement.

But it took a
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major revolt to bring major losses.
The 1904-07 revolt in the Yemen proved extremely
difficult for the Ottomans to suppress.

The British

Military Attache in Constantinople, Colonel H.C. Surtees,
reported in early 1906 that by July of the previous year the
Ottomans had a total of some 80,000 riflemen in Yemen,
supported by artillery.

Of these a dispatch from 1905

states that at least 40,000 were armed with Mausers, of
various types.

[83] (Bury, as noted above, later reported

that all of the smokeless powder Mausers used by Ottoman
troops were returned to Constantinople after the
rebellion.)
During Imam Yaha's revolt, British diplomatic
dispatches reported the capture of many weapons from the
Ottoman troops.

At the fall of Sana alone in April, 1905,

they lost some 11,000 rifles and 24 artillery pieces.

[84]

When luck was with them, the Turks were able to recapture
the lost rifles.

For example, a dispatch from the

Vice-Consul Richardson at Hodeida, Yemen, in October, 1905
first records the Ottoman loss of two guns (artillery), 100
rifles and much ammunition near Sana in August. Two weeks
later, an Ottoman force recaptured Sana, and the rebels
escaped, "abandoning a considerable quantity of ammunition
and numerous rifles."

[85] Several months later, a dispatch

of January, 1906, from the Military Attache, Constantinople,
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discussed a December, 1905 attack in which the Ottomans
first lost "arms, ammunition, and money" followed by a
counter-attack in which they recaptured them.

[86] Many of

the lost weapons, of course, were never recaptured.
CAPTURE FROM TRIBAL ENEMIES
One of the clear benefits from a military victory was
the capture of weapons from the enemy.

Raids against the

long supply lines of the desert were also a good source of
arms.

The British Consul at Basra, F.E. Crowe, reported to

the Ambassador in Constantinople that a:
••• convoy of arms dispatched to
Yussuf-el-Ibrahim from El Katr has been
intercepted by Mohamed, brother of Abdul
Aziz-bin-Saoud, at El Sirr, some two days from
Boreyda. It is said he captured ten loads.
[87]
And again, in January or February, 1904, letters from the
Consul and from Abdul Aziz ibn Saud reported a Saudi victory
over a Rashidi 400 man force led by Husein-el-Jerad. All
their weapons were captured, and somewhat later, a convoy of
150 camels with a small treasury (1,000 "Reals") was
seized.

[88] Capture of enemy arms was an important source

of supply, even if it fell far short of the volume obtained
by other means.
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CHAPTER VII
THE GOVERNMENTAL ARMS TRAFFIC
Modern arms entered the Peninsula through two main
channels, private traders and governmental action.

While

all aspects of the private trade accounted for the greater
part of the arms entering Arabia, purchases by the Ottoman
Empire - and the distribution of those weapons to Ottoman
clients - may have formed the largest single source of
modern weapons entering Arabia during the period under
study.
OFFICIAL OTTOMAN ARMS PURCHASES
During the nineteenth century, as now, the major
powers continually replaced obsolete guns with new weapons.
When this happened, or when the end of a war brought
demobilization, thousands of rifles were sold to other
nations or private arms dealers.

The Ottoman government was

a major buyer of both new and surplus firearms.
Following Mahmut II's reorganization and modernization
of the Ottoman army in 1827, the state factories were unable
to supply the modern weapons needed by the army, and
throughout the remainder of the Century the Empire became
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increasingly dependent upon expensive imported arms.

[1]

Many of these weapons later appeared in Arabia. To trace
them, it is necessary to review Ottoman purchases, and the
technical specifications of the rifles involved.
Examples of both the sale of old weapons on the
international market and of Ottoman purchases are found
after the American Civil War. With the change to
breech-loading rifles by the united States Army, old
muzzle-loaders were worth little, and many were sold
overseas.

In 1869 "at least 60,000 government owned Enfield

r ifl1es were clec';lned and repaired at the Spr ingf ield Armory
and sold to the Turkish government."

[2] In 1869 the

Ottomans 'also expressed interest in buying machinery from
the Armory that could make some two hundred Springfield
muzzle-loading muskets a day.

[3] I do not know if this

purchase was actually made.
Modern rifles were also sold by United States
companies.

In 1870, Winchester sold the Ottomans 15,000

Winchester Model 1866 repeating rifles and 5,000 carbines in
caliber .44 Turkish Rim Fire. (These Winchesters were
important in the early stages of the Russo-Turkish War of
1877-78.) By 1873, Winchester had a Turkish contract for
2,000,000 blank metallic drill cartridges and 50,000,000

"Snyder" rifle cartridges.

The Company also shipped

cartridge-making machinery to the Ottomans. [4] Smith
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reports that many of these Turkish Winchesteys were later
converted from lever-action repeaters into the first
semiautomatic rifle, using an 1881-83 design by Hiram Maxim.
Smith does not say if the rifles were converted while still
in Turkish service.

[5]

The "Snyder" cartridges mentioned by Deyrup make it
probable that the Enfield rifles purchased by Turkey were in
fact Snider rifles, for the Snider was an Enfield
muzzle-loader converted into a breech-loader.

The Model

1853-1866 Snider Single Shot, British service rifle, was
based on the invention of American inventor Jacob Snyder.
After the conversion a

breec~

plate swung up to allow the

loading of a brass cartridge, which expanded on firing to
seal the chamber.

The gun was caliber .557. [6] The

official British name for the rifle appears to have been the
Snider-Enfield, and it was only considered a "stopgap" until
a better gun was designed.

[7]

During the Civil War, the United States imported over
428,000 Enfield muzzle-loading rifles from England and
purchased some 670,000 U.S. made Springfieldsl [8] at the
end of the War, over "a million muzzle-loading rifled
muskets, caliber .58, in first-class condition" were still
held by the United States Government. [9] The "Snyder"
cartridges sold by the Springfield Armory to Turkey had to
be for use in the Snider rifle.

Ottoman use of the Snider
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is confirmed by Metschl, who states that it was "exclusively
employed" by their army, though he gives no service dates or
numbers.

[10] Their use of the Snider during the 1877-78

Russo-Turkish war is also mentioned by Yapp, [11] while
Lewis notes its use by Ottoman forces in Transjordan in
1869. [12]
At about the same time, the Ottomans began purchase of
the rifle that, as discussed above, was to become common
throughout Arabia. Springfield Armory Records note that in
about 1870 the Providence Tool Company made Peabody-Martini
rifles for Turkey, [13] while Metschl reports that in 1873
the Ottoman Government purchased 600,000 peabody-Martini
rifles, .45 caliber, center fire.

The rifle in the

Nunnemacher Collection has Turkish "figures" on the lock
plate and rear sight.

[14] The Martinis were used by the

Ottomans, along with Sniders, during the Russo-Turkish war
of 1877-78, [15] with at least 75,000 Ottoman troops armed
with one or the other by the time of the War. [16]
Because the Peabody and its successor Martinis became
so dominant in Arabia, they are of special importance.
Different forms of the rifle entered the international arms
market over the years, as the Peabody evolved through a
number of designs, several of which later appeared in
Arabia. The Peabody was first patented in 1862 by Henry O.
Peabody of Boston. His rifle used a falling breech-block,
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hinged at the rear, that was opened by levering the large
trigger guard down and forward.

As with most black powder

models derived from the Peabody, it was of .45 Caliber. The
gun was tested by the united States in 1865, and performed
very well.

with the Civil War over, however, the Government

had no interest in a new gun:
Like the British, all we could think of was how
to convert our enormous stock of muzzle loaders
cheaply, we had no time for new designs.
and
the manufacturers ••• were encouraged to seek
fore ign mar kets. [17]
The first change in the Peabody was made by a Swiss
mechanic, Frederich Von Martini. Martini's major alteration
of the rifle replaced the original external hammer with an
internal hammer.

"The result was a streamlined design

retaining the Peabody breechblock but embodying the now
famous Martini firing mechanism."

[18] This created the

Peabody-Martini sold to the Ottomans. Martini submitted his
design to the British, who further modified the rifle by
adding a Henry pattern rifled barrel.

The new weapon was

called the Martini-Henry. Both the Peabody-Martini and the
Martini-Henry were later common in Arabia, though often
simply called Martinis.
Smith discusses the Turkish Peabody-Martini rifle in
conjunction with the Romanian Model 1874-78, which was
similar.

The Turkish rifle was the Martini modification of

the original peabody design.

It was issued with a black
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powder Center Fire, caliber .45 Turkish shell.
was also made as a carbine.

The Martini

While the Martini was an

excellent weapon, magazine-fed rifles soon entered military
service, making it obsolete.

[19] Following the normal

pattern for arms procurement, the Ottomans felt that they
had to continue modernization.
In 1887, the Ottomans ordered 500,000 Model 1887
Mauser rifles and 50,000 cavalry carbines in 9.Smm.
caliber.

The Model l887s were repeaters with tube

magazines, and were the last of the black powder guns made
by Mauser, for the invention of smokeless powder by the
French in the same year made black powder rifles obsolete.
The Ottomans took delivery of 220,000 rifles on the order,
then renegotiated with Mauser in 1890 and changed the
remainder of the order to the new, smokeless powder, Model
1890. This rifle had a vertical box magazine and came in
7.65mm. Turkish Rimless Caliber. 280,000 were delivered, and
in 1893 an additional 150,000 Model l890s were purchased.
Also in 1893, the Ottomans ordered 201,000 modified Spanish
Mausers with a staggered built-in box magazine, again in
7.65mm. Turkish. In 1905, a modified Mauser pattern was
adopted by the Ottomans, still in Caliber 7.65mm Turkish.
[20] (See Table I.)
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OTTOMAN SINGLE-SHOT BREECH-LOADERS AND AMMUNITION
YEAR

NUMBER PURCHASED

RIFLE

11

Snider (Converted Enfield Musket)

1

1869

Enfield (or U.S. conversion)

60,000

1870

Winchester Model 1866 Rifles

15,000

1873

Peabody-Martini Rifles

1873

Snider Cartridges

600,000
50,000,000

OTTOMAN PURCHASES OF MAUSER MAGAZINE RIFLES
YEAR

MODEL

CALIBER

ORDERED

RECEIVED

1887

1887 Rifle
1887 Carbine

9.5mm. Black powder

500,000
50,000

220,000

M. 90 Rifle

7.65mm.Turkish Rimless

"
1890

"

"

"

?

280,000

1893 M. 90 Rifle
7.65mm.
"
201,000
(Modified Spanish Mausers. Cited as Model 1895 Turkish.)
1905
1
7.65mm.Turkish
(New pattern adopted.)

1

1

[21]
TABLE I
OTTOMAN PURCHASES OF BREECH-LOADING RIFLES AND AMMUNITION
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Smith's figures for the purchase of Mausers up to 1905
total 751,000 rifles and carbines.

A contemporary estimate

by Vincent Cai1lard, a director of the British arms firm of
Vickers, Sons & Maxim and a former president of the Ottoman
Public Debt Council, and Financial Representative of
England, Holland and Belgium in Constantinople, gives a
substantially higher total for the Mauser models 1887 and
1890 of 1,120,000. As Caillard's estimate appears in the
1911 Encyclopedia Britannica, it may have included the order
Smith mentions for 1905. Caillard also notes that the
Ottomans had a reserve stock of 510,000 "Martini-Henry"
rifles.

These, presumably, were the remaining

Peabody-Martinis ordered in the l870s, and mis-labeled by
the British source.

[22] Given the wars between the two

dates, the attrition from the original 600,000 is not
excessive.
In addition to the purchases from Mauser, Turkey had
in service some British Lee Enfield, Rifle No.1, magazine
fed breech-loaders.

This designation, sub-divided into

various models, or "Marks," covers weapons made from 1895
until after World War I, and Smith does not give dates of
purchase or numbers.

He does say that a major design change

occurred in the Lee Enfield after the Boer War, when the
rifle was shortened to produce the Short Model Lee-Enfield.
At the end of the Boer War, thousands of surplus Enfie1ds
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from South Africa were sold on the world market, many of
them ending up in Arabia. The decision to change the design
of the gun no doubt encouraged these sales.

[23] It is

probable that the Ottoman purchases that I have cited
constituted most of the rifles obtained by them, but it is
also probable that they did buy additional rifles from time
to time.
To understand the number of surplus weapons available
for the Ottomans to distribute to clients in Arabia (and
elsewhere), an estimate must be made of the size of the
Turkish army.

Two general categories are of importance, the

regular standing field force, and the variety of reserve and
irregular forces.
The standing force (nizam) remained remarkably
consistent in size during

th~

four decades preceding World

War I. At the end of the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War the
Nizam, according to Yapp, stood at about 250,000 men.

[24]

Caillard estimated the 1904 strength of the Nizam at
230,408. [25] And Shaw states that in 1912 the Ottomans had
"no more than 250,000 men under arms."

[26] Caillard

includes a variety of fully and partially trained reserves,
territorial forces, and gendarmes to reach a total figure of
1,795,350 men, but this includes many questionably trained 
or even untrained - reserves.

A more accurate reserve force

is gained by taking Caillard's figures for the active
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reserves (ihtiyat), 251,511; and the trained inactive
reserve (redif, Class I), 237,026 , both of which had
various garrison duties.

This gives a total serious reserve

strength of 488,537, for a total infantry force of 718,945.
In addition, there were over 27,000 cavalry and the
gendarmes to be armed.

While the total of trained regulars

and reserves would still have been under one million men,
the Ottomans also had a substantial number of untrained or
semi-trained reserves on the rolls in 1904.
The Ottoman military thus had a standing force of
about 250,000 in the years before World War I, and a large
reserve force.

Caillard states that the Ottomans had

issued, or had available in stores, 1,120,000 Mausers by
1904 with 510,000 Martinis in reserve.

This is

substantially higher than Smith's figures for an Ottoman
purchase of 751,000 Mausers, but is consistent - allowing
for losses - with his figure of 600,000 Martinis. Caillard's
total of 1,630,000 Mausers and Martinis is substantially
higher that Smith's total of 1,351,000. With either figure,
however, it is apparent that after arming their own forces,
the Ottomans still had a significant surplus for
distribution to clients, as will be discussed later.

[27]

The British Military Attache in Constantinople,
Lieutenant-Colonel Maunsell, reported to the Counselor of
the Embassy in early November, 1904, on the Ottoman reaction
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to recent victories by Abdul Aziz ibn Saud. The Ottomans had
already lost one expedition attempting to aid the Al Rashid,
and now, rather that send more men were preparing to
modernize the arms carried by their troops in Iraq. The
dispatch provides important information on how quickly the
Mauser was replacing the Martini-Henry.
The troops of the 6th. or Bagdad Corp are still
armed with the old Martini rifle, now much worn,
and practically the same weapon as possessed by
Ibn Saoud's men. It has now been decided to issue
them the Mauser rifle like the rest of the army,
and for this purpose 40,000 small-bore Mausers and
also six batteries of the newer pattern of 7.5
centime mountain guns, ••• , have been packed up,
and are awaiting shipment by an early steamer to
Bussorah (Basra). [28]
Throughout the period, the Ottomans appear to have
armed their regular army with the best modern rifles
available.
EGYPTIAN ARMS PURCHASES
Before WW I the Egyptians used various European
rifles, "none truly standard."

In 1870, Egypt ordered

60,000 Remington Single Shot Rolling Breechblock rifles in
llmm. (caliber .43) Egyptian. After that order had been
partly filled, Egypt defaulted, and many rifles were shipped
to France in 1870-71. In 1876 the Egyptians renegotiated
with Remington, and the order for the full 60,000 rifles was
completed.

[29]
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Interestingly, thirty-five years after the initial
Egyptian order of Remingtons, the British Military Attache
in Constantinople reported (March, 1905) that Ottoman
Zaptiehas (i.e. gendarmes) serving as border guards between
Aqaba and the Mediterranean were armed with Remington
carbines.

[30] I have found no mention of a direct Ottoman

purchase of Remingtons, and these weapons may be those
originally bought by Egypt and later re-sold to local
Ottoman commanders.

The distribution patterns to the tribes

of Arabia show that arms did reach the Peninsula from the
Red Seacoast.

While no direct evidence has been available,

it is likely that some surplus arms from Egypt were sold to
Arabian traders.
OTTOMAN DISTRIBUTION TO CLIENTS
The Ottoman Government's distribution of weapons to
client tribes in Arabia, both to strengthen them and keep
them under a measure of control, was a major source of arms
for the Peninsula. During the war between the Saudis and the
Rashidis, Turkish shipments of arms to the Al Rashid
illustrate both this practice, and the disposal of obsolete
weapons on the frontiers of the Empire. In April, 1904 the
Persian Gulf Resident, citing newspaper articles, reported
that the Ottomans had shipped Ibn Rashid "800 Martini-Henry
rifles, 1,000 Sniders, with 60,000 rounds of ammunition, and
4,000 lira - rifles, ammunition, and money having left
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Bagdad three days ago."

preparations for the sending of

artillery were also reported underway.

[31] The

distribution of arms was a standard element of Ottoman
policy in Arabia.
In his various books, Alois Musil reports the use of
arms and ammunition by the Turkish authorities to strengthen
some tribes while checking the power of others.

In

December, 1914, he was traveling with the Emir of the Ruwala
tribe, al-Nuri ibn Hazza al-Shaalan and his son, Nawaf.
Al-Nuri noted that the Turkish governor of Syria had asked
him to remain loyal to the -government during the War, and
had promised to aid the Ruwala against their enemy (and the
main enemy of the Al Saud, at the time), the Sammar tribe
led by the Al Rashid. Nawaf objected, declaring that the
Turkish Minister of War, Enver Pasha, considered the Emir of
the Rashid "his most loyal ally."

Nawaf then gave details

of a large arms shipment to the Sammar.
At the beginning of this year he (i.e. Enver
Pasha) sent him (i.e. the Rashidi emir) by rail to
al-Hegr fifteen thousand Mauser rifles, four
hundred thousand cartridges, field guns, and so
much gold that ten camels could hardly carry it.
Zamel eban Subhan transported the arms to Hajel
(i.e., Hail) and distributed them among the Sammar
and even the Slejb. Before that the Sammar had
barely five hundred good rifles; now they have so
many that they sell Mauser rifles in Hajel for two
Turkish pounds ($ 9.00) apiece. And what did
Enver send these rifles to Eban Rasid for? That
he might more easily defeat Eban Sa'ud, who
eighteen months before had driven the Turkish
soldiers out of the province of al-Hasa. [321
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Later, in his appendix on the Al Rashid, Musil states
that the weapons were sent by the Ottomans in late 1913, and
that the shipment included only 6,000 Mausers and 60,000
cartridges.

Ibn Rashid was also sent an automobile and "a

large sum of money."

[33] (The Sammar Emir appears to have

used his family name as a title, thus being called Ibn
Rashid.) Philby reports that in 1912, in reaction to the
Saudi capture of al-Basa, the Ottomans sent Ibn Rashid
12,000 rifles "with corresponding quantities of ammunition
and money," and notes that Abdul Aziz viewed this as
directed against him.

[34] Philby's figures are thus closer

to the Ruwala estimate than to Musil's.
Lancaster reports that Musil, a Czech, worked for the
Austrian Government and that he "escorted parties of
military engineers" through parts of Arabia. [35] Musil's
official position went beyond Lancaster's implication.
Winstone reports that Musil had met an officer of
Austro-Bungarian military intelligence, Berr Thomasberger,
while still a student: Thomasberger accompanied Musil on his
1910-12 trip to Arabia. In addition, that trip was taken at
the direct request of the Austrian Embassy in
Constantinople. [36] It is clear that throughout his trips,
Musil was acting for Austrian military intelligence, and in
at least one case, he carried the orders of the Ottoman
Government to the tribes.
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Throughout his travels, Musil acted in a semi-official
role for the Austrians, and occasionally for the Ottomans.
Thus, it is likely, though not explicitly stated by Musil,
that he obtained his own figures on arms shipments from
sources in either the Ottoman Government or the Austrian
diplomatic service.

It is possible, of course, that both

figures are accurate, and that the shipment of 6,000 rifles
mentioned in Musil's appendix was only one of several
shipments in late 1913 and early 1914 that totaled between
12,000 and 15,000 weapons.

Of the two sets of figures,

however, Musil's lower numbers are probably more accurate
for this period than either Philby's or the Ruwala's.
Musil estimated that the Rashid had formerly had a
normal "mercenary" force of 10,000 tribesmen who were given
arms, ammunition and riding camels by the Emir, but that by
1914 this force had been reduced by defections to 3,000.
This force could be supplemented by other tribesmen.
Lorimer estimated the heart of Sammar territory around Hail
to have a population of about 55,000. [37] Although he
reports a fighting force by this time (c.1905) of only
3,000, his normal percentage of fighters is 29% of the total
population, a rate that would easily have raised 10,000
troops during the Rashidi's hayday.
Assuming that the figures given by Nawaf were either
highly inflated, or represented shipments over a prolonged
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period of time, there is still an internal logic to Musil's
lower numbers.

The normal Rashidi force had been reduced to

3,000, and Musil notes that it was entirely armed with new
Mausers. The shipment of 6,000 rifles would have fully
re-armed the core of the army and still left a surplus for
additional tribal irregulars and for sale.
The 60,000 rounds in the shipment reported by Musil
comes to only ten per rifle: this is scarcely enough to
sight-in the rifles, much less use them in war.

Even the

ratio given by Nawaf provides only 26 rounds per rifle.
Thus, at either rifle figure, the ammunition provided was
insufficient for serious use of all the guns.

As discussed

above, the Sheikh of Bahrein set a ratio of 200 rounds of
ammunition per rifle as his import duty in 1896. [38]
Limiting the supply of ammunition, however, gave the Turks
greater control over their clients.
Musil suggested that the guns were not properly
distributed to the Al Rashid army, but were diverted for the
benefit of the chief minister/regent of the weak Emir Saud
ibn Abdul Aziz al-Rashid.

The minister, Saud ibn Salih

al-Subhan, had murdered his predecessor and assumed power in
early 1914. He then distributed the newly arrived Mausers
"among his supporters and, as these were not very numerous,
even among the Slejb, men without honor in Arabia." Further,
Musil states, many of the guns also armed "robber bands"
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sent by Saud to harass the tribes of the Iraqi and Syrian
border regions.

[39]

The Ruwala were placed at a serious military
disadvantage because of the modern equipment sent the
Sammar. Nawaf suggested joining his forces with his father's
and attacking Ibn Rashid with the combined army of 5,000.
Al-Nuri pointed out that even if the Rashidi forces were
only equal to the Ruwala's 5,000, and not the 10,000 or
15,000 he would expect, the chances of success were not
good, for the Al Rashid had "plenty of good ammunition,
while we must be sparing of bad ammunition."

[40] Musil

~

later commented on the proposed attack and on the power of
the Rashidi's chief minister, Saud, that "Saud possessed
more effective arms than ours and that we should be unable
to drive him out of Hajel if he once fortified it."

[41]

Modern weapons gave a major advantage to a fortified
defense.
The Ottomans, moreover, had been supporting the Al
Rashid for some time, for when Abdul Aziz ibn Rashid was
killed in a clash with the Saudis in 1906, the British
Ambassador in Constantinople reported that the Ottomans had
given official recognition to his successor.

[42] In

addition, they sent a military force into Central Arabia in
an effort to support the Al Rashid directly: the Ottomans
were defeated by the Saudis. [43]
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The Ruwala were opposed by other tribes armed by the
Turks, for Musil reports on vicious fighting between them
and the Fedan in the 1910-1915 era.

The Fedan were allied

with the Turkish Government, received arms and ammunition
from them, and were "stirred" to attack the Ruwala by the
Ottomans. [44] The Turks' distribution of guns to the tribes
they favored did not, however, guarantee the results they
wished.
After the start of the World War, the Turks attempted
to stop the inter-tribal fighting that they had previously
encouraged.

They tried to call the tribes to help fight an

expected English attack from Egypt. In December, 1914, Musil
spoke with Awde abu Tajeh, "head chief" of the Huwaitat
tribe, who were camping with the Ruwala. After a long
discussion of the possibilities of, and need for, peace
between the tribes, Awde commented on Turkish aid, and the
degree to which it brought his obedience:
So long as there is no peace, I shall not move
from the desert. If I become reconciled with
Abtan and Eben Rasid, and if my affiliated Hwetat
camping in Egypt call to me for help, then I will
march there. The Government promises me arms and
also gold at some station of the Hegaz Railway. I
need both. I shall take both arms and gold but I
shall fight him whom my affiliated Hwetat fight.
If they arise against the Inkliz (English), I
shall combat the Inkliz1 if they rise against the
Government, I shall massacre the government
troops. I shall not separate myself from my
fellow tr ibesmen. [45]
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THE BLACKMARKET: PRIVATE SALES BY OTTOMAN TROOPS
OR CLIENT TRIBES
The Ottoman Government regularly failed to pay its
troops in Arabia, and when their pay did arrive, its value
was often reduced by local economic factors and graft.
Ochsenwald describes the poor condition of Ottoman troops in
the Hijaz in the late l850s, noting that they were paid with
paper currency that was only worth 40 percent of its face
value in the markets.

To make the situation worse:

When the troops protested about pay, the
governors bought rice from dealers, with a
kickback to them and to the governor, and the
soldiers were given the rice in lieu of money;
then the soldiers, in order to raise ca$h to
purchase necessities, had to sell the rice back to
the original dealers at a substantial loss. [46]
The situation in the Hijaz became worse as the
Ottomans were pushed into bankruptcy later in the century.
And as matters deteriorated, private Ottoman soldiers sold
their rifles and ammunition to the tribes.

Given the lack

of proper pay, and the need to survive, many had little
choice.

At the same time, it is likely that officers and

local officials also sold weapons for personal profit.
Musil quotes a 1910 conversation with Afnan ibn Abu Tkeka,
whose father was sheikh of the coastal section of the
Huwaitat tribe.

They spoke at Sarma, just south of the Gulf

of Aqaba on the Red Sea coast.

Afnan cursed the Turkish

Government and attacked it for poor administration that took
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money but gave no benefit.

He then discussed the condition

of the Turkish soldiers in the Hijaz:
I am sorry for the soldiers who die here or who
are killed by our arms. They are destroyed by the
climate, to which they are not accustomed, and
they are destroyed by us when they steal our
goats, sheep, and cows. They are supposed to
protect us against our enemies, but they do not
venture even so much as a gunshot beyond their
barracks and indeed scarcely dare even to thrust
their heads outside of doors. IT IS A GOOD THING
THAT THEY LET US HAVE THEIR AMMUNITION AND EVEN
THEIR FIREARMS BY TRADE OR SALE. [47]
In April, 1915, Musil again noted the sale of weapons
by Ottoman troops.

He was then traveling near

al~Ruhbe,

just west of the Euphrates and about 100 miles south of
Baghdad. In that area, Turkish deserters and gendarmes sold
their rifles to the local tribesmen, the gendarmes later
claiming that they had been robbed.

At the same time, Musil

learned that a number of Mausers the Turks had given the
Sammar had been sold in Mesopotamia by members of his own
par ty.
The negroes of Eben Rashid, too, were willing to
sell their own arms or those of anybody else.
With reference to this, Nazel told us that Rased
and the other slaves who had come with us to
an-Negef sold in five days thirty-eight Mauser
rifles which had been sent to Eben Rashid by the
Turkish Government. [48]
Thus, not only did the weapons given out by the
Ottomans fail to guarantee the allegiance of the tribe
receiving them, there was a fair chance that the guns would
be sold rather than used to support the Ottoman's goals.
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BRITISH DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS
Arms shipped to the Al Saud
The role of the British in allowing, and perhaps
encouraging, arms deliveries to the Saudis through Kuwait as
early as 1904 has been discussed in Chapter VI. Muscat
customs figures show a substantial and continuous British
role in the arms trade.

(Figure III.) As World War I

approached, Britain's position becomes clearer.

While most

of the British involvement in supplying arms to various
Arabian factions during the World War are beyond the scope
of this work, two examples illustrate the practice in
relation to the Saudis. During the summer of 1914, the
British expressed their good will toward Abdul Aziz aI-Saud
by sending him 1,000 rifles and £20,000. They also gave
nfacilities n at Bahrain to import the ammunition Abdul Aziz
needed for his campaign against rebels of the Ajman tribe.
Later, near the end of 1916, Abdul Aziz agreed to accept
from the British £5,000 a month, 3,000 rifles with
ammunition, and four machine guns in exchange for keeping a
force of 4,000 men in the field to attack the Rashidi forces
around Hail continuously.

[49] Arms were to continue to

flow into Arabia throughout the War.
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Aden
The British distribution of guns to various local
rulers in Aden provides a sidelight on the use of obsolete
guns to further British policy.

In 1914 and 1915 the

British authorities at Aden signed agreements with three
rulers - the Haushabi Sultan Ali bin Mani, the Alawi Sheikh
Ali Nasher, and the Kotaibi (or Quteibi, Aitchison uses both
spellings) Sheikh Mahomed Saleh al Akhram - for the
protection of local trade.

The three rulers were given

Martini-Henry rifles and ammunition to help patrol the
roads.

The 1914 Agreement with the Haushabi Sultan was the

prototype for the other two.

After standard diplomatic

platitudes promising mutual "peace and friendship" between
the British and the Sultan, the Agreement reached the heart
of the issue, with the Sultan promising to guard the roads
and protect travelers going to or from Aden. The Agreement
continued:
ARTICLE IV
To assist him in carrying out the
obligations imposed by this agreement the said
Sultan Ali bin Mani engages ••• to establish
suitable posts at El-Mitlah, Am Tannan or such
other places on the roads as may be necessary and
to maintain a force of 50 men or such less number
as the Political Resident, Aden, may agree to; in
consideration of which a present of 50
Martini-Henry rifles with 100 rounds of ammunition
per rifle will be granted to him by the British
Government, and a reasonable supply of ammunition
will be furnished to him hereafter for the same on
payment. • ••
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The Haushabi Agreement was signed on September 24,
1914, and renewed on February 11, 1920. [50] [51]
The Martini-Henry was a good rifle, but as a
single-shot black powder rifle, it was completely obsolete
by 1914. The British were, in effect, dumping old weapons to
keep the natives happy.

In view of Bury's 1914 report that

the tribes of Yemen were armed with magazine-fed smokeless
powder rifles, the local road patrols established by the
agreements would have been at a serious disadvantage in any
fight.

The policy of giving obsolete guns to the natives

was consistent, however, with Bury's strong warning of the
danger of modern arms in the hands of what he called
"subject races":
The relations between governors and governed
in Yamen have undergone a radical change during
the last decade or two, owing to Turkey's laxity
or inability to check the surreptitious import of
arms. This covert traffic has gradually
undermined the pillars of Ottoman rule,
honeycombing the whole vi1ayet ••• Now the
population is as well armed as the forces of
government, far more numerous, and, on their own
ground, more formidable, man for man. [52]
ITALIAN DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS
The first major Italian interest in the Red Sea
littoral was manifest in 1869 when merchants from Genoa
purchased land at Assab, just north of Djibouti, in an
effort to gain advantage from the opening of the Suez Canal.
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The Italian Government did not take control of the port
until 1882, and made no effort to expand its territory until
1885. International events led to the growth of the colony.
After Italy failed to gain territory she desired in Tunisia,
she looked for other areas of colonial expansion in Africa.
Acting with the encouragement of the British, who wanted
support against the Mahdi after the fall of Khartoum, Italy
seized the Ottoman Red Sea port of Massawa.
Italian designs were checked in 1887 when they were
defeated by Ras Aloua, an ally of Ethiopia, at the battle of
Dogali. with the death of Emperor Yohannis of Ethiopia two
years later, Italy gained an opportunity to expand her
colony.

When Menelik of Shoa fought his political rivals

for the Ethiopian throne, he took arms and ammunition from
the Italians. In return, Menelik recognized Italy's
authority over Massawa and territory inland, including the
town of Asmara. On January 1, 1890, Italy's territories on
the Red Sea coast were formed into the colony of Eritrea.
Italian expansion inland was stopped, sharply and
dramatically, when they tried to invade Ethiopia itself in
1896. At the battle of Aduwa in March, 1896, an Italian army
of over 17,000 was smashed, 6,000 men killed, 2,000 wounded
and 2,000 captured.

While the attack had been motivated by

internal Italian politics more than by a real desire to
seize Ethiopia, the result confined Italy to the coastal
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areas until after World War I. [53] The battle also revealed
the danger to would-be colonial powers of modern arms in
native hands.
the region.

These events established Italian interests in
As noted above, they later joined the British

in protesting the arms market at Djibouti.
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CHAPTER VIII
EFFECT OF MODERN ARMS ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA
The increased deadliness of the modern firearms
introduced into Arabia has been discussed in general, but
the other effects of modern arms on the Peninsula have not
been considered.

The use of the new weapons, and their

effect on the military and political balance of power is
hard to gauge, but some general points can be made.

First,

however, the general problems created by modern weapons must
be rev iewed •
INCREASED DEPENDENCE ON EXTERNAL AMMUNITION
The introduction of increasingly modern firearms into
Arabia inevitably produced a growing dependence on external
sources of ammunition.

With muzzle-loaders, ammunition was

a comparatively simple matter of lead shot and gunpowder.
Even the more complex projectiles fired from the later
rifled muskets - such as tht Minie with its conical bullet 
could generally be replaced with a simple lead ball,
although performance would suffer.

And while the lead and

powder had to be imported, both were cheap and abundant, and
could be purchased from many sources.
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At first, modern ammunition for breech-loaders came
only from modern factories.

It was, however, inevitable

that reloading equipment would be imported after particular
weapons became well established.

The major cities

surrounding Arabia did have reloading and repair
facilities.

It will be remembered that al-Nuri of the

Ruwala was able to have his Mannlicher's magazine-fed lock
replaced with a Martini-style single-shot mechanism by a
gunsmith somewhere near Damascus. [1] Lorimer, however,
mentions only one center for reloading within Arabia, the
town of Dam or Ildam, in Nejd. [2]
The fact that Lorimer only mentions a single site in
the interior of the Peninsula should not be taken to mean
that facilities were not available.

It is most probable

that the major towns and tribes the ability to reload
amm~nitionand

make minor repairs.

Some ten years after

Lorimer's study, Musil reports that the northern tribes all
had gunsmiths to repair guns and reload ammunition.

[3] But

even with reloading facilities, the tribes could not meet
the demands of war and remained dependent upon an external
supply of ammunition.

A desire not to waste ammunition, for

~

example, motivated al-Nuri's conversion of the Mannlicher.
Shortage of ammunition for the new weapons was a constant
problem to military leaders, as illustrated by the dangerous
situation of the Saudi forces during the 1902 battle of
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Dilam.
Following Abdul Aziz's capture of Riyadh in January,
1902, Rashidi forces were slow to move against the renewed
Saudi state.

When they finally attacked in the autumn, the

two armies met at the town of Dilam, approximately fifty
miles south-southeast of Riyadh. Ibn Rashid's forces
attacked in the morning, and "came under a withering fire
from the well-concealed defenders of the Dilam palm-groves
and were forced to retreat in some disorder."

The Saudi

cavalry counter-attacked, and the cavalry battle continued
fiercely until sunset.

During the night, the Rashidi forces

withdrew, yielding the district to the Al Saud. Abdul Aziz
later reported that had Ibn Rashid continued the battle, he
would have found the Saudis to be nearly out of ammunition.
"The cavalry pursuit had been little more than a gesture of
defiance; but it had served its purpose."

[4]

The battle illustrates two of the factors involved in
the conversion to modern weapons.

First, modern weapons

greatly increased the strength of the defense.

The initial

Al Rashid attack would not, in all likelihood, have been
repulsed without the high rate of fire of breech-loading
rifles.

Second, in spite of their effectiveness, the

shortage of ammunition for the modern guns nearly led to a
Saudi defeat.

In the end, Ibn Rashid's tactical leadership

failed, preventing him from crushing the resurgence of the
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Al Saud. Technology was important, but leadership was more
important.
IMPOSITION OF OTTOMAN AUTHORITY FOLLOWED BY
SUCCESSFUL LOCAL RESISTANCE
Two incidents from the northern borders of Arabia
reveal one of the major influences of modern arms on the
history of the region.

The introduction of breech-loaders

first helped the Ottomans extend their authority, and later
helped the tribes resist that authority.
During the last decades of the nineteenth century, the
Ottomans began to bring uncontrolled territory in
Mesopotamia and the Levant under their administration.

The

Euphrates road to Palmyra was secured, and much of
Transjordan was placed under direct Turkish administration.
Tactically, the process involved the use of military and
police posts as the basis for wider patrols.

A number of

conditions, both in the Empire at large and in the local
districts, aided the Ottomans. The greatest difference
between this expansion and earlier attempts to establish
control, however, was that the Ottomans now had a marked
superiority in weapons over the tribes.

[5]

Beginning in the l860s, Turkish troops were armed with
modern breech-loaders.

For example, during a successful

1869 expedition against the Beni Sakhr of Transjordan the
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Ottoman troops used Sniders, and by the late l870s the Turks
were using the "much dreaded" Winchester in their
expeditions against the tribes.

"Companies of mule-borne

riflemen, operating from the new garrison centers and posts,
proved very effective," and "for the first time the Turkish
soldier found himself superior to the bedouin warrior, and
the whole balance of force was changed."

[6]

The balance of arms, however, shifted again.

As a

part of its attempt to modernize its military, the Ottoman
Government made a strong effort to increase the coverage of
military conscription throughout the Empire. When the Druze
of the Hauran area resisted in 1909-10, they were easily
disarmed and forced to submit to conscription.

Lt. Col.

C.C.R. Murphy reported what happened when an attempt was
made to confiscate breech-loading rifles and impose
conscription upon the Arab tribes around the town of Kerak.
[7] Murphy later became Persian Gulf Intelligence Officer,
and was in Damascus for an important meeting of British
military intelligence officials.

During his stay in the

region, he met with Arab leaders from Al Ahad, the military
section of a secret society interested in starting a general
Arab revolt in Syria and Mesopotamia. [8]
Following the success against the Druze, the Wali
(governor) of Damascus advised similar action against the
Arabs near Kerak. The Ottoman government agreed, and ordered
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extra troops sent to Kerak November 1910, to disarm the
tribes and enforce conscription.

The commander of the

Hauran area, an Arab, Sami pasha, advised against the
operation.

Orders to disarm and to comply with

conscriptions were, however, sent to the tribes.

The

commander of the Turkish forces at Kerak called in the local
sheikhs to obtain their comments.

They advised him to set a

"strong girdle of posts" around Kerak to impress the tribes
with the government's power, by December 4, sixteen posts
had been established around the town, each having two guns
(artillery) and forty riflemen.

The remainder of the

garrison, whose numbers are not given, were stationed in
Kerak's citadel.

This meant that the "bulk" of the Turkish

infantry and "nearly all the guns" were in the outposts.
[9]

At sundown on December 4, "without the slightest
warning" the Arabs of Kerak opened fire on the Turks. They
were joined by "hordes" of Arabs from outside the town.

The

outposts were quickly taken, with two Turks from each kept
alive to man the guns, which were now directed against the
citadel.

The Arabs looted the local treasury and bazaar

before moving to attack the Hejaz Railway. In these attacks,
stations at Lubin, Jizeh, Qatraneh and al-Hassa were
destroyed; telegraph lines and equipment was destroyed and
railroad tracks were torn up at intervals for over 80
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miles.

800 Turkish troops were killed, along with many

officials.

The tribesmen who staged the attack vanished.

[10 ]
The official Turkish reports said the Arab attack had
been caused by cuts in the tribal subsidy given to protect
the railway, and that the attack had also been incited by
the Druze. Murphy states that this was false, that the
attack had been only against Turks, although four Christians
were killed accidentally in the streets, and that no Druze
were involved.

Turkish soldiers and officials were the

targets of the revolt.

He added that several thousand Arabs

were involved from the "Mujelli, the ruling Keraki family,
and the Hamaideh, Atami, Salaiteh, Hajaiyah, Saidin,
Ghawarni, Jawabari and several other tribes."

The Ruwala,

Huwaitat and the Beni Sakhr were not "actively concerned"
though the Beni Sakhr failed to protect the railway, as they
r

had been paid to do.

[11] Peake, citing Audeh Bey Qusus - a

"Christian notable" who at the time of the revolt lived in
Kerak and who later (c.1939) became the Attorney General of
the Jordan Government, and other sources, confirms Murphy's
report of Arab tactics.

[12] Vatikiotis also agrees with

Murphy, noting that the rebellion "did not in any way
represent an Arab challenge to Turkish authority" but was a
reaction "against growing administrative control of their
area."

[13]
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The inability of regular military officers to
understand and deal with irregular forces and tactics has
been common throughout history.

Murphy does not comment on

the rifles used by either side in the fight, but the Turkish
troops would, at the very least, have been armed with
Martinis and probably carried older Mausers. Their attackers
would very likely have been unable to gain such an easy
victory unless they too were armed with breech-loaders, and
Gubser specifically reports that the Turkish orders that
precipitated the attack called for the confiscation of
breech-loaders.

[14] The qualitative gap between the rulers

and the ruled had been closed, and was closed further by the
Turkish weapons captured in the raid.
While Musil does not mention this raid, he reports
that before this section of the railway had opened in 1906,
the Ottoman government had paid the Beni Sakhr a subsidy to
protect and guide pilgrims passing through their territory.
After the railroad opened, the Government stopped both the
tribe's subsidy and the salary of its sheikh, Talal ibn
Fajez. In September, 1908, Talal visited Damascus in an
effort to straighten out the problem of payment, but found
the governor unable to obtain a decision from
Constantinople. When Musil met Talal in October, the Sheikh
was "very bitter against the governor and said he did not
know what his kinsmen might yet compel him to do."

[15]
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Even if the subsidy had been renewed by the time of the 1910
raid, a residue of bad feeling among the Bani Sakhr probably
contributed to their failure to protect the railway after
the Kerak raid.
THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY IN WAR
Technology pas always played a part in war, as it did
in Arabia during the period under study.

But technology has

rarely been a primary factor in determining victory.
Rather, the use made of the technology - the tactics and
strategy that applied the technology to a particular
situation - has generally been the deciding factor.
Technology can seldom overcome poor tactical doctrine or
poor leadership.

All of the major tribes and factions

fighting in Arabia had modern arms.

While it is probable

that there were many incidents where one side had better
weapons than its enemy, between the major tribes such an
imbalance was transitory.
The most important effects of modern arms came from
the nature of the arms themselves, from factors common to
the technology.

The rapid increase in the deadliness of the

guns is the first of these.

Colonel T.N. Dupuy directed a

study for the United States Army in 1964-65 on the
comparative lethality of weapons.

The study analyzed

weapons ranging from swords through a one-megaton nuclear
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airburst, and produced a "Theoretical Lethality Index" for
each.

The analysis was based upon the "range, rate of fire,

accuracy, reliability, radius of damage, etc."
weapons.

of the

[16] The study is interesting in its attempt to

compare the deadliness of weapons, several examples of which
are reproduced in Table II, with [bracketed] comments by the
author:

Hand to Hand (sword, pike, etc.)

23

Longbow

36

17th. century musket

19

18th. century flintlock

43

Early 19th. century rifle

36

Mid-19th. century rifle/conoidal bullet
[The Minie or the Pattern 1853 Enfield.]

102

Late 19th. century breech-loading rifle
[The Snider or the Martini-Henry.]

153

Springfield Model 1903 rifle (magazine)
[Equal to the Mauser or the Enfield
smokeless powder magazine-fed rifles.]

495

World War I machine gun

3,463

TABLE II
DUPUY'S THEORETICAL LETHALITY INDEX
Dupuy's study is useful because it graphically
displays the progressive improvement in small arms
technology.

In particular, the rapid increase in the

deadliness of rifles between the early and the late
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nineteenth century is dramatic, and shows clearly why both
the armies of Europe and the tribes of Arabia were driven to
modernize their weapons as the technology changed.

But it

remained for the parties in a war to use their new weapons
well.
Again, leadership, not technology, determined the
victors in Arabia. It is true that machineguns and cannon
were beginning to reach the Peninsula in the decade before
World War I, but not in significant numbers.

It is only

necessary to look at that war itself to see that when the
technology was equally matched, leadership (or lack of sound
leadership, in the case of the European powers in that war)
determined the results.

Philby gives an example from Arabia

in 1918 comparing the leadership of the Saudis with that of
the Hashimites. While it comes a few years after the main
period considered here, it illustrates the point.
Both sides were receiving arms from the British to
fight the Ottomans or their allies, the A1 Rashid of Hail.
The Hashimites, in particular, were very well supplied.
they controlled neither their weapons nor their men.

But

Philby

reports that various tribal leaders would approach the
Hashimites and swear "undying loyalty":
But no sooner had they received an appropriate
number of rifles and boxes of ammunition - to say
nothing of bags of gold - than they loaded up
their beasts and returned to their pastures, to
take no part in their patrons' operations except

188
perhaps to return a second or even a third time to
replenish the stocks of ammunition exhausted by
sales in the markets of Najd. [17]
The weapons the British gave the Hashimites to fight
the Turks were thus sold on the open market, much as the
guns sent the Al Rashid by the Turks were sold in Iraq.
Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, on the other hand, maintained strict
control over his men.

Be believed that it was to his

benefit for all men to be armed, and made no effort to
control the sale of guns within his territory, "but with
ammunition it was a different matter."

Abdul Aziz supplied

his men with ammunition for war and raids, while acting to
control the ammunition market in Nejd. His agents purchased
all ammunition that they found in his territory, and placed
it in the state's arsenal.

Further, he tried to prevent the

re-export of ammunition to Persia. While the Hashimites
distributed guns and ammunition without maintaining control,
the Saudis carefully managed their own weapons.

[18] The

Hashimites actually had easier access to weapons than did
the Al Saud, but they failed to control and use them
effectively.
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CONCLUSION
Gunmetal, exposed to the sun of Arabia, soon becomes
hot enough to sear flesh.

The human emotions that lead to

the use of weapons in war burn as sharply as sun-baked
steel.

The political policies that make arms available, and

the trade that distributes them to the world appear cold.
But they are also fired with emotion.
The factors that drove the arms trade in Arabia were
themselves driven by a mix of cold commercial interest, and
hot emotions stirred by international and local rivalries.
Nor was the technology driving the arms trade without
emotion, for there is emotion in science and engineering.
And the desire for scientific discovery was fueled by fear
of enemies, both new and traditional.

The international

rivalry between Britain and France was driven by emotion,
and only cooled with the growth of a threat to both powers.
The local demand for arms was a mix of emotion-driven
national and tribal resistance to foreign invasion - on the
Northwest frontier, and elsewhere - with a cold analysis of
strategic and tactical needs by local leaders.

Xenophobia

in part drove the local need for arms, as surely as the
British reacted xenophobiclly to the presence of any other
power in the region
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The mix of hot and cold, and the mix of three major
factors directed the arms trade in and around Arabia. The
general pattern of the trade is clear (Figure 1), but many
of the specifics remain uncertain.

Because most of the

available sources are British, and because those sources
accuse the French and other Europeans of being the major
participants in the arms trade, it is probable that British
participation in the arms trade appears smaller here than it
actually was.

The customs data for Muscat (Figure 3) show

that in all years reported, the British trade was higher
than that of the French, and was only exceeded by the
Belgians for the last seven years of the period, years
unfortunately not covered by Lorimer, who might have
provided valuable information.
More detailed work on the British records for the Gulf
and the Red Sea, and serious attention to the French records
could be vital to fully understanding the arms trade in
Arabia. In particular, the records of the French Consulate
at Muscat and the records of the Goguyer company should be
carefully examined.

Despite the remaining issues, there is

no question that modern arms flooded into Arabia and the
Gulf in the later decades of the nineteenth century.

The

technology has changed, it has become easier to kill on a
momentous scale, and the flood continues.

DISCUSSION OF SOURCES
The great majority of the information available on the
arms trade to Arabia comes from British sources, most of
these dealing with the Persian Gulf. Lorimer is the most
important primary source that has been re-published, and
made generally available in the united States. Bidwell's
collections of British diplomatic papers is also important,
and provides information on areas of Arabia outside of the
Gulf. In addition to these governmental sources, a variety
of memoirs have been published by British officials who
dealt with the arms trade.

Bury's two books read as if they

were taken directly from his intelligence reports.
is also good in this regard.

Murphy

Austin, Keppel, Thomas and

others give information, but their books were written for a
general audience, and do not give enough detail on military
affairs.

Philby comes between the two styles, depending

upon which of his books is involved.
The few non-British sources are important when trying
to obtain a full picture of the trade, but few of those
available give much information.

The best primary source

available is the collected writing of Alois Musil, who
traveled throughout Northern Arabia. Musil worked for
Austrian Military Intelligence, and provides excellent
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information.

Unfortunately, the series of books Musil

published after World War I were intended for a civilian
audience.

Somewhere in the Austrian records there may still

exist Musil's intelligence reports: they should be found and
published.

Barclay Raunkiaer's short book gives information

on the types of rifles he saw, but little on the trade
itself.
Many excellent secondary sources have been available.
The best of these is Busch, with Landen and others providing
good information.
sources.

The great lack is in non-British

Only one French work has been available.

Review

of numerous bibliographies, and Index Islamicus, reveal
little European work on the arms trade in Arabia. It appears
that even the French have failed to study the trade at
Djibouti.

"
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APPENDIX A
PRIVATE FIRMS ENGAGED IN THE ARMS TRADE
The following is a list of firms cited by name in the
sources available.
FIRMS ACTIVE IN THE PERSIAN GULF
Joyce and Kynoch
The British firm of Joyce and Kynoch is cited by
Lorimer as being the main arms dealer at Muscat between 1891
and 1897. However, he gives little additional information on
the company.

[1] The company is mentioned again by Phillips

as being a major trader at Muscat. [2]
Fracis, Times and Company
The Anglo-Parsi firm of Fracis, Times and Company
(apparently headquartered, at least for some time, in London
at 27 Leadenhall Street [3]) opened its first office in the
Gulf in 1887 at Bushire. In 1891 one of the partners of the
firm moved to Bushirei presumably to oversee the business.
Additional offices opened at Bahrein in 1895 and Muscat in
1896. For reasons not given by Lorimer, but which were
probably related to increased controls by the British, the
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English partner sold his interest in the company by 1896.
The arms trade proved profitable for the firm, and Lorimer
notes that by "the middle of 1897" they had made profits of
"not less than £40,000." [4]
During the later 1890s and the early years of this
century, a number of the firm's weapons were captured on the
Northwest Frontier of India by British troops and
officials.

The weapons were identified by various stamped

marks, ranging from the letters "F.T.C." and a double-headed
eagle "the device of Messrs. Fracis, Times and Company" to
the mark on a captured revolver of "Made for Fracis, Times
and Company, London." [5]
Because Fracis, Times and Company was owned by British
subjects, the firm was easily brought under control.

In

1897-89 they filed suits against the commander of H.M.S.
LAPWING because of his capture of the BALUCHISTAN and
against the Persian Gulf Resident, Lt. Col. Meade, over the
seizure of arms in Bahrain and Bushire. By 1901 they had
lost both cases, and been "reduced to bankruptcy."

Both

Conservative and Liberal Governments refused to indemnify
the firm's London underwriters for any of the loss.

[6]
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The Firm of M. Goguyer
The exact name of Goguyer's firm is not given by
Lorimer. He opened his Muscat office in March, 1899, and
soon prospered.

[7] By the 1904-1905 period, M. Goguyer

"appeared to transact most of his business" between Muscat
and Kuwait, with the bulk of the arms shipped on that route
reaching the Al Saud. [8] He appears to have maintained a
complex and sophisticated organization in the Gulf, with one
agent - Haji Abdullah Thahaba - reported by the British as
stationed at Kuwait. Goguyer may have used agents to monitor
the market so that he could establish his price for arms at
Muscat. [9]
M. Goguyer, a former French diplomat in Tunisia, spoke
Arabic. While in Muscat he wrote anti-British articles for
the Paris paper "Depeche Coloniale." In his arms dealings,
Goguyer "was backed by French newspapers and some
influential politicians of the Colonial Party in Paris." The
firm's activities seem to have continued until 1914 and the
Anglo-French settlement at Muscat. [10]
Goguyer was heavily engaged in the trade with
Afghanistan, and Lorimer reports that in 1907 there were
some 100 Afghans in Muscat, "more than half of whom appeared
to be living there at the expense of M. Goguyer." [11]
According to British diplomats at the 1908 Brussels Arms
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Conference, Goguyer carried on a very high proportion of the
entire Muscat trade: in 1908, French traders were
responsible for 49% of the arms trade at Muscat, and of that
49%, Goguyer was responsible for 60%. [12] Goguyer died late
in 1909, and the business was passed to his sons.

His total

stock was estimated in 1909 at some 100,000 weapons of
various types and 10,000,000 rounds of ammunition.

Goguyer

had started with "very slender resources", and in the ten
years he operated managed to accumulate "a considerable
fortune (reputed to be £40,000) at the time of his death."
[13]

By February, 1914, when the British paid the Goguyer
firm compensation for the loss of its stocks and future
profit after the establishment of the Muscat arms warehouse,
the company was sill being run by his sons.

[14] British

reports of Goguyer's activities carry a strong flavor of
Francophobia, and while his firm's trade was clearly
important, the British may have inflated its importance
relative to British trade.
Baijeot and Company
The French firm of Baijeot and Company, operating out
of Djibouti, opened an office at Muscat in 1905. [15]
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The Firm of Dieu
The French firm of Dieu was active in the arms trade
at Muscat. Dieu was paid compensation for the loss of its
property and future profit in 1914 after the establishment
of the bonded warehouse by the Sultan. [16]
Keverkoff and Company
The Russian firm of Keverkoff and Company, with its
headquarters in Odessa, opened an office in Muscat in 1903
for the shipment of arms.

[17]

TRADERS ACTIVE ON THE PERSIAN COAST
A. and T.J. Malcolm and Company
The company A. and T.J. Malcom, a "Persian Armenian
firm under British protection," first imported arms through
Bushire in 1884. [18] In November, 1900, the firm was still
active at Bushire, when some 380 Martini-Henries and 183,000
cartridges were seized from them.

[19]

Belgian Firms
In 1900, an un-named Belgian firm was shipping about
5,000 rifles a year into Bushire, for delivery to an
Armenian arms dealer.

[20] Based upon customs records,

there appears to have been considerable additional Belgian
trade at Muscat between 1906-07 and 1913-14. Details have
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not been available.

[21]

German Firms
Muscat customs records show German activity there
between 1907-08 and 1912-13. Details have not been
available.

[22]
FRENCH FIRMS AT DJIBOUTI AND OBOCK

In 1881 the French trading company, the Compagnie
Franco-Ethiopienne, set up a coaling station at Obock. Three
other French firms soon followed: the Societe Francais
d'Obock and the Factoreries

Francaise~

in 1882, and the

Compagnie Mesnier in 1883. Because of the geographical
limits of Obock, France moved her main base across the Gulf
to Djibouti in 1888. [23] Between them, the two ports were
vital to the arms trade, with Djibouti rapidly becoming the
major transshipment point for arms imported from Europe.
FIRMS OPERATING FROM ZANZIBAR
In 1893, the British consul at Zanzibar reported that
in addition to the Sultan of Zanzibar himself, a number of
German firms were engaged in shipping arms to Muscat. Two
mentioned are O'Swald and Company, and Hansing and Company.
The total volume is given at some 1,000 rifles a month.

[24]
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NATIVE TRADERS IN THE GULF
ACTIVE AT MUSCAT
Ali Musa Khan
A Baluchi arms trader, Ali Musa Khan, is mentioned by
Phillips as being active at Muscat in the l890s, and is
described as being "notorious." [25] Following the opening
of the bonded arms warehouse at Muscat in 1911, and the
associated controls on the arms trade, Ali Musa Khan was
banished from Muscat for a period of five year.

[26] His

activity is discussed in detail by Austin. [27]
Islam Khan
Lt. Col. C.C.R. Murphy, then naval and military
intelligence officer for the Gulf, was sent by Percy Cox
(following the Oman rebellion of 1913) to Galag on the
Mekran Coast of Persia to talk with Islam Khan, a "gun
running chief" of the area.

Islam Khan's camp was

surrounded by guards armed with rifles.

Islam Kahn:

gave assurances of his friendship toward the
British Raj, of his future good behaviour, and all
the rest of it, in the most approved style.
However, the interview did achieve certain results
and passed off successfully. [28]
Murphy does not give specifics of the talk, or of Islam
Khan's connections with Muscat.
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Traders Reported at Kuwait
A February, 1905, dispatch from Captain Knox at Kuwait
mentioned five men as the "principal" arms dealers at
Kuwait: "Haji Mohammed Ali, Marafi, of Persian extraction"J
Mohammed Taqui, "also Persian"; Mohammed Jaueyfi; Mubarak
Sayer; and Goguyer's agent, Haji Abdullah Thahaba. [29]
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APPENDIX B
THE DEMAND FOR ARMS IN ARABIA: ARMIES AND POPULATIONS
THE GENERAL POPULATION
The size of the Arabian population and of the various
armies in Arabia provide a rough measure of the demand for
modern arms in the peninsula. Overall estimates of the
Arabian population are uncertain.

Issawi prints a World War

I British Admiralty estimate:
The population of Arabia cannot be estimated
with any approach to accuracy. It is usually
guessed to be from five to eight millions. The
lower of these figures is probably nearest to the
truth. If we allow two and a half millions of
settled and nomadic to the whole Red Sea slope
from Midian to Yemen (the last-named, with Asir,
holding two-thirds of the total): one and a half
to the southern districts and the gulf littoral,
inclusive of Hadramaut (Oman alone has about half
a million): half a million to all the Central
settled districts together: and one million
Central nomads, we are probably over the mark.
[1]
Issawi immediately suggests that the five to eight
million British estimate be compared with one from the
Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition, which gives a total
population not over ten million.

[2] In any case, even the

lower population estimates would have been sufficient to
support the number of fighters suggested below.
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ARMIES
The Army of the Al Saud
Some months after the Saudi defeat of Ibn Rashid at
Dilam in 1902, near the end of the 1902-03 campaign season
Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait asked for Saudi help against a
large Rashidi raiding force.

Abdul Aziz "no doubt

influenced by the urgent need of replenishing his
ammunition" after the earlier fighting appeared near Kuwait
town with a force Philby reports may have approached 10,000
of his own troops.

He was joined by a Kuwaiti army of

4,000, thus providing "an impressive demonstration of force
in the eastern desert."
not press an attack.

The Al Rashid and their allies did

[3]

When Abdul Aziz later attacked and captured the towns
of Kassim, Buraida, and Anaiza in April, 1904, the British
Consul at Jeddah reported that he used a "strong following
of more than 5,000 men •••• " Following the capture of
Anaiza, which did not resist strongly, Abdul Aziz took the
title of Emir of Nejd. [4]
Estimates of the strength of desert armies varied
rather widely.

In August of the same year, the British

Resident at Kuwait, Major Knox, sent Percy Cox a copy of a
report given him by Sheikh Mubarak on the Saudi army then
operating against the Al Rashid. Mubarak reported a Saudi
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force "said to be 10,500 infantry strong, with 1,800
horse."

Knox did not believe the figures, and commented "It

will probably be found advisable to divide the numbers given
for Bin Saood's forces by ten to arrive at a just
appreciation of his fighting strength."

[5] Even if

Mubarak's figures are high, Knox's cut to 1,500 infantry and
18 cavalry is absurd, and not consistent with other
estimates.
The Army of the Al Rashid.
During the height of Sammar power under Muhammad
ibn-Rashid, who ruled in Hail from 1869-97, the Emir
maintained a large bodyguard under his direct control.

This

force, described by Musil, appears to have served as the
core of the Rashidi army as well.
The bodyguard of the prince was formed by about
four hundred slaves, who dwelt in groups of twenty
each and were supported by the prince. Besides
these he had at his disposal about as many young
volunteers, called, together with the slaves,
ragagil as-sjuh (men of the head chief), all of
whom he had to arm and pay.
[6]
Writing about the general period of 1914-15, Musil
described the military organization of the Sammar tribe led
by the Al Rashid as they entered the final years of their
fight against the al Saud. He first noted that the monetary
standard, the Maria Theresa dollar - called locally the
"rejal abu suse," or the rial showing a person with short
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hair - had dropped in value in the territory of the Al
Rashid. Measured against the Ottoman megidijje (worth about
90 cents U.S.) the Maria Teresa had moved from one and a
half to one to two to one.
the old value still held.

In the territory of the Al Saud
Musil then discussed the tax and

military situation.
The Sammar paid their tribute to Eben Rasid in
rejal abu suse, one rejal for every five camels.
This tax, called zeka, was not paid by the
chiefs. As a rule, out of every clan of any
importance forty to eighty men were exempted from
the tax. These were men who, at the order of Eben
Rasid, took active part in his military
campaigns. Although he gave them arms,
ammunition, and riding camels, they received no
pay, getting a share of the spoils instead. Each
chief was obliged to appear before Eben Rasid
every month or two (tasjir). Eben Rasid relied
mainly on his mercenary troops, his slaves, and
his settlers. Whenever he proclaimed a gihad
(religious war) against Eben Saud, he had up to
five hundred white tents (hejme) in which his men,
both cavalry and infantry, lived; but when he made
a raid on the Bedouins, the number of white tents
amounted to only about one hundred. On such
occasions he was accompanied by many Arabs mounted
on camels (gejs), for whom tents were never
taken. Eben Rasid was obliged to support the
mercenaries. The settlers did not pay the zeka in
money but contributed a part of their crops
instead, and these contributions in kind were
stored away in magazines (bejt aI-mal) and were
issued again to the slaves and mercenaries.
Usually twenty men messed together.
[7]
Taking Musil's figure of twenty men to a mess to mean
twenty to a tent, a figure supported by the organization of
the earlier force of bodyguards, this would give him a
"mercenary" army of some 10,000 men that could have been
supplemented by additional tribal forces.

The force used on
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a standard raid would have been 2,000 plus other tribal
forces.

This estimate is confirmed by a statement from Emir

al-Nuri of the Ruwala. As discussed in Chapter VII, when
considering a large-scale attack· on the Sammar led by
ibn-Rashid, al-Nuri estimated the possible enemy strength at
between 10,000 and 15,000, most armed with modern rifles.
[8] These figures appear much too high, however, represent
the forces available to the Al Rashid at this late date.
In his appendix on the Al Rashid, Musil states that
when Saud al- Rashid proclaimed a jihad against the Al Saud
in 1914, he was only able to muster 1,000 townsmen and 2,000
bedouin, all armed with new Mausers. [9] These figures
reflect the failure of the minister, Saud al-Subhan, to hold
the Rashidi forces together.
The figures for the full muster of the Al Rashid army
are, however, consistent with the population estimate given
by Lorimer, writing in about 1906-07. He estimated that the
region of Jabal Sammar - under the titular authority of the
Al Rashid - had a total settled population of 28,000 and a
bedouin population of 27,000. [10] This population of 55,000
should have been able to provide a military force of 10,000,
but it is most unlikely that this figure represented the
paid troops of the Al Rashid. The estimated strength of
10,000-15,000 implied by Musil and supported by the
expectations of al-Nuri, was probably the full muster of the

239
Sammar and their allies when they had been united under
Muhammad ibn-Rashid.

As the force put in the field by a

large alliance, the numbers would be in the same range as
the 14,000 man figure given by Philby for the combined
Saudi-Kuwaiti army of 1902-03, discussed earlier.
The Army of Kuwait.
Estimates of Kuwaiti forces varied widely.

The

British "News-Agent" at Kuwait provided an estimate of
Sheikh Mubarak's forces in November, 1900 that the Gulf
Resident, Lieutenant Colonel Kemball, believed to be
"exaggerated, though I have no reason to doubt that he can
put a considerable body of men into the field."

The Agent

reported that the Sheikh was prepared for war against the Al
Rashid, and had a force of "15,000 cavalry and 40,000
camels," while Sheikh Sadun of the Muntafiq who was allied
to Mubarak, had "5,000 cavalry and 20,000 camels.

Ibn

Rashid is said to have had only some "2,000 cavalry and
10,000 camels."

[11]

Several months later, in February, 1901, Commander
Phillipps of H.M.S. SPHINX forwarded the latest military
estimates of the British "Secret Agent at Koweit, Haji
Ali-bin Ghulum Reza" to Kemball. This report lists the
following tribes and approximate number of men from each
with Mubarak: Matier

= 4,000;

Owazen

= 10,000;

Rashaidah

=
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7,000: Ajman

= 9,000:

Adwaiesh

= 5,000:

Beni Hajar

= 3,000:

Beni Khaled = 6,000: Sheikh Sadoun = 10,000 for a total of
the allied forces of 54,000. To this are added Mubarak's own
forces of 10,000 to give him a total army of 64,000. Ibn
Rashid is estimated to have 10,000 men with him.

[12] A

month later, March 19, 1901, the "News Agent" reported from
Kuwait that Mubarak, now nearing Nejd, had an army of "about
70,000." At the same time, a garrison of about 4,000 had
been left to protect Kuwait. [13] These figures are absurdly
high.
A more accurate report was later given by Lt.-Col.
Kemball after Mubarak's defeat by Abdul Aziz ibn Rashid.
Kemball lists the forces of the parties before the battle at
some 5,000 for Mubarak, not counting his allies, and 7,000
for the Al Rashid. Mubarak's casualties were reported to be
heavy, with 2,000 "killed in action or subsequently perished
in the desert. II

[14]
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